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This dissertation explores the rise of social economy in South Korea, in order to understand the 
transformations of sociality, ethicality, and subjectivity in the contemporary capitalism. In the 
wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, we have witnessed “the return of the social” through 
introduction of various socio-economic projects—such as social economy, social innovation, and 
social entrepreneurship—that aim to graft morality and sociality onto the market. In the last 
decade, South Korea’s social economy sector has also grown quickly with the active support and 
promotion by the government, representing a new model of development as well as a feasible 
solution to reproduction crisis. This rapid growth has generated public and academic debates 
over whether the returned “socials” are the seeds of post-neoliberalism or just an ideological 
cloak for the expansion of market rationality. Based on ethnographic research on the social 
economy sector in Seoul, this dissertation focuses on an often-neglected question in these 
debates: what forms of the social imaginary, knowledge, subjectivity, and ethicality have 
emerged in the new “socials” as a result of the imbrication of moral aspirations with the 
neoliberal human condition?  
  
To address the question, I first demonstrate how contemporary neoliberalism presupposes 
a new form of homo œconomicus, human capital, who is expected to manage all the aspects of 
life within a single value frame, acting as a “portfolio manager.” As the new subjectivity 
incorporates non-economic elements—including social logics and moral orientations—as assets 
that can be translated into economic value, the responsibilities for society and the construction of 
social bonds are directly devolved on the new economic subjects. This dissertation goes on to 
show how the financial logic of human capital has conditioned and created a new sociality and 
ethicality. In examining the various fields from community development through the social care 
market to fair trade activism, I trace how community, care, affective labor, and ethical practices 
have been intermingled and articulated with the new form of economic rationality and have 
contributed to the economization of sociality and ethicality. Notions such as “enterprization of 
community,” “projective ethicality,” “affective labor (hwaldong),” and “marketized gift-
exchange” are discussed to flesh out the transformation and articulation more clearly. Finally, 
this thesis conceptualizes the dynamics of the new subjectivity, ethicality, and social imaginary in 
terms of “neosocial government,” in which the crisis of the neoliberal human capital regime is 
managed and addressed through social ties based on care, affective labor, and gift. In unveiling 
how the new governing rationality prioritizes and reifies intimate social bonds over political 
engagement and structural transformation, this dissertation not only illuminates the depoliticized 
aspects of the newly returned socials but also highlights the necessity of reinventing a universal 
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 “LET THEM TASTE A FISH” 
 
“Today, global capitalism is faced with a crisis again. Growing fiscal deficits and 
increasing unemployment rates in the developed countries are weakening our trust in the 
market system and cast doubt over market fundamentalism.... Against this backdrop, 
South Korea finds the alternative in “inclusive development” [p'oyongjŏk sŏngjang] that 
attempts to share the benefits of growth with all members of society by reconciling 
economic development and social welfare. Although, in the past, economic growth by 
itself could guarantee people a “good life,” this is not the case anymore. For the new 
inclusive development, the role of society thus needs to be emphasized to undergird the 
market and the state. In addition, individual citizens need to embody “social 
entrepreneurship” that discovers problems in every corner of society and solve them 
through an empathetic attitude and innovative ideas…. Post-crisis capitalism has to be 
“warm capitalism” [Ttattŭt'an chabonjuŭi] which can be achieved through mutual care, 
creative innovation, and social responsibility.”  
– Lee Myung-Bak, President of South Korea, “The Welcoming Address to the 2012 
Global Korea Conference” 
 
On a February evening in 2014, the Seoul Youth Hub’s co-working space was filled with more 
than one hundred youths attending the spring orientation meeting of the 2014 Youth School. The 
semester-long free training program—which is operated by the Youth Hub and the Seoul 
Metropolitan Government—aims to educate “young social innovators” who are interested in 
“social activities [hwaldong] and problem-solving projects that respond to new social changes.”1 
The spring semester consisted of various introductory and advanced courses that were relevant to 
social economy and social entrepreneurship—to name a few, courses for social space design, 
global innovators networking, alternative urban regeneration, community building, and social 
marketing. After introducing each class’s instructors, Lee Joo-Won, the vice principal of the 
                                                     
1 Youth Hub, 2013 Youth Hub Annual Report, 2014, p. 63.  
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Youth School, began his welcome speech by suggesting a new school motto:  
 
You all perhaps have heard about the saying, “Teach people how to fish, instead of just 
giving them a fish.” It has been the zeitgeist of our society for a long time…. I believe, 
however, teaching and learning a manual about how to fish would kill your creativity and 
innovative ideas by setting one guideline that everyone has to follow. In fact, this 
outmoded way of thinking has excluded those who tried off-the-beaten-track and made 
our society monotonous and authoritarian…. In my opinion, our new slogan should rather 
be “Let people taste a fish.” If people once come to know the taste of fish, they will then 
develop their desire for fish and eventually invent or find their own diverse, innovative 
ways to fish. We, the instructors, are here not to teach how to fish but to help you taste a 
fish….    
 
As James Ferguson points out in his inspiring book Give a Man a Fish (2015), the 
famous mantra, “Give a man a fish, and you feed him for a day. Teach a man to fish, and you 
feed him for a life time,” has been extensively circulated as a “development cliché” for the last 
half of the 20th century (35). In South Korea, whose development model has served as an 
exemplar for many other developing countries, the old refrain has been considered a “national 
catchphrase” that well encapsulates its “developmental ethos.”2 The military junta wielded the 
slogan to criticize the civil government’s foreign aid-dependent economy in the 1950s and 
provide a rationale for its economic growth plans during the 1960s-80s that mainly focused on 
technology, infrastructure, and labor-intensive industrialization.3 The slogan and its implied 
values such as autonomy, diligence, and self-restraint were emphasized to defend the lack of the 
                                                     
2 At odds with Ferguson’s observation that the slogan is often “dubiously attributed as a Chinese proverb” in Africa 
(2015: 35), it is believed in South Korea that the refrain comes from the Jewish Talmud. Whether this is true or 
not, the prevalent belief is interesting in itself, considering the local contexts in which the Jewish people’s tragic 
history has often been analogized with Korea’s national experiences of colonialism and civil war, and their zeal for 
education and economic prosperity have been seen as a promising path for South Korea’s development. As it has 
been believed that Jews have thrived because of certain “cultural” and “moral” values, the abbreviated version of 
the Talmud has even become arguably “the second bestseller in South Korea behind the Bible” since the 1970s. 
See “How the Talmud Became a Bestseller in South Korea,” The New Yorker (June 23, 2015). 
3 For a general introduction to the history of South Korea’s economic growth and its crisis, see Chang and Shin 
(2003) and Jeong (1997). 
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state’s social welfare policies and to justify the regime’s disciplinary, militaristic control over the 
fields of education and labor as “the engine of economic growth” (Moon, 2005; Nam, 2009). 
Although there is no general agreement about the extent to which the government’s development 
policies actually contributed to the economic growth, the South Korean economy recorded an 
unprecedented high rate of growth during the same period.4   
It is since the 1990s that the old paradigm represented by the slogan “Teach a man to 
fish” has increasingly become the target of criticism.5 With democratization in the 1990s, the 
state-centered, top-down model of development began to be seen as a negative remnant of 
authoritarian militarism. Furthermore, the 1997 Asian financial crisis—widely accepted as the 
death bell of the “East Asian development model”6—intensified the governmental effort to find 
an alternative development model beyond the previous labor-driven industrial model. As the 
“progressive” voices that criticized the authoritarian state have confusingly intermingled with 
post-developmental and neoliberal agendas that aimed to reduce the state’s roles (to be discussed 
in Chapter 1), “(civil) society” and social organizations have emerged not only as a political 
bulwark against the state but also as a new locus and agency for economic development (Jun 
                                                     
4 According to Chang Ha Joon (2008), between the 1960s and 1980s South Korea’s per capita income grew more 
than 14 times in terms of purchasing power. It took the U.K. over two centuries and the U.S. around one and half 
centuries to achieve the same result.  
5 This is not unrelated to the general collapse of confidence in development. As pointed out by development 
researchers, economic development as a “modernization” project has increasingly lost its persuasiveness since the 
turn of the century (Escobar 2012; Ferguson 1999; Hart 2001; Rudnyckyj 2010; cf. Latham 2011). Ferguson states, 
“Something has happened in recent years to the taken-for-granted faith in development as a universal prescription 
for poverty and inequality. For Africa, at least, as for some other parts of the world, there is a real break with the 
certainties and expectations that made a development era possible” (1999: 247). Of course, it seems to be risky to 
simply equate the increasing doubts with “the end of development” (Rahnema and Bawtree, 1997; Sachs, 1992). 
By exploring a new model for development projects in South Korea, this thesis will show that the suspicion only 
signifies the end or crisis of a certain type of development program.  
6 For discussions about the “East Asian development model” that features the strong developmental state, labor-
intensive heavy industrialization, high dependence on the export market, and massive investment in technology 
and education, see Chang and Grabel (2004), Johnson (1982), and Wade (1996). For an argument that the 




2011; Kim 2016; Song 2009). Youth School’s new motto “Let people taste a fish” (with 
President Lee’s advocacy of “inclusive growth” and “warm capitalism”) reflects the latest 
version of the recent civil and governmental efforts to formulate more democratic, participatory, 
and society-based visions for development.7 In its compact form, the refrain shows how the new 
developmental ethos diverges from the old “materialistic,” “labor-intensive,” and “authoritarian” 
paradigm of “teaching a man to fish.” A brief comparison of these slogans and their different 
developmental imaginaries, therefore, seems to be a good entry point for this dissertation—
which explores new forms of subjectivity, sociality, and ethicality in the new governmental-
development program.  
What stands out first and foremost in the comparison is the changing role of the state as 
the primary agent of development. No matter if the slogan is to “give a fish” or “teach to fish,” 
the sayings imply that it is the state (or equivalent governmental organizations) that should 
provide temporary aid or long-term education. The new motto “Let people taste a fish,” in 
contrast, limits the role of the state to “let”: the state is no longer the central director that 
oversees the whole process and exclusively shoulders the responsibility for economic 
development. As seen in Chapter 2, instead of seeking centralized regulation and planning, the 
state now acts more as an “incubator of development” that facilitates inclusive and flexible 
governance with non-state entities—NGOs, voluntary organizations, and private corporations—
and promotes their self-governing activities (Rudnyckyj and Schwittay 2014: 3). The direct 
responsibility for development is thus transferred from the state to “people who once come to 
                                                     
7 Besides local contexts, these efforts can also be understood as a variation of the “social” or “Post-Washington 
consensus” shift in international development discourse since the late 1990s (Fine, 2004; Harriss, 2002; Hart, 
2001). A World Bank’s official report defines “social development” as follows: “With the goal of empowering 
poor and marginalized women and men, social development is a process of transforming institutions for greater 
inclusion, cohesion and accountability.” World Bank Groups, “Empowering People by Transforming Institutions: 
Social Development in World Bank Operations,” 2005, p. vi.   
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know the taste of fish,” that is, active and participatory citizens who are empowered to pursue 
their inner desires and aspirations (Elyachar, 2005; Li, 2007; O’Neill, 2010; Ong, 2006; 
Rudnyckyj, 2010).  
The recast of the state’s role is accompanied by a sea-change in citizen-subjectivity. 
Citizens are not imagined either as dependent subjects who passively receive a fish or as 
malleable, disciplinable subjects who can be taught how to harness the skill of fishing. The ideal 
citizen-subject will rather actively commit to his or her aspirations and make social innovations 
in the process of seeking them. In fact, it has been repeatedly pointed out that contemporary 
neoliberalism is contingent upon the production of self-responsible and self-entrepreneurial 
subjects rather than dependent and docile citizens (Bröckling, 2016; Foucault, 2008; Lessenich, 
2011; Read, 2009): as Michel Foucault famously remarks, “The stake in all neoliberal analyses is 
the replacement of homo œconomicus as partner of exchange with a homo œconomicus as 
entrepreneur of himself, being for himself his own capital, being for himself his own producer, 
being for himself the source of [his] earnings” (2010: 226). Two points in the manifestation of 
the active, self-entrepreneurial citizen-subject, however, need to be more highlighted in relation 
to our discussion: the importance of non-rational, affective elements and the establishment of a 
new relation between subject, knowledge, and experts in the subject’s formation. 
First, as seen in the emphasis on “taste” and “desire” in the new development slogan and 
in President Lee’s advocacy of “empathetic attitude,” “creativity,” and “warm” capitalism, the 
formation of active, participatory citizen-subjects often depends on their non-rational, affective, 
and even spiritual motivations (O’Neill, 2010; Rudnyckyj, 2010).8 If the prior development 
                                                     
8 In fact, emotion, passion, and non-rational qualities have been considered important elements to explain economic 
phenomena since the beginning of capitalism (Haskell 1985; Hirschman 1977; cf. Smith 1966; Weber 2002). 
Contemporary capitalism, however, is characterized by actively mobilizing and utilizing the non-rational elements 
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scheme has focused on basic, material needs and the production of self-interested, calculating 
subjects (who can temporarily sacrifice immediate pleasure for the sake of delayed but greater 
satisfaction, from learning how to fish), the new development subjects are not necessarily 
identified as rational, profit-maximizing beings (Feher, 2009; Feiner, 1999; Mcdonough, 2015).9 
These entrepreneurial human capitals are rather assumed to have irrational preferences, 
emotional predilections, moral orientations, and even “animal spirits” that willingly take risks 
and undergo uncertainties to turn them into opportunities (Dardot and Laval, 2013; Davies, 2014, 
2015).10 As Joo-Won emphasizes, they invent their own “innovative” ways, resisting the fear of 
failure rather than following a manual’s instructions. As a result, “self-esteem” and “resilience” 
become more important attributes rather than self-restraint and work discipline (Cruikshank, 
1999; Evans and Reid, 2014).  
Moreover, the formation of innovative, entrepreneurial citizen-subjects involves a 
specific relation between subject, knowledge, and expert. As repeatedly pointed out by critical 
development studies, the modern development project has prioritized standard, technical 
                                                     
not merely as external factors but as essential economic dimension that should be controlled and governed through 
various governmental techniques (Berardi, 2009; Boris and Parrenas, 2010; Davies, 2015; Illouz, 2007).  
9 Amartya Sen would be the most relevant theorist who prioritizes the non-calculative, social, and moral dimensions 
in the recent development discourse. Sen re-defines development as “a process of expanding the real freedoms” 
and “human capabilities” that cannot be reduced to material prosperity (2000:3). It seems obvious that Sen’s 
redefinition is contingent upon entrepreneurial subjects who continuously seek to improve their various 
capabilities beyond economic income. Sen admits the direct relevance between the theory of human capital and his 
notion of “human capability.” In arguing that human capability should incorporate the perspective of human 
capital, he notes, “The broadening that is needed is additional and inclusive, rather than, in any sense, an 
alternative to the ‘human capital’ perspective” (Sen, 2000: 296, Sen’s italics). Although this dissertation does not 
directly engage with Sen’s notion of development, the implications of his statement that the development of 
human capability should incorporate the logic of human capital will be critically examined throughout the thesis. 
For a general critique of Sen’s idea of development, see Chandler (2013). Chandler argues that Sen’s ideas of 
“development as freedom” contributes to de-politicizing and absolutizing development by transforming its 
measure from external focus to internal, individual choice-making.  
10 “Animal spirits” is a Keynesian term to indicate the influence of “spontaneous optimism rather than mathematical 
expectations” in making economic choices (Keynes 1936: 161). Behavioral economists Akerlof and Schiller link 
the animal spirits to “entrepreneurship” that fearlessly takes “ambiguity or uncertainty” (2009: 32) and expand the 
notion to describe all the “non-rational” motivations such as preference, emotion, and belief.  
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knowledge (for example, “how to fish”) over local context and indigenous practices, thus relying 
on external expert knowledge to “enlighten” and empower locals (e.g., Scott 1998). The slogan 
“Let people taste a fish,” in contrast, exhibits a firm belief in individuals’ local knowledge and 
practical skills to pursue their own aspirations without immediate help from external experts. 
The subjects are rather called on to become “the experts” in their specific situations and deploy 
their know-how to recreate and navigate the circumstances. In addition, this emphasis on 
immanent, specific, and contextual knowledge over a transcendent and homogenous prescription, 
brings about what Tania Li (2007, 2010) calls an “ethnographic turn” in the production of 
development knowledge. As I discuss in detail in Chapter 2, in counterpoint to the top-down 
application of expert knowledge, the new paradigm requires the bottom-up construction of 
knowledge that involves ethnographic, detailed investigations of various subjective experiences 
and contexts; the universal “liberal presumption of common calculative capacity,” as William 
Davies points out, is now complemented or even “replaced with a cultural anthropology” of 
diverse habits, propensities, and tastes (2014: 161). As a result, the active citizens (and their local 
communities) are given the primary authority to investigate their various inner “resources” and 
seek desired improvements. The only thing that governments need to do, as incubators and 
facilitators of development, is to “nudge” citizens to use their knowledge to diagnose and 
ameliorate the obstructive predicaments.11 It becomes clear at this point what Joo-Won means by 
saying “We are here not to teach how to fish but help you taste a fish”: the expert’s role is 
limited to stimulating the innovative, entrepreneurial spirits who are empowered as the new 
                                                     
11 The notion of “nudge” became famous through Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein’s mega-bestselling book Nudge 
(2008). Based on behavioral economics, they present various ways to utilize our non-rational motivations for 
better individual decision-making. In a subsequent book Why Nudge? (2014), Sunstein goes further to suggest “the 
politics of libertarian paternalism” that aims to completely transform all the government policies by considering 
people’s irrational elements so that the government can “nudge” them effectively. For a discussion of nudge as a 
neoliberal governmental technique, see Davies (2015: Ch. 3) and McMahon (2015). 
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agents of development.  
The new development paradigm driven by entrepreneurial subjects, however, seems to 
raise difficult predicaments from the governmental perspective. Primarily, how can this 
centrifugal and “effervescent citizen” be properly governed and channeled for a collective 
development project (Ong, 2006)? If labor and education have worked in the old 
developmentalism for harmonizing individual self-interest pursuits with national development, 
how can entrepreneurial aspirations for self-improvement be aligned with the shared purpose of 
development? Moreover, if, as seen in Joo-Won’s remarks, unilateral education and discipline 
only “kill” the creativity of the new entrepreneurial subjects, what kinds of tactics and strategies 
are deployable to govern them? Once again, in discussing the theory of entrepreneurial human 
capital, Foucault argues that the new figure of homo œconomicus can only be governed by 
“intervening on an environment in which he is able to play” (2008: 216). The question then 
would be: How can a governmental space be constructed in which citizens’ free pursuit of 
aspirations is guaranteed but coordinated so that the entrepreneurial spirit is not harmed?12 These 
related questions reveal the lingering necessity of a collective, social plane in governing human 
capital where the game of “omnes et singluatum (all and each)” can be played to synchronize 
individual desires with a general will (cf. Foucault 2001; Procacci 1987). As I will show 
throughout this thesis, it is here that the problematic of “the social” has returned and 
intermingled with the new scheme of government and development—in the forms of social 
                                                     
12 This question is consonant with Akerlof and Schiller’s argument that “the world of animal spirits gives the 
government an opportunity to step in. Its role is to set the conditions in which our animal spirits can be harnessed 
creatively to serve the greater good. Government must set the rules of the game.” (2009: 214). In fact, the 
necessity of an “environment” through which to promote and govern human capital’s non-calculative aspirations 
and creativity is also found Joo-Won’s welcome speech. He ended the speech with the importance of a favorable 
“ecosystem” [saengt'aegye] for social innovation that enables various experiments without fear of failure: 
“Innovative ideas hit you when you are playing and experimenting. We will try our best to provide you the best 
‘ecosystem’ in which you can play and experiment free from all anxiety.” The emphasis on favorable “ecosystem” 
is commonly found in social economy discourses. I touch upon this issue in Chapter 4.  
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development, social entrepreneurship, social innovation, and the social economy. 
In this sense, it is crucial not to confuse the new paradigm with a simple revision or 
return of the old “give a fish” aid-dependent or gift-oriented model. For example, in contrasting 
the refrains of “Give a man a fish” and “Teach a man to fish,” Ferguson (2015) relates each 
motto respectively to the politics of distribution and the paradigm of production: whereas the 
“teach to fish” slogan reflects the old “productionist premise” that development is fundamentally 
a problem of production and can be solved by “bringing more people into productive labor” (36), 
“give a fish” represents a distributive radical politics whose principle can be encapsulated in the 
premise that “before a man can produce, he must be nursed—that is, the receipt of unconditional 
and unlearned distribution and care must always precede any productive labor” (45). In 
contemporary capitalism in which “wage labor no longer has any real prospect of being 
universalized”, Ferguson argues that the “Give a man a fish” refrain should be re-considered as 
an emerging alternative social paradigm that is replacing the labor-productionist development 
paradigm (2015: 51).13 By prioritizing care, sharing, and social reproduction, the non-labor-
based distributive model offers a foundation for a new sort of “social” that differs from the old 
welfarist/developmental societies that had relied upon “the male wage laborer, the nuclear 
family, and the interventionist, social-engineering state” (Ibid.: 82). Although his trenchant 
critiques of productionism and its premises are valid and persuasive, his advocacy of distributive 
politics over production sounds unexpectedly consonant with President Lee’s and Joo-Won’s 
voices—ones that problematize the past developmentalism as materialist and productionist and 
                                                     
13 For a useful theoretical discussion of the crisis of work, see Weeks (2011). As Weeks and Ferguson commonly 
point out, the significant share of the recent “work crisis” discourses consist of the crisis of male industrial 
employment and its breadwinner model. Women’s reproductive and caring labor that was ignored by the 
productionist standpoint, instead, is being increasingly commoditized and drawn into the labor market. See 
Chapter 3 in this volume. 
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locate the antidote in inclusive development and warm capitalism, which also accentuates 
“mutual care,” “sharing,” and “social responsibility.” As I will show in the later chapters, such 
convergence, either directly or inadvertently, is not exceptional: the recent expansion of “the 
socials” has been often described and interpreted in terms of the return of a gift-oriented, human-
centered, caring distribution economy—not only in popular and governmental discourses but 
also in many scholarly works (e.g., Hart, Laville, and Cattani 2010; Karatani 2003; Standing 
2011).  
The problem lies in that the attempts to frame the new socials in light of the return to 
“give a fish” and its distributionist paradigm spotlight only half the story. On the surface, the 
“Let them taste a fish” refrain appears to be similar to “Give them a fish”—at the very least, you 
should give a fish to let them taste it. The similarity ends there, however. As will be discussed 
later, in the new social paradigm, the returned socials and their spirits of care and gift are 
strongly articulated and imbricated with the production of entrepreneurial subjects and a new 
form of economic rationality. It can even be said that the passionate belief in entrepreneurialism 
and innovative subjects constitutes the condition of possibility for the return of gift-spirit and 
distribution politics.14 In other words, people would be given or shared a fish only on condition 
that they can and will invent their “innovative” ways to obtain more fish. Thus, the politics of 
inclusion and exclusion, as discussed throughout this thesis, still operate only with different 
boundaries and dynamics from the labor-based production politics. What needs more attention, 
therefore, is an examination of how the rise of care, sharing, and distribution create hybrid 
                                                     
14 The basic income grant and cash transfer (to which Ferguson’s discussion is directly targeted) could be a 
representative example. They can be viewed as an innovative program of sharing and a “creative and progressive 
form of redistribution” (Bangstad, Erikse, Comaroff, and Comaroff 2012: 131-2). At the same time, however, the 
experiments not only rely on the belief in people’s self-managerial capabilities but also can play as a platform for 
the expansion and intensification of entrepreneurship and market rationality. For research that illuminates such 
ambivalence through an ethnography of cash transfer policies in the Philippines, see Seki (2015).  
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practices and spaces where “the socials” become instrumental to the production and expansion of 
entrepreneurial human capital and vice versa.     
This thesis is an attempt to investigate the new forms of subjectivity, ethicality, and 
sociality found in the hybrid practices and spaces, by exploring the recent formation of South 
Korea’s social economy. The social economy sector in Korea has emerged rapidly since the late 
2000s, when the government introduced a series of legal acts for social enterprise, cooperative, 
and community organizations and stipulated the promotion of the social economy as the state’s 
responsibility. At first glance, the sector—which comprises social enterprises, social ventures, 
co-ops, and social care organizations—appears to be a salient deviation from the standard 
narrative that explains contemporary Korean society’s transition from state-centered 
developmentalism to unbridled market fundamentalism. This study, instead, views the social 
economy sector as an exemplary space where anti-neoliberal solidaristic dreams meet with the 
governmental necessity to manage the perennial crisis of capitalism in the face of the various 
socio-economic conditions such as democratization, neoliberal financialization, and the decline 
of industrial development and its laborism. This hybrid space, which is enjoying widespread and 
enthusiastic support across the political spectrum, serves as a window through which to examine 
the ideological frontline where the new governmental-developmental dispositifs are being 
effectively formulated in the contemporary South Korean society that has swiftly undergone—
but still been haunted by—developmentalism and neoliberalization. Let us move onto that 









INTRODUCTION: NEW HUMAN CONDITION, NEW SOCIALS 
 
“I suggest that our new Constitution’s First Article should be ‘everyone has to be micro-
entrepreneur.’” –Park Won-Soon, Mayor of Seoul1 
 
“This belief was what lay behind my remarks… about there being ‘no such thing as 
society.’ They never quoted the rest. I went on to say: There are individual men and 
women, and there are families. And no government can do anything except through 
people, and people must look to themselves first. It’s our duty to look after ourselves and 
then to look after our neighbour. My meaning, clear at the time but subsequently distorted 
beyond recognition, was that society was not an abstraction, separate from the men and 
women who composed it, but a living structure of individuals, families, neighbours and 
voluntary associations.” –Margaret Thatcher (1993: 626) 
 
“There is only desire and the social, and nothing else.” –Deleuze and Guattari (2004: 31) 
 
INTO THE FIELD 
 
An Invitation  
One day in the fall of 2013, I was wandering lost in Seoul Innovation Park, holding a printed 
invitation and a rough map meant to guide me to a social entrepreneurship training program 
offered by the Seoul Social Economy Center and the Seoul Metropolitan Government. The letter 
sent me via email began with a quotation that was attributed to a Zapatista militant: “If you have 
come here to help me, you are wasting your time. But if you have come because your liberation 
                                                 
1 “‘Everyone has to be a micro-entrepreneur!’” [국민 모두를 소기업 사장으로], Weekly Sisain no. 70 (Jan. 12, 2009). 
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is bound up with mine, then let us work together.”2 The letter then disclosed the purpose of the 
training: “It is not only you who have discontents and frustrations about this society, and our 
problems are all connected to each other. So let’s gather and discuss how to change this society!” 
After providing basic information about the program, the short invitation ended with the phrase 
“Possibility of the Impossible” from the leftist philosopher Slavoj Žižek—who had visited Seoul 
a couple of weeks prior for “The Idea of Communism Conference.”3 The invitation went on to 
explain the phrase’s meaning: “Even though society appears to be unchangeable, we should push 
the limit and pursue the impossible!”  
Encountering a Zapatista militant’s and a leftist philosopher’s words in an invitation for a 
municipal government-sponsored social entrepreneurship training indeed stunned and bewildered 
me. It reminded me of another experience that I had just before starting my fieldwork research. 
When I visited a local university to meet my friends, I found a poster inside the student center, 
which read “Transform the World!” [Segye-rŭl pyŏnhyŏk-hara!] in big red letters. Because the 
slogan was popular among South Korean labor and student activists in the late 1990s and early 
2000s, I initially thought it was a rather anachronistic agitprop poster put up by surviving 
Marxist groups in the university. As I approached the poster, however, smaller black letters 
under the red ones caught my eye: “With Business!” It turned out that the poster was made by 
the university’s social start-up club to recruit members and potential business partners. In fact, it 
                                                 
2 In fact, the quote is often attributed to an Australian indigenous artist and activist, Lila Watson, from her speech at 
the 1985 United Nations Decade for Women Conference. Since then, numerous activist groups across the world 
have adopted the quote as their slogan. The invitation that I received attributed the words to a female Zapatista 
militant in Mexico. 
3 Žižek describes his experience in Seoul in the book Trouble in Paradise: From the End of History to the End of 
Capitalism (2014). He says, “When I accepted an invitation, my first reaction was: Is it not outright crazy to talk 
about the Idea of Communism in South Korea?” (5) The conference, which was held in a small “alternative space” 
in the affluent Gangnam area in Seoul, attracted more than 1,500 attendants for three days. The number is 
surprising, considering that the academic conference was conducted in English. It was also reported that 
approximately 10,000 people attended Žižek’s public lecture series given before the conference.  
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is well known that contemporary managerial and entrepreneurial discourses often appropriate 
social activism’s counter-cultural and anti-capitalist rhetoric for promoting entrepreneurship and 
innovative projects (Boltanski and Chiapello 2005; Gershon 2016; Guilhot 2006; Heath and 
Potter 2005; Seo 2011). Furthermore, given the fact that a number of former social activists had 
become social entrepreneurs or enthusiastic advocates of social economy, such encounters might 
not be as surprising as they first appeared to be. Considering the local context, however, added 
perplexity to my bewilderment: when I received the invitation via email, the country’s political 
scene was in turmoil, as an incumbent leftist lawmaker, Lee Seok-Ki, was arrested and 
imprisoned for his pro-North Korea and pro-communist stance. The Ministry of Justice and the 
National Intelligence Service accused him of “benefitting the enemy” and threatening national 
security by “instigating a pro-North Korean rebellion.”4 How could I reconcile this stark contrast 
between the radical rhetoric of the government’s entrepreneurship training invitation and the 
news that documents the ongoing brutal legacies of the Cold War and anti-communism? How 
can we understand the blatant juxtaposition of the old socialist slogan “transform the world” and 
its new descriptor “with business”? I could not help but feel lost just as I was physically lost in 
the large and labyrinthine Seoul Innovation Park on my way to the first session of the training 
program.   
 
Seoul Innovation Park 
The Seoul Innovation Park, which consists of 32 buildings, occupies an area of approximately 27 
acres (109,727 square meters) in the Northwestern outskirts of Seoul. The area had served since 
                                                 
4 “South Korean politician accused of plotting pro-North rebellion” The Guardian (Sep. 2, 2013). Lee was sentenced 
to 12 years of prison in February 2014 and his party, the Unified Progressive Party, was disbanded by the 




1962 as headquarter of The National Center for Public Health and Disease Control, which 
included a variety of disease laboratories, public health research centers, and family planning 
organizations. When the Center relocated to a rural province in 2010, various renovation plans 
for the empty space were suggested, including master plans for a commercial business complex 
or a high-rise apartment compound. When Park Won-Soon, a pioneering social economy 
advocate, was elected Mayor of Seoul in 2011, these plans were dropped, and it was decided to 
redevelop the area into a space for social economy and innovation. Since then, in addition to 
housing headquarters for the Seoul Social Economy Center and the Youth Hub, the monotonous 
and rectangular buildings—which reflect the “developmentalist taste” of the 1960s and 70s—
have been gradually occupied by various social enterprises, social ventures, community 
organizations, and social economy research institutes such as the Social Innovation Research Lab 
and the Karl Polanyi Institute.5 
 
 
Figure 1. The Appearance of the Headquarters of Social Innovation Park (photo by author) 
                                                 
5 It is reported that 220 social economy organizations and more than 1,200 “social innovators” are nested in Social 




The fact that the National Center for Public Health and Disease Control, one of the emblematic 
institutions of the past biopolitical-developmental regime, was replaced with a space dedicated to 
social economy and innovation seems an interesting and symbolic confirmation of the recent 
paradigm shift in South Korea’s developmentalism. A mildly contentious encounter that 
occurred when Mayor Park Won-Sun spoke at the official opening ceremony of Seoul 
Innovation Park in 2015 more dramatically illustrates the shift (and the lurking discontents). 
When Park Won-Sun delivered a congratulatory speech before cutting the ribbon, a group of 
hecklers interrupted his talk, shouting, “If you want to make creative social innovation, do it in 
Gangnam, not in this poor district!”6 Because development of the neighborhood around the Park 
had lagged far behind the other districts in the city, some of the residents wanted redevelopment 
efforts such as the introduction of a high-rise apartment complex or an international convention 
center. The confrontation uncovered a frustrated dissatisfaction among some of the district’s 
residents. Without losing his usual calmness, however, the mayor responded: “The development 
so far has only focused on infrastructure and material wealth. It has just kept to construct 
massive and towering buildings and thus destroyed our affectionate neighborhoods. New 
development must be immaterial and spiritual. It can only be achieved through creative, 
innovative ideas and cooperation. I bet this park will bring new development to this region.”  
This statement’s stark portrait of contrast between the old and new development models 
represents the symbolic coordinate where the concrete meanings and practices of “social 
                                                 
6 As described in singer Psy’s global mega-hit song “Gangnam Style,” the Gangnam area (south of the Han River) is 
famous as the most affluent and developed neighborhood in Seoul. In particular, the district is symbolically 
regarded as representing the consumer culture and life style of the relatively young and rich middle class who have 
accumulated their wealth through finance, start-ups, and real estate. Seoul Innovation Park and the Seongbuk 
district, where I mainly conducted my fieldwork research, are geographically located in the Gangbuk area (north 
of the Han River) of Seoul and in contrast to Gangnam, represent a relatively poor and older population. 
6 
 
economy” and “social innovation” are located and articulated in contemporary South Korea. As 
noted in the Prologue, the new development scheme problematizes past development as 
materialistic, economic, and asocial, in sharp contrast to its current emphasis on moral, social, 
and even spiritual development. In the same way, social economy and social innovation as 
development strategies have achieved their identities and hegemony by constituting prior 
developmentalism as the negative mirror image. What should not be missed, however, is that this 
binary opposition is neither self-evident nor naturally established. As the aforementioned event 
shows, the contrast has been established by schematically opposing two value chains and thus 
erasing other lingering desires, voices, and discontent. In order to understand how the dichotomy 
has been formed, it is necessary to look into the historical background of the recent rise of social 





The spatial arrangement of Social Innovation Park and its headquarters building seems to 
confirm Pierre Bourdieu’s argument that “the spatial structures structure not only the group’s 
representation of the world but the group itself, which orders itself in accordance with this 
representation” (1977: 163). In other words, the alignment and the structure of the space, either 
coincidentally or intentionally, exhibit the multi-layered historical trajectories surrounding the 
contemporary landscape of the social economy in South Korea. For example, before you enter 
the main part of the Park through the nearest gate from the subway station, you are met by two 
buildings facing each other, which the government rented out for civil society organizations. The 
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left one houses the office of the Korean Intelligence Veteran Association that has gained 
notoriety for its violent, right-wing terrorist attacks on leftist groups. On the opposite side, you 
will see the building for the Seoul chapter of the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions [Minju 
nochong] that is considered symbolic of South Korea’s radical, militant labor movement. As you 
walk along the narrow road between two buildings, which a social economy activist once 
humorously described to me as “the Third Way,” you encounter a sizeable urban vegetable farm 
that is cultivated by organizations residing in the Park and small office buildings occupied by 
various social economy organizations. Passing through the farm and smaller buildings, you 
finally arrive at the headquarters of the Park: the Seoul Social Economy Center (SSEC, 
hereafter) and Youth Hub.   
Welcoming you at the entrance to the main building is a “Community Map” [maul chido] 
that represents the spatial configuration of this administrative edifice as a small, cozy village in a 
fairytale world (see feature 2). This type of map—which is also commonly found in other local 
social/community economy centers—seems to demonstrate what Davoudi and Madanipour 
(2013) call “romanticized localism,” i.e., imagining a social space not as abstract, monolithic, 
and homogeneous but as an intimate and affective bonding locale (see also Chapters 2 and 5).7 
 
                                                 
7 Davoudi and Madanipour argue that romantic localism can be understood as “the continuation and intensification 
of neo-liberalism and its post-welfarist reconfiguration of ‘the social’” (559). According to them, the new social 
imaginary abandons the conceptualization of society as a space for collective and national politics. Instead, it 
reflects the operation of individualized and local identity politics based on consumerism and markets. In a new 
social imaginary, “not only society is seen as the collection of individuals, but also the national is considered as the 




Figure 2. A Community Map: Seoul Social Economy Center and Youth Hub (photo by author) 
 
A closer look at the fairy-tale village on the map, however, shows that the community is 
not represented as a unified space but rather is divided into two large sections. On the right side 
of the long entrance hallway is the government-commissioned intermediary organization, SSEC, 
which mainly serves to provide governmental subvention, administrative support, and business 
consulting for “government-certified” social enterprises. The other side of the building is 
occupied by Youth Hub—an organization seeking to promote social innovation and 
entrepreneurial spirit among youth. The two areas are not only divided by the hallway and a 
cobbled shallow gutter but also designed and decorated in distinctively different ways. Whereas 
SSEC consists of a group of bureaucratic but newly renovated square-shaped offices and meeting 
rooms, the space of Youth Hub appears to be a kind of indoor playground with spacious co-
working places, a number of sleeping dens, and colorful teepee tents used for congregating and 





Figure 3. Seoul Social Economy Center 
(photo by author) 
 
Figure 4. Youth Hub's Co-Working Place  
(photo by author) 
 
The marked contrast between the two spaces is noteworthy, because it seems to signify two 
historically distinct tendencies that have converged in South Korea’s social economy sector in its 
search for a new development model.  
 
Prehistory: Developmental (Non-)Welfarism 
In this dissertation, I understand “developmentalism” not simply as a specific set of macro-
economic policies or particular political-economic structures, but also as a “project of 
government” that works to produce and channel the aspirations and actions of its subjects (Li 
2007; Pandian 2009; Rudnyckyj 2010; Yeh 2013). As I will show throughout this thesis, 
developmentalism has relied on various technologies, strategies, and dispositifs of power that 
organize individual and social life and has created its hegemony by aligning and synchronizing 
individual improvement with collective and national development in a linear temporality.  
The hegemony of South Korea’s old developmentalism, as noted in various studies, was 
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mainly undergirded by two pillars: family and labor (Abelmann 2003; Chang 1999; Kwon 2005; 
Lee 2012; Ochiai 2009; Peng 2012). First of all, South Korea’s (and East Asia’s) developmental 
state, as Esping-Anderson notes, was characterized by its “unusually accentuated familialism” 
that devolved and offloaded a maximum of welfare responsibilities to households (1999: 92).8 
Although it is true that family has played a key role in welfare and care—to greater or lesser 
degrees—in every society, during the rapid growth period from the 1960s to the 1980s, the 
Korean developmental regime offered almost no social welfare programs to individual 
households. Even though health insurance and pension systems were introduced, they were 
selectively offered only to regular employees of large business conglomerates [chaebŏl] and the 
public sector (Kwon 2005).9 In this system that enabled the government to minimize social 
reproduction costs and divert resources to investment in infrastructure and economic growth 
(Chang 2011), individual households were organized as essential dispositifs that provided care 
and reproductive labor through women’s unpaid work; family had been assigned the role of the 
primary unit of development and the subject of the “development narrative” (Abelmann 2003).  
Such delegation of the social reproduction burden to families, furthermore, was 
accompanied and complemented with an intensive, disciplinary, labor regime based on the 
developmentalist version of the male breadwinner model. In its period of rapid development, the 
                                                 
8 “Familialism” refers to “the policy tendency to assign a maximum of welfare responsibilities to the family, 
particularly in its caring function.” (Peng 2010: 463). Esping-Anderson locates the reason for the strong 
familialism in the countries of Korea, Taiwan, and Japan in Confucianism: “The Confucian tradition of familial 
piety and loyalty has, like the Catholic subsidiarity principle in Europe, been the overpowering force” (91-92). See 
also Han and Ling (1998). Although this explanation might have partial validity, it could fall prey to an easy 
“cultural” explanation, unless the familialism is analyzed with various socio-political factors such as insufficient 
public welfare services, relatively weak labor movement traditions, and the oppressive states in the region (Lee 
2012; cf. Dirlik 1995). 
9 This should not be understood, however, to mean that the state did not play any effective role in governing the 
realm of care; rather, it actively organized “family” as the first and primary care provider. For example, the 
government provided tax exemptions and public housing priorities for co-residency households amongst the 
elderly and their adult children.   
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South Korean developmental state sought to ensure the economic security of households by 
providing stable, almost full-time employment selectively for male workers, especially in the 
heavy-industry sector (Koo 2001; Moon 2005; Nam 2009; Woo 2007).10 In a society without 
official public welfare and universal social insurance systems, the rapid economic growth and the 
plethora of employment opportunities served as the primary dispositifs for social security (Chang 
1999, 2007). Although low-wages and long work hours prevented the regime from fully offering 
leisure and consumption as the flip side of alienated labor like in Western Fordist societies, the 
dearth of compensation was supplemented with the imposition of a militaristic work ethic, the 
brutal oppression of trade unions, and the aggressive promotion of nationalism—which all 
contributed to aligning individual aspirations with national prosperity (Kim and Park 2003; 
Kwon 2015). Such division and articulation between the family’s role in private care and the 
labor regime’s responsibility for economic growth formulated the core structure of South 
Korea’s “developmental (non-)welfare state” that could only be effective and sustainable with 
continuous, rapid economic growth (Kwon 2005). No doubt, it is inaccurate and misleading to 
say that this model operated perfectly in reality. Yet South Korea’s version of Western 
Fordism—based on the nexus of strong familialism and a harsh but stable labor regime—has 
long served as a normative and effective developmental model in governmental and popular 
imaginaries and, as discussed in Chapter 4, still haunts neoliberal Korea as a ghostly reminder to 
some extent (cf. Muehlebach and Shoshan 2012).  
 
 
                                                 
10 As the industrial focus shifted from light industry to heavy industry since the late 1970s, many female workers in 
the light industry sector lost their jobs and were gradually subsumed into the male-centered breadwinner model 
(Barraclough 2012; Koo 2001; Moon 2005; Nam 2009).  
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The Birth of Neoliberal Welfarism 
It is generally agreed that this old development model finally came to an end with the 1997 
Asian financial crisis and the neoliberal reforms that followed (Chang and Shin 2003; Cumings 
1998; Jeong and Shin 1999; Song 2009). Given the central roles of family and employment 
opportunities in the old developmentalism, it is not surprising that the 1997 Asian financial crisis 
was primarily understood as a double crisis of family and stable employment: “the nation’s worst 
economic plummet since the Korean War,” which brought about the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) bailout, was popularly conveyed through stories of “family breakdowns” and 
epitomized by figures of “unemployed IMF homeless” (Song 2009: ix).11 The old developmental 
model exposed its weakness when economic growth hit the wall and the virtuous circle 
comprising family care and full employment came to be dysfunctional and broken. As the 
unemployment rate soared, the household could not sustain its function as the primary care 
space: once the male breadwinner model became unsustainable, former housewives were pushed 
to participate in the low-wage, precarious labor market to make a living—which was expected to 
produce more lacunas in the reproductive and care realm (Chon 2014; Jeong 2016; Peng 2010, 
2012).12 The post-crisis transformation in South Korea that Song (2009) describes as the 
emergence of the “neoliberal welfare state” reveals how family and labor—the two axes of the 
old developmentalism—have been radically reorganized and rearticulated.  
First, the responsibilities of care and welfare—which had been exclusively placed upon 
family—began to be delegated to “society” through the “the de-familiarization of care” and the 
                                                 
11 About the regional and global contexts of the crisis, see Chang (2006: Ch. 5 and 6). For debates over the causes of 
the crisis, see Chang and Shin (2003). 
12 Women’s economic participation rate has gradually increased from 50.3% in 1998 to 57% in 2014. The rate of 
irregular workers in total female employment is 40.3% which is much higher than men (25.5%). In addition, more 
than 65% of female temporary workers are over age 40. The Korean Statistical Information Service, The 2016 
Women’s Life in Statistics [2016 통계로 보는 여성의 삶], 2017. 
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expansion of public welfare (Crompton 2006; cf. Fraser 2016). The government not only 
expanded social insurances—Employment Insurance, the National Pension, and Industrial 
Accident Compensation Insurance were respectively universalized in 1998, 1999, and 2000; it 
also introduced “The National Basic Living Security Act” in 2000 that guarantees the minimum 
standard of living for those under the poverty line. In addition, the various “social care 
programs” for the ailing elderly, children, and the disabled were implemented throughout the 
2000s (see Chapter 3). Although they were the first universal social welfare and care systems in 
South Korea’s history, the newly introduced welfare system, as noted by various studies, has 
been operating under the neoliberal and neo-developmental imperatives that seek to improve 
work productivity and minimize welfare costs (Kwon 2005; Peng 2012; Song 2009). Not only 
did the government frame that the expanded social welfare and care service sector serve as “the 
new ‘growth engine’ for future economic development” (Lee 2007), but public welfare programs 
were mainly carried out by providing temporary, irregular employment to the beneficiaries. In 
the midst of the economic crisis in 1998, for example, the government launched “public work 
programs” [konggong gŭllo] that offered the unemployed and the underprivileged community 
welfare jobs such as community beautification, social worker assistance, and patient/elderly care 
in community health centers. Despite its low wages and poor working conditions, the typical 
“workfare” program (i.e., the Third Way-ish coordination of work and welfare) has continued 
and expanded into various programs of “self-supporting work” [jahwal gŭllo], “social 
contribution work” [sahoe gonghŏn il-chari]  and “social innovation work” throughout the 
2000s, serving to supply cheap labor forces such as unskilled female workers and unemployed 
youths for the social care sectors (see Chapter 3 and 4).  
On the other hand, the realm of stable employment has been rapidly dismantled with the 
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increase of flexible, irregular employment and the rise of entrepreneurial culture (Seo 2011; Shin 
2013). First of all, irregular temporary workers have dramatically increased in number in South 
Korea since the late 1990s. The intensive but stable labor regime—which had been perceived as 
the locomotive of South Korea’s economic miracle—suddenly began to be viewed as the culprit 
in the crisis. Flexibility in the labor market was presented as the principal solution to overcome 
economic collapse; the law that allowed conglomerates’ massive lay-offs had passed, with the 
partial consent of the national trade unions. Labor flexibility was ideologically justified and 
encouraged with an “entrepreneurial culture” that urged everyone to become an innovative 
“entrepreneur of the self” (Seo, 2011). In 1998, the government initiated the “New Intellectual 
Campaign” that forged a creative, responsible, and self-governing entrepreneur as an ideal 
subject in the post-work and knowledge-based economy.13 Innovative creativity, entrepreneurial 
spirit, and risk-taking activities were eulogized as essential virtues for competing in globalized 
financial capitalism. In governmental discourses, venture companies and micro start-ups 
emerged as an alternative not only to the bureaucratic, industrial conglomerates but also to the 
shrinking job market and the soaring unemployment rate (Seo 2005; Ryu 2014). Throughout the 
2000s, the government established nationwide incubation centers for start-ups, proclaiming that 
venture business would be the essential source for “new development” in the knowledge-based, 
high-technology economy. The stable, long-term employment that was a normative ideal under 
the old developmental regime has been gradually replaced with the neoliberal myth of innovative 
entrepreneurship that “everyone has to be micro-entrepreneurs.”  
In a nutshell, two pillars of the old developmentalism—family care and stable labor—
                                                 
13 For the concrete deployment of the “New Intellectual Campaign,” see Song (2009). The “new intellectual” is 
defined as “who creates and shares social wealth and value by innovating the status quo with critical thoughts and 
creativity.” The Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs, The 2003 Plan for the New 
Intellectual Award, 2003 (quoted in Seo 2005: 60). 
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have undergone radical transformations as the country sought a new developmental model after 
the 1997 financial crisis. While the responsibility of care has been partially shifted from family 
to society,14 the labor market has rapidly become flexible and insecure, which has been justified 
in the name of a knowledge-based creative economy. Such entangled processes of socialization 
of care and precarization of labor may explain why South Korea’s neoliberal reform has been 
described in the seemingly oxymoronic terms “neoliberal welfare state” (Song 2009), “social 
neoliberalism” (Jun 2011) and the more popular term, “left neoliberalism.”15 What is particularly 
interesting in relation to our discussion is that these apparently independent transformations 
were, in fact, a process of convergence: socialized (and commodified) care has transformed into 
a type of labor such as caring labor, immaterial labor, and affective labor (see Chapter 3), while 
post-industrial precarious labor has come close to what Foucault (1986) calls “the care of self” 
under the initiatives of self-development and entrepreneurial spirit (see Chapter 4). It was under 
the signifier and the common ground of “social economy” that these two heterogeneous but 
related transformations in the realms of care and labor came to finally merge in the late 2000s.  
 
The Rise of Social Economy 
In 2007, the South Korean government passed “The Act of the Promotion of Social Enterprise,” 
which aims to promote “social enterprises” that offer jobs for the disadvantaged (e.g., the 
homeless, single mothers, and the disabled) and grant them governmental certification and 
                                                 
14 Despite the reform, family clearly remains as a primary care institution. For example, the National Basic Living 
Security Act includes “the Obligation of Family Support” [kajok puyangŭimuje], according to which minors or 
elders who have a family member with income are not eligible for various social benefits. This obligation shows 
that the primary responsibility for social welfare is still on the family and that the government provides social 
security as a complement to family care.   
15 The term “left neoliberalism” was first used by President Roh Moo-Hyun (2003-2008) to self-mockingly describe 
his policy orientation. The term became popular and ironically remains as the appropriate label that encapsulates 
his political merits and demerits.  
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subventions.16 Although the then-conservative government’s enactment of the law has often been 
described as unexpected and surprising, the policy had been under consideration for a long time. 
In fact, the government’s previous workfare programs had been criticized for only providing 
welfare recipients with temporary, interim jobs and thus failing to effectively empower them.17 
Subsidizing private enterprises to hire the disadvantaged emerged as the alternative: the policy 
was expected not only to give the recipients stable jobs and opportunities to learn necessary 
skills, but also to lessen small-scale entrepreneurs’ financial burden. This policy can be viewed, 
on the other hand, as an attempt to reduce the government’s public welfare cost. For example, 
the span of governmental support has been limited to five years. After five years, the social 
enterprises are expected to survive in the market on their own feet and the recipients to become 
skillful enough to maintain their jobs or find new ones so that the government no longer needs to 
directly hire them for workfare programs. That is to say, the certification and support system of 
social enterprise has been initially introduced as an extension or intensification of the workfare 
program for welfare recipients.  
The government-certified social enterprises, however, comprise only a part of the boom 
of social economy. Implementing “The Basic Plan for Social Enterprise Promotion (2008-
2012),” the government diverted the prior support and investment for for-profit start-ups toward 
“social” start-ups and “community” ventures and also started to provide numerous social 
entrepreneurship and innovation trainings (especially for youth).18 All the local governments 
                                                 
16 The law defines “social enterprise” as “an organization which is engaged in business activities of producing and 
selling goods and services while pursuing a social purpose of enhancing the quality of local residents’ life by 
means of providing social services and creating jobs for the disadvantaged” (Article 2). 
17 The Ministry of Labor, “The Basic Plan for Social Enterprise Promotion (2008~2012)” [사회적기업 육성 기본계획 
(2008~2012)], 2008, p. 1. 




were encouraged to establish local community/social economy centers for incubating social start-
ups and promote residents’ entrepreneurship. Since “The Framework Act on Cooperative” was 
passed in 2012, the government’s financial supports have expanded to community enterprises 
and cooperatives. Along with the promotion of various social economy organizations—social 
enterprise, community enterprise, and local cooperatives—“the social care market” has been 
created and fostered as the central testbed and platform for social start-ups’ innovations and 
social/community enterprises’ ethical business (which I detail in Chapter 3). A number of local 
governments have also actively promoted governance with local social economy organizations to 
build “community care networks” and a “social economy ecosystem.”  
As a result, notions such as “social economy,” “social innovation,” and “the sharing 
economy” began to be circulated in the public sphere as buzz words. Local mass media were 
quick to join and celebrate the idea of social economy as a new zeitgeist.19 Karl Polanyi’s The 
Great Transformation was re-published in 2009 and became a national bestseller; textbooks 
about social economy have been published and taught in middle and high schools. Park Won-
soon, a pioneering social economy activist and an advocate of social innovation, was elected as 
Mayor of Seoul in 2011. Another enthusiastic social economy advocate, Moon Jae-in introduced 
“Human-centered, Cooperative Social Economy” as a slogan for his economic policies and was 
elected as President in 2017. The government’s “Basic Plan for Social Enterprise Promotion” 
seems to summarize well what has been at stake in the tempestuous excitement and expectation 
surrounding social economy: it says that the social economy will contribute to overcoming the 
“prolonged low-growth crisis” after the 1997 financial crisis and bring about “new social 
                                                 
19 For a meticulous analysis of South Korean newspapers’ discourses on social economy, see Kim (2016). 
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development and integration” by “innovating social services and creating sustainable jobs.”20 
As noted earlier, the spatial arrangement of the headquarters building reveals that South 
Korea’s social economy has emerged at the juncture of two major governing reforms—the 
neoliberal socialization of care and the enterprization of labor—that responded to the collapse of 
the old developmental government. First, the cramped, bureaucratic administration offices in 
SSEC seem to divulge that social economy is the continuation of the governmental effort to 
expand public welfare or workfare at minimum cost since the 1997 financial crisis. The main 
roles of SSEC are to distribute government’s subventions to certified social enterprises, 
cooperatives, and community enterprises and to promote their participation in the social care 
market by offering various forms of business consulting (see Chapter 3). Their mission also 
includes facilitating the governance between local governments and social care and economy 
organizations to reduce the government’s welfare burden.  
By contrast, Youth Hub’s open playground-like space appears to flesh out what 
“innovation” and “entrepreneurial spirit” mean. Its social start-up offices and pastel-toned co-
working places are open and airy with movable walls and furniture. A group tour guide of Youth 
Hub explained that the space was designed to serve as “a platform” for promoting “the richer 
sense of cooperation and free-flow of ideas,” both of which are vital for “social innovation.” In 
these spaces, Youth Hub holds Youth School and various programs for “Social Innovation Youth 
Activists” (see Chapter 4). At a corner of the co-working spaces, Youth Hub has a “Room for 
Carpentry and Manual Craft” for young innovators who are “tired of sharing ideas” and want to 
experience “the joy of manual labor.” Manual labor—which has long served as an engine of 
development—is now regarded as a beneficial past time and a source of joy in the “knowledge-
                                                 
20 The Ministry of Labor, Ibid., pp. 15-18. 
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based, innovation economy.” In addition, the space is designed to support the enthusiastic, 
adventurous habits of the young: The nooks and crannies are filled with beanbag chairs and 
Indian Tepee tents for those who work all night long and want to take a short rest or sleep. In this 
way, the spatial arrangement of the Youth Hub not only represents “the labor experience in 
immaterial capitalism” in which the boundaries of work, play, and rest are blurred and work is 
directly equated with communication, networking, and innovation (Lazzarato 1996, 2014), but 
also it faithfully reflects the definition of social innovator: “a passionate young leader who seeks 
creative solutions for social problems through sharing ideas and cooperation.”21 These two 
heterogeneous spaces compatibly co-exist in the massive red-block headquarters building of the 
Seoul Innovation Park for social economy organizations.  
 
… and Smaller Buildings 
It would be unfair and misleading, however, to argue that the recent rise of social economy in 
South Korea can be attributed exclusively to the governmental efforts to manage the crisis and 
promote new development. As noted above, Seoul Innovation Park consists of more than 30 
buildings that surround the headquarters, in which 220 social economy organizations are nested. 
Who are actually occupying the buildings, then? Who are these people or organizations that 
identify themselves as social innovators or ethical citizens and actively participate in the space of 
“governance” opened by the government? In fact, SSEC and Youth Hub themselves are not 
directly managed by the Seoul Metropolitan Government. The government has commissioned 
and authorized “civil society organizations” to take part in the operation of the headquarters—the 
radical rhetoric of the invitation letter that I received might have reflected a political position of 
                                                 
21 An excerpt from a text book of the 2014 Spring Youth School.  
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one of the commissioned groups. Who are these groups that operate various programs on the 
government’s behalf? These questions may be answered by briefly sketching the history of “civil 
society movements” in South Korea—the last strand that formed the social economy sector. 
It can be traced back to the late 1980s and the early 1990s that “society” first emerged as 
a political space in South Korea. When the almost 30-year-long military junta was finally 
toppled in the late 1980s, the “civil society discourse” [shimin sahoe-ron]—that introduced 
society as a “political” space consisting of democratic citizens as opposed to the authoritarian 
state—began to be widely circulated in the media, academia, and social movement groups (Cho 
1993; Yoo and Kim 1995). Despite then-strong critiques from Marxist groups of its “bourgeois” 
nature (Kim 1995), there had been a general consensus that civil society activism could serve as 
an effective bulwark against the overgrown developmental state, and numerous civil society 
organizations were actively formed and founded throughout the 1990s.  
The imaginary of this political civil society underwent a modification with the 1997 
crisis. As the economic crisis invalidated the developmental state model and brought about a 
series of neoliberal reforms, the relationship of society to the market gradually came to the focus: 
society began to be discussed as a space for care, welfare, and social reproduction that could 
alleviate the vices of the market (Cho and Lee 2017). Civil society groups increasingly centered 
more upon “real-life” issues such as care, welfare, education, and environment, rather than 
macro-political or mass labor contentions. What is noteworthy is that such a new orientation of 
civil society groups was congruent with the government’s intention to de-familiarize and expand 
care and welfare across social planes. As the government increasingly incorporated civil society 
organizations into its policy-making processes, incipient forms of “governance” began to emerge 
between the state and civil society. 
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Throughout the 2000s, a number of civil society groups have sought their identities in 
developing a local, life-politics agenda and suggesting concrete policy reforms to the 
government. To increase their influence, the groups have adopted professionalism and localism 
in devising and implementing policies. In the process, they have not only distanced themselves 
from so-called old-leftist groups—radical labor activism or the pro-North Korean nationalist 
movement—but have also sought to organize their movements following the civic activism 
models of more “advanced countries.” Park Won-Soon is the epitomizing figure of this 
promotion of civil society movements. As a former human rights lawyer who fought against the 
military dictatorship, Park became a civil society activist after democratization. In the early 
2000s, he organized a research tour group, the “New Courtiers Observation Mission” [Shin 
shinsayuramdan],22 to examine the models of social activism and governance in “advanced 
countries” including the US, Japan, and the Western European countries. Based on his findings, 
he established in 2002 the first self-proclaimed “social enterprise,” Beautiful Store and Beautiful 
Coffee, following the example of Oxfam in the UK; in 2006, he instituted Hope Maker as a think 
tank for civil society groups (I will detail my experience in Beautiful Coffee in Chapter 5). These 
organizations have proposed numerous social policies and have actively set a new agenda for 
civil society including social economy, social innovation, social impact bonds, and the sharing 
economy. Although other smaller civil society groups were still hesitant to fully accept the new 
language, the ethical and moral models of “advanced countries’ civil activism” [sŏnjin'guk'yŏng 
                                                 
22 “Courtiers Observation Mission” was an official group dispatched to Japan by King Kojong in 1881 to learn about 
the “Westernized modernization process” of the Meiji Japan. Based on their experience in Japan for four months, 
the group produced more than 80 reports about politics, education, and economic systems of Japan, which served 
as the blueprint to advance Korea’s westernizing modernization process in the late 19th century. For the roles of 
Courtier Observation Mission, see Huh and Tikhonov (2005). Park’s audacious naming of the research group as 
“New Courtiers Observation Mission” seems to divulge the undercurrent “developmental ethos” of the project that 
aims to “learn, imitate, and catch up” with Western “advanced” countries not only economically but also morally 
and socially, and even in the fields of social movements.  
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shiminundong] have extensively influenced the groups who were seeking effective, feasible ways 
to oppose neoliberal marketization.     
It is these civil society groups that have most actively participated in the social economy 
sector when it emerged as a new governance space between the state and civil society. “The Act 
of the Promotion of Social Enterprise” defined the scope of the adjective “social” as covering 
“education, health, social welfare, environment, culture, child care, arts, and… tourism 
services.”23 These fields strongly overlap with the long-standing agenda of civil society groups.  
Through legislation, the government opened up the possibility of converting formal/informal 
care groups, small civil society organizations, and local communities into government-certified 
social enterprises, community enterprises, and cooperatives to participate in the governance 
process. Governmental support for social economy and innovation has thus dramatically 
expanded the remit of the participation in the care and welfare governance of civil society 
organizations (cf. Peck, Theodore and Brenner 2009; Larner and Craig 2005). It is notable that 
the process has drawn civil society organizations into the more incorporated, depoliticized 
governmental process. First, the more universal and political initiatives in the civil society 
movement, such as labor, human rights, and feminist groups are tacitly excluded from the newly 
opened governance space, or their agenda is incorporated only in specific avenues such as job 
creation, poverty alleviation, or child care. Second, in social economy governance, the roles of 
civil society organizations are seen to reflect an “equal partnership” in governance with the state, 
cooperating in order to provide more efficient and diverse local welfare benefits, rather than 
raising criticism or monitoring the government. As the political imagination of “civil society 
discourse” has gradually become obsolete, “social economy” has thus become a place where 
                                                 
23 The Act of the Promotion of Social Enterprise, Article II, section 3.  
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civil society organizations’ humanistic, ethical anti-market agendas find their depoliticized and 
even neoliberal home in collaboration with the government.  
What is now clear is that underneath the mayor’s superficial dichotomy between old 
developmentalism and social economy/innovation, are hidden the multi-layered and complex 
historical contexts: the government’s attempt to re-organize the care realm to manage the crisis 
of reproduction has gradually converged with the rise of entrepreneurial, innovative culture in 
search of a new engine of development. Such governmental exigencies have also been entangled 
with civil society groups’ aspirations to expand public welfare and advance alternatives to 
marketization in working with the government. South Korea’s social economy sector has 
emerged at the confluence of these heterogeneous streams.  
Of particular interest is that local community/social economy centers, such as Seoul 
Innovation Park, have been structured to reflect these complex historical contexts. Another 
fieldwork site of mine, the Seongbuk Community/Social Economy Center, provides a good 
example. The center was established in 2011 by the Seoungbuk district government, one of 25 
district governments in Seoul. The self-proclaimed Polanyian district mayor, Kim Young-Bae, 
renovated a five-story, gray-squared former administration building into a space for social 
economy organizations—the first floor is occupied by a government-sponsored day care center; 
the second floor is a fancy co-working space and a coffee shop that sells fair trade coffee and 
local social enterprise products; the third is the office of an intermediary support organization 
that aims to provide subvention for local social/community enterprises and organize local care 
and welfare networks; the fourth and fifth floors are used as an incubation center for social start-
ups and classrooms for social economy/innovation training and business consulting for social 
economy organizations. The operation of the building and the programs are commissioned by the 
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government to “Live Together, Seongbuk” a network association of more than 50 local grass-
roots civil society activist groups. The field sites, in a nutshell, have served as rich archaeological 
sites in which to excavate the complicated historical contexts and the heterogeneous forces and 
desires that have been sedimented and congealed in South Korea’s social economy sector. While 
conducting my fieldwork research into these institutions, I focused on navigating, and analyzing 




During the period between the fall of 2013 and the winter of 2014, with three additional 
summers in 2012, 2015, and 2016, I conducted my fieldwork research at the aforementioned 
sites: Seoul Social Economy Center, Youth Hub, and Seongbuk Community/Social Economy 
Center. As a volunteer and an intern, I made extensive participant observation. First of all, I 
attended a series of social economy, innovation, and community development trainings; 
observed formal and informal meetings of social economy activists and social entrepreneurs; and 
participated in business consulting sessions for social start-ups and cooperatives. In addition, I 
attended various events held in the organizations such as international/domestic conferences, 
workshops, and expositions. In 2014, Mayor of Seoul, Park Won-Soon, announced that he would 
make Seoul “the capital of the world social economy.”24 No matter what he exactly meant by the 
statement, Seoul suddenly became the favorite destination for global social entrepreneurs and 
social economy organizations. The municipal government hosted various international and 
                                                 
24 Park Won-Soon, The Opening Speech at the 2014 Global Social Economy Forum (Nov. 17, 2014).  
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interregional social economy events such as the 2014 and 2015 Global Social Economy Forum 
and the 2015 Asia Network for Young Social Entrepreneurs Conference. Almost every month, I 
had multiple events to attend as an audience member, a volunteer, a translator, or sometimes 
even as a panelist. In addition, throughout the fieldwork period, I was able to communicate with 
a number of social entrepreneurs, young social innovators, and social economy activists on a 
daily basis and conduct in-depth interviews. Finally, in order to look into how social enterprises 
and community cooperatives are actually working, I worked as a volunteer in a fair trade social 
enterprise nested in Seoul Innovation Park and an elderly care cooperative in the Seongbuk 
district at the early and the final stages in my fieldwork research. I will detail the experiences in 
Chapter 3 and 5, respectively. Drawing upon the investigations and findings, this dissertation 




In this dissertation, I aim to situate the recent rise of the social economy in South Korea not only 
in the local context of searching for a new development model, but also as part of the global 
resurgence of “the social.” As explained above, South Korea’s social economy boom can be 
primarily seen as an attempt to seek a new engine of development and manage the crisis of social 
reproduction after the collapse of the old state-centered, industrial development model. What can 
be called “the return of the social,” however, has also emerged as a global phenomenon over the 
past decades, especially in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis. Not only have new 
types of media, business, and knowledge popped up with the adjective “social”—social media, 
social network, social commerce, social marketing, social design, and social neuroscience; but 
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various socio-economic projects that aim to graft morality and sociality onto the market have 
also been presented as the most feasible and promising alternative to unfettered market 
fundamentalism: social economy, community development, and social entrepreneurship are just 
a few of the representative examples.25 While the governments of advanced capitalist countries 
have rushed to join the trend by putting “social” in the center of their policy visions—from 
David Cameron’s “big society” to Angela Merkel’s “new social market economy,”26 other 
“developing” countries have competitively set forth “social development” or “post-neoliberal 
development” as goals for their future.27 This rather abrupt upsurge of the “socials” seems to 
raise the challenging but important question of how to locate and understand the place of “the 
social” in the ongoing hegemony of financial neoliberalism, not only historically but also 
theoretically.  
 
Neoliberalism and the Social    
Since Margaret Thatcher’s famous dictum, “There is no such thing as society,” neoliberalism has 
been predominantly equated with amoral and asocial market fundamentalism that dissolves all 
forms of sociality in favor of privatization and individualism (Bauman 1998; Bourdieu 1998; 
Harvey 2005, 2006; Wallerstein 2005). Exclusively based on the experience of Western states, 
                                                 
25 The list could continue: “solidarity economy” (Utting 2015), “philanthropic capitalism” (Bishop and Green 2009), 
“capitalism 4.0” (Kaletsky 2011), “conscious capitalism” (Mackey and Sisodia 2013), “sharing economy,” 
(Widlok, 2016: Ch. 6), and “human economy” (Hart, Laville, and Cattani 2010).  
26 For heated debates over “big society,” see Kisby (2010), Tam (2011); for Merkel’s “new social market economy,” 
see Vogelmann (2012). Perhaps, then-French President Nikolas Sarkozy’s speech at the 2010 Davos Forum 
perfectly summarizes the essential spirit of this “social” or “moral” turn in governing the crisis of capitalism: “We 
will save capitalism and the market economy, by rebuilding it, by, if I dare to use this word, restoring its moral 
dimension.... What do we need, in the end, if it is not rules, principles, a governance that reflects shared values, a 
common morality?”  
27 For the rise of social development or post-neoliberal agendas in Latin America, see Goodale and Postero (2013), 
Silva (2009), and Veltmeyer and Petras (2014). For development through social economy in China and other 
regions see Pun, Ky, Yan, and Koo (2016).  
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“the death of society” through neoliberalism has been widely declared, mourned, or disavowed 
via a type of melancholic attachment.28 Such a homogenous and monolithic understanding of 
neoliberalism—which often relies on the sensational, popular imagery of “an economic tsunami” 
that immediately sweeps away all the social, moral, national bonds (Ong 2006: 4), however, 
seems to serve as an obstacle to clearly grasp the meanings of the returned socials in the 
heartlands of neoliberalism. As William Davies aptly points out, the conventional understanding 
of neoliberalism has only produced “either sceptical or teleological” responses to the socials in 
circulation (2015b: 432). If the sceptical response denounces the return of the social as simply an 
“ideological cloak” or a rhetorical sham that covers the overwhelming dominance of neoliberal 
rationality (e.g., Aschoff 2015; Cremin 2011), the teleological response positively views it as 
society’s “self-defense” against unbridled marketism, locating the return of the socials in a 
teleological, linear temporality from neoliberalism to a post-neoliberal society (cf. Peck, 
Theodore, and Brenner 2009). 
Instead of dwelling upon whether the returned socials can be regarded as neoliberal or 
post-neoliberal, I would like to illuminate two major problems shared by these seemingly 
opposite responses. First, both positions are, as already noted, not only based on the homogenous 
imaginary of neoliberalism but also share the assumption that market and society are assumed 
natural realities that stand in antithesis in a kind of “zero-sum” game. In this perspective, 
economic market and social/moral domains can be interlinked only as externally so that one side 
                                                 
28 An apocalyptic postmodernist, Jean Baudrillard was the quickest to declare “the end of the social”: “Networks of 
symbolic ties were precisely neither ‘relational’ nor ‘social.’ At the other extreme, our ‘society’ is perhaps in the 
process of putting an end to the social, of burying the social beneath a simulation of the social…. Perhaps the 
social will have had only an ephemeral existence, in the narrow gap between the symbolic formations and our 
‘society’ where it is dying” (1983: 67). Nikolas Rose (1996) also illuminates the death of the social in the different 
context of the transition from the “social government” to “governing through communities.” See also Chapter 2 in 
this dissertation. For melancholic attachment to the “lost” social and its political predicaments, see Brown (2003).  
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can be “swept” by or “defended” against the other side. These drawbacks make both not only fail 
to illuminate the polymorphoric, hybrid natures of “actually existing” neoliberalization (Larner 
2006; Ong 2007; Peck 2010) but also ignore the fact that “the phenomenon of neoliberalism 
itself changes” in different social settings (Collier 2011; Hoffman, Dehart, and Collier 2006). 
Furthermore, these rather hasty responses pay no heed to new forms of sociality and social 
imaginary that have emerged with neoliberalization or in neoliberal conditions. Considering that 
a modern conception of society is a historical product that materialized out of the liberal human 
condition and its contradictions (Arendt 1958; Elliott and Turner 2012; Foucault 2008; Taylor 
2003), it is legitimate and necessary to ask how neoliberalism and its new human condition have 
transformed the established social imaginary and produced new forms of sociality and ethicality. 
That is to say, what if the “society” that was lamented and mourned for its death and the 
“returned socials” that are either distrusted or acclaimed are not identical? In order to navigate 
between melancholic skepticism and teleological optimism surrounding the returned socials, 
what should be addressed first is thus the following question: What kinds of new features of 
sociality and social imaginary are found in the return of the social?  
In this dissertation, I understand society and economy neither as given natural realities 
nor as conceptual a priori, but rather as “transactional realities” that are constructed from “the 
interplay of relations of power” and correlative to “the form of governmental technology” 
(Foucault 2008: 297; see also Mitchell 2002). In other words, society and economy should not be 
thought of as the starting point of analysis but rather as composites of the “little lines of various 
techniques and discourses” which emerge as an intelligible field in the end of analysis (Deleuze 
1979: x). Instead of reproducing the dichotomy of society and market, therefore, I will ask how 
society or the social has been modified and reshaped in accordance with new assemblages of 
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power and how neoliberalism itself has been transformed in different contexts.  
This approach is consonant with various ethnographic studies that explore the 
entanglement of moral and social logics with neoliberal rationality and a “Janus-faced 
neoliberalism” that relies on relational, social virtues as well as economic calculation 
(Muehlebach 2012; see also Karim 2011, Rajak 2011, and Roy 2010). These studies show that 
neoliberal reforms have often been concomitant with attempts to empower subjects and 
encourage their participation in social and public programs to complement the retreat of the state 
from social welfare. Furthermore, a series of historical analyses of neoliberalism shows that 
neoliberal government has gradually incorporated and integrated social logics in the forms of 
“roll-out,” “post-Washington,” or “communitarian” neoliberalism to resist critiques and manage 
the crisis of social reproduction (Davies 2012, 2014; Hendrikse and Sidaway 2010; Peck 2010; 
Peck et al. 2009; Vogelmann 2012).  
While agreeing with these analyses, this dissertation goes further to argue that the 
neoliberal condition can be characterized as producing the hybrid spaces and practices where 
social and, moral virtues, and economic rationality are closely intertwined and implicated. In 
other words, the social and the economic become more intimately infiltrated and entangled under 
a neoliberal human capital regime than under any other form of government; as I will show later, 
ethical aspirations and the social good are now subjectified as assets of individual agents and 
managed by a new form of economic rationality. Foucault’s pioneering analysis of neo-
liberalism as an enterprisation of society and Michel Feher’s recent conceptualization of human 





Neoliberal Human Capital  
In comparing German ordo-liberalism and American neoliberalism, Foucault points out that the 
common essence of their projects can be summarized as the economization of entire social fields 
or “the multiplication of the enterprise form within the social body” (2008: 248). As pointed out 
by post-Foucauldian scholars (W. Brown 2015; Dardot and Laval 2013), such economization or 
enterprization are not necessarily equated with actual marketization and privatization; the point is 
rather to re-arrange heretofore noneconomic domains with the identical framework of enterprise. 
The same rearrangement is applied to the dimension of subjectivity; Foucault argues that 
neoliberal homo œconomicus is different from liberal economic man in its enterprise form: “the 
stake in all neoliberal analyses is the replacement every time of homo œconomicus as partner of 
exchange with a homo œconomicus as entrepreneur of himself, being for himself his own capital, 
being for himself his own producer, being for himself the source of [his] earnings” (2008: 226). 
Foucault’s point—that today’s neoliberal subject differs from classical liberal homo œconomicus 
who has the propensity of “truck, barter, exchange” to maximize their utilitarian pleasure, 
however, has not been sufficiently pondered and developed. Except for several notable studies 
(W. Brown 2015; Dardot and Laval 2013; Feher 2009; Read 2009), Foucault’s argument has 
often been interpreted through the lens of a conventional understanding of neoliberalism, i.e., 
that neoliberal entrepreneurs are more crass and selfish economic men who are deprived of a 
safety net and are only concerned with personal survival and the maximization of private 
interests.  
Michel Feher’s conceptualization of “human capital” provides a promising path to 
advance Foucault’s idea and grasp the new features of the neoliberal human condition (2009). In 
arguing that the radical novelty of neoliberal subjectivity has been underestimated, Feher draws a 
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clear distinction between “free laborer” as the partner of exchange in liberal capitalism and 
“human capital” as self-entrepreneur in neoliberalism. A free laborer, Feher argues, is a social 
being split between an intimate, existential private realm and a labor power sold and exchanged 
in the market: whereas the private sphere is dominated by mutual care and moral obligation for 
“biological, social, cultural, and moral reproduction,” the commodity realm is organized by the 
principle of material interests (2009: 29).29 In counterpoint, neoliberal human capital is generated 
and maintained by seamlessly incorporating all the aspects of life into a single value frame and 
managing them as a “portfolio manager.”   
 
Human capital, by contrast, does not presuppose a separation of the spheres of production 
and reproduction. The various things I do, in any existential domain (dietary, erotic, 
religious, etc.), all contribute to either appreciating or depreciating the human capital… 
As investors in their own human capital, the subjects that are presupposed and targeted 
by neoliberalism can thus be conceived as the managers of a portfolio of conducts 
pertaining to all the aspects of their lives (30). 
  
As all the resources, features, and actions of the subject are positioned and managed on the 
“same plane of immanence” without any outside and transcendence (Read 2009: 34),30 neoliberal 
human capital is situated within a series of dissolving borders—between the private and the 
public, between reproduction and production, between work and play, between wages and 
                                                 
29 This separation between the private and the public is also relevant to the formation of modern society. As Hannah 
Arendt argues, modern “society” has emerged in merging the private and the public spheres: “The emergence of 
the social realm, which is neither private nor public, strictly speaking, is a relatively new phenomenon whose 
origin coincided with the emergence of the modern age and which found its political form in the nation-state… In 
our understanding, the dividing line is entirely blurred, because we see the body of peoples and political 
communities in the image of a family whose everyday affairs have to be taken care of by a gigantic, nation-wide 
administration of housekeeping” (1958: 28-9). This hybrid, paradoxical nature inherent to modern society is what 
Feher’s discussion has omitted. As Foucault points out, liberal civil society is considered to operate on the 
paradoxical virtue of “disinterested interests” (2008: 301). See also Chapter 5.  
30 In this sense, neoliberal human capital (and its correlatives, social entrepreneur and social economy) seem to be 




capital. While liberal free laborers pursue their interests by exchanging their alienable labor 
power as the inalienable possessor, neoliberal human capitals “invest (themselves) in their 
capital” and leverage “its (monetary and nonmonetary) portfolio value across all of its endeavors 
and venues” (W. Brown 2015: 10).  
In fact, Feher’s argument that neoliberalism transforms human beings into human capital 
heuristically stimulates various questions and further discussions (e.g., Ascher 2016; W. Brown 
2015; Mcdonough 2015). I here focus only on two points relevant to my analysis. First, human 
capital subjectivity establishes a new relationship with economic reason. The resources of human 
capital are arranged and optimized to enhance their portfolios and attract more investment rather 
than to maximize their utilitarian pleasure in exchange. The dynamics of appreciation of the asset 
value—what can be comparable to financial logics working in the stock market—are far more 
complex and composite than calculating profit in the market exchange. As noted in the Prologue, 
various elements—such as irrational desires, creative enthusiasm, moral orientations, or 
extensive private networks—all can be the assets of human capital. In their portfolios, social, 
moral values and blatant economic utility can be registered on the same plane and co-exist in a 
mutually translatable form to appreciate and increase the entire asset value and investability.  
It is very important not to misunderstand this point as a conventional argument that moral 
and social values are directly subordinate to or monetized by economic rationality, because the 
point here is that the nature of economic rationality itself has changed. As Boltanski and 
Chiapello (2005) point out, in the new network capitalism the point of entrepreneurial activity is 
less to gain immediate economic profit through exchange than to “enhance their values” and 
become an influential element in the network. As I will show in chapters 2 and 3, such enterprise 
or human capital forms are configuring and refiguring the imaginaries surrounding community, 
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the state, and subjects’ ethical practices. For example, various elements in a community—
including beautiful views, kind neighborhoods, or even the landscape of poverty—are regarded 
as assets that should be arranged to enhance the community’s entire value; the state assumes the 
role of a central investor who finances citizens’ caring practices and expects substantial social 
impacts as “the return on investment”; citizens’ ethical aspirations and practices are organized as 
projects to raise their investability and attract more fund from the state and the market.  
Second, as the production of human capital blurs the boundary of the private and the 
public, care and work have mutually transformed and homologized. In liberal capitalism, care 
and work belonged to different realms and were organized according to different principles. 
While work has been abstracted to serve as the foundation of social recognition and rights 
(Balibar 2004), care has remained concrete in the private sphere. As Robert Castel maintains, 
“Work is truly a social act when it can no longer be confused with private activity, such as work 
in the home” (1996: 619). In the human capital regime, abstract work and private care gradually 
come to have no qualitative differences: as noted above in discussing the rise of “entrepreneurial 
culture” in South Korea, while private care can take the form of work such as affective and 
caring labors, abstract work comes to convey the intimate nature of care, such as through social 
services or community activities (I will touch upon this transformation in Chapter 4). As a result, 
in the immanent plane of human capital, there exists no breaking point between care of self and 
care for others, or more exactly, care for others is considered “as a constitutive part” of self-care. 
Feher argues, “Far from disregarding social concerns to merely focus on personal ones, they no 
longer recognized the pertinence of allocating the care of others and the care of the self to two 
distinct realms” (37).31  
                                                 
31 “Innovation” emerges as a strong principle to conduct the continuum of care of self and care for others. As 
Schumpeter famously defines, entrepreneurs are not those who are motivated by money but rather who seek the 
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The “enterprisation of social fields” or the rise of neoliberal human capital has thus 
undermined “the constitutive oppositions” upon which the modern liberal societies have been 
constructed—the distinctions between production and reproduction, private and public, care and 
labor (Feher 2009: 38). What would the form of a society be like that consists of human capitals, 
then? How have sociality and ethicality been transformed, as the subjectivity of the free laborer 
has gradually been replaced with a new form of subjectivity, human capital? These are some of 
the main questions that I want to address in this dissertation by exploring South Korea’s social 
economy sector.   
 
Neosocial Government/Development  
As noted above, I understand development as a form of liberal government that seeks to align the 
individual with the collective and resolve the conundrum between the empowerment and the 
control of free, self-interested subjects (Cruikshank 1999; Lessenich 2011; Rudnyckyj 2010). In 
this dissertation, I heuristically attempt to understand the recent rise of social economy and social 
innovation in South Korea as part of the formation of “neosocial government/development” that 
pursues the construction of society under neoliberal conditions.32 This new governmental or 
developmental program is not only directly associated with neoliberal human capital subjects and 
the new social imaginary, but it also relies on governing dispositifs distinct from other forms of 
governing rationalities—developmental, liberal, neoliberal, and social governmentality.  
                                                 
practices of innovation that “carry out a new combination” of the existing materials and forces (1983 [1911]: 66). 
In the human capital regime, the practices of transformed care and work have been managed by and replaced with 
social innovation to optimize their assets and enhance their “social impacts.”  
32 I borrow the term “neosocial” from Lessenich (2011), Maasen et al. (2007), and Vogelmann (2012). In arguing 
that the ongoing transitions toward an “active society” or “neosocial market economy” should not be understood 
as the unilateral subordination of the social to economic rationality but as the renewal of social logics within 




Above all, neosocial government is predicated upon the production of human capital 
subjectivity that incorporates social, ethical dimensions into their immanent portfolios. The 
emergence of the new homo œconomicus has radically displaced and outmoded the essential 
governmental conundrum of liberalism: how individual pursuits of interest can create or be 
converted into the social good. As commonly pointed out by Foucault and Arendt, in liberal 
imagination society has served as an answer to the mystery: as the intermediary sphere between 
the private and the public, society is not only where individual pursuit of self-interest 
enigmatically benefits others through the working of the “individual hand” (Foucault 2008: 277-
280) but also where private needs and necessities of citizens are taken care of as collective 
concerns (Arendt 1958: 41-43). In contrast, under neoliberal conditions, the social as the 
intermediary space—in which self-interest is connected with care for others—are gradually 
folded into the practice of self-care. Lessenich (2011) describes the process as “the 
subjectivization of the social” that hands over “social responsibility from public (collective) 
institutions to private (individual) actors” (315). The social good is now imagined not as the 
result of aligning individual interest with collective gain but as being directly achieved through 
the production of “a ‘socialized self’ who, in relying on and taking care of him/herself, is 
actually acting in the name and for the sake of society” (306). This change explains why social 
entrepreneurs, social innovators and ethical enterprises—to whom care of self is 
indistinguishable from social responsibility and vice versa—have emerged as a new ideal 
subject.   
The form of society that consists of human capitals, therefore, significantly differs from 
the social universe of liberal and social governments. It is well-known that the modern social 
imaginary has been based on the conceptualization of society “as an objective order with its own 
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regulated dynamics” (Poovey 2002: 129). That is to say, society has been imagined as the 
autonomous and abstract plane that exists separate from individual human actors and their 
particular perspectives (Taylor 2003). A Famous Durkheimian axiom—“as a totality, society is 
bigger than the sum of its parts” (Lukes 1973: 57)—lay in fact at the heart of this 
conceptualization of society as an object sui generis.33 As I show in Chapters 2 and 5, such an 
abstract, objective, and universal imaginary of society has been gradually replaced with the new 
image of fragmented, temporary, and multiple networks of participatory, ethical citizens. Society 
is increasingly imagined as the congregation of intimate and affective bonds “produced, step by 
step, by participatory citizens rather than an a priori domain into which the state interjects” 
(Muehlebach 2012: 43). As the objectivity of social structure has been foreclosed, therefore, the 
individual’s social responsibilities and ethical practices have been more emphasized and 
considered a way of directly “transforming the world” and contributing to the social good. For 
this reason, as discussed in Chapter 5, the recent plethora of “the social” can be understood as 
symptomatic of the vanishing of “society” as a universal and abstract plane. 
What should be noted is that the new social imaginary is not unrelated to neoliberal post-
work conditions in which labor has lost its status as the foundation of society. As Ferguson 
(2015: Ch. 2) points out, the key dispotisifs of the welfare state’s social government—family 
care, social insurance, education, and trade unions—were primarily organized around labor and 
its collective rights. Labor has served not only as the concrete means to survival but also as an 
abstract entry to claim social rights and obtain social recognition (Balibar 2004; Castel 2003; 
                                                 
33 Poovey (2002) points out that statistics have served as the most appropriate knowledge form for this abstract and 
objective imaginary of society. See also Hacking (1990) and Mitchell (2002). As I will discuss in Chapter 2, the 
ethnographic turn in developmental knowledge is relevant to the transformation of the modern social imaginary. In 
addition, various new forms of social scientific knowledge including “big data” recently begin to challenge the 
hegemony of statistics. See Davies (2015a) and also his newspaper article “How statistics lost their power – and 
why we should fear what comes next” The Guardian (Jan. 19, 2017). 
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Rosanvallon 2000). The decline of labor and the replacement of free laborer with human capital 
in the neoliberal human condition thus raises the important question: What can replace the status 
of labor as the foundation of society and solidarity? The recent upsurge of discourses 
surrounding caring labor, affective labor, and gift-exchange in relation to the resurgence of the 
social reflects not simply a transformation in the nature of work but also the emergence of 
various experiments in search of a new societal foundation on the condition of human capital 
regime. In this dissertation, I examine potential candidates for cementing “the social”—ethical 
care, affective labor, and gift-exchange—and show that, due the inability to reflect political 
antagonism and objective structures, these moral and economic practices remain within the 
threshold of fragmented intimate and ethical sociality. 
The heuristic conceptualization of neosocial government seeks neither to complete the 
prevalent Western-centered teleological genealogy of governmental rationalities, i.e, liberal 
government-social government-neoliberal government (and subsequently neosocial 
government), nor to argue that old developmental government has been completely replaced with 
the new form of governing rationality. The conceptualization rather aims to illuminate how a 
post-developmental state’s endeavors to manage the crisis of reproduction and to find new 
development through the construction of society are conditioned by and entangled with 
neoliberal conditions that produce human capital. Just as the social government of welfare states 
did not replace liberalism, but rather was constructed upon the liberal human condition that 
presupposes free laborer who possesses and exchanges his or her property or labor forces in the 
market (Burchell, Gordon, and Miller 1991; Donzelot 1994), the “neosocial” governing 
rationality also operates upon the neoliberal human condition and the figure of new homo 
œconomicus who constructs themselves as investable subjects who appreciate all the aspects of 
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their lives as assets in a manageable portfolio. In addition, as Mitchell Dean argues, concrete 
forms of government “must be considered in their combination and recombination with other 
diverse, power relations” including different governing rationalities (2015: 363).34 As an 
ethnographic investigation of the social economy sector in South Korea, this dissertation will 
concentrate on the modus operandi of what can be called “neosocial government” and the gray 
zone where the incipient governing rationality is articulated with neoliberal rationality and old 
developmentalism.   
 
OBJECTS AND METHOD 
 
In concluding this chapter, the objects and the method of analysis employed in this dissertation 
need to be clarified. Although my research has an affinity with the studies of “neoliberal 
governmentality,”35 it also aims to engage with and overcome their analytical limitations. It is 
undeniable that governmentality studies have provided a useful means to critically examine 
contemporary governing rationalities and technologies. They open the possibility to approach 
neoliberalism not simply as macroeconomic doctrines or policies but as an assemblage of 
                                                 
34 Foucault goes even further to argue that the competition among different governing rationality can be thought as a 
place of politics. In concluding analysis of neoliberalism, he remarks: “...art of government according to truth, art 
of government according to the rationality of the sovereign state, and art of government according to the 
rationality of economic agents, and more generally, according to the rationality of the governed themselves. And it 
is all these different arts of government, all these different types of ways of calculating, rationalizing, and 
regulating the art of government which, overlapping each other, broadly speaking constitute the object of political 
debate from the nineteenth century. What is politics, in the end, if not both the interplay of these different arts of 
government with their different reference points and the debate to which these different arts of government give 
rise? It seems to me that it is here that politics is born.” (2008: 313) 
35 For general introductions to governmentality studies and their concrete analysis of neoliberalism, see Dean 
(2009); Lemke et al. (2011); Rose (1999); Rose and Miller (2008); Walters, (2000). 
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rationalities, practices, and strategies.36 Furthermore, the studies also help illuminate how the 
various programs and strategies transact in reality and how the neoliberal rationalities have been 
metamorphosed and advanced (Dardot and Laval 2013; Larner and Craig 2005; Lemke 2002). 
As James Ferguson (2010) aptly criticizes, however, the studies have often limited their inquiry 
to the question of whether particular governing programs are neoliberal or not and thus have 
resulted in reasserting an already familiar conclusion that heterogeneous rationalities and 
technologies ultimately contribute to the working of neoliberalism.  
This reflection leads to a more general critique of governmentality studies—that they 
tend to overemphasize the stability and efficacy of governing programs and technologies. 
Although they continue to emphasize the heterogeneous or even contradictory natures of 
governing rationalities, their actual descriptions seem to be often totalizing and even 
functionalist (Brenner 1994; Donzelot and Gordon 2008; Flew 2012; Hilgers 2010; Lemke, 
Krasmann, and Bröckling 2011; Stäheli 2011). Such a tendency is most manifest in the ways that 
they account for the inherent failures or ambiguities of governing programs. Although they 
ostensibly and frequently acknowledge that governing programs do not necessarily produce the 
desired effect and “reality always escapes the theories that inform programmes” (Rose and 
Miller 2008: 35), the unintended results and conflicts are often described simply as “productive 
obstructions” to advance the programs. As Stäheli points out, even when the failures of programs 
are seriously examined in the studies, they tend to be regarded as the “empirical shortcomings” 
of programs rather than as “the ontological aporia of governmental technologies” (2011: 279). 
The burgeoning governmentality studies on social economy and social entrepreneurship 
                                                 
36 For different perspectives on neoliberalism focusing on its nature in terms of economic ideology, policies, and 
governmental rationality, see Larner (2000). 
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share the same drawback. In mostly focusing on how social economy and social entrepreneurship 
contribute to neoliberal or “advanced liberal” government, they usually reach the conclusion that 
“the socials” are instrumental and functional managing the crisis of contemporary neoliberalism 
(Carmel and Harlock 2008; Dey 2014; Kim 2015; Kim 2016; Pathak 2014). To overcome this 
rather unidimensional approach, this thesis purports to illuminate competing desires and 
conflicting perspectives found in South Korea’s social economy sector, rather than asking 
whether social economy and social innovation are inherently neoliberal or not. Evidently, “social 
economy” in South Korea serves as an encompassing signifier containing divergent and 
heterogeneous desires: not only governmental desire to manage social risks at a minimal cost and 
find a new engine of development, but also mixed desires from the below. These include: 
individual will to self-improvement and economic survival; an impulse to refuse work and its 
disciplinary regime; anti-neoliberal aspirations to (re)build a society and community; social 
activists’ longstanding anti-statism; feminists’ intervention to de-familiarize and expand care; 
and even nationalistic passion for “catching up” to the moral development of advanced countries. 
Various longings are invested in the field of social economy and thus create a variegated field. 
As noted earlier, one of the objectives of this dissertation is to excavate the multi-layered strata 
of the congealed desires.37  
Paying attention to various, ambiguous desires, however, cannot be simply equated with 
phenomenologically describing the heterogeneity inherent in the field or unveiling intricate 
multiplicities of reality (Brady 2014; Li 2007). What this dissertation takes as the focal point of 
analysis is the working of dispositifs that serve to “translate” the varied desires into the 
                                                 
37 As a caveat, this does not mean that all the participants in social economy well recognize their own impulses and 
choose the social economy sector to pursue them. While some of the aspirations are self-reflective, many desires 
remain obscure and ambiguous even to the participants themselves and only become visible in retrospect as a 
result of the “(mis)translation” (cf. Callon and Latour 1981 and Latour 2007. See also Rose and Miller (1990)). 
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governable forms.38 In an interview that was conducted in 1977—when he was developing the 
notion of governmentality, Foucault defines dispositif (apparatus) as follows:39  
 
What I’m trying to single out with this term is, firstly, a thoroughly heterogeneous 
ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, 
laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and 
philanthropic propositions—in short, the said as much as the unsaid. Such are the 
elements of dispositif (apparatus). Dispositif itself is the network that can be established 
between these elements… I understand by the term dipositif a sort of formation that has 
its major function at a given historical moment that of responding to an urgent need… I 
said that dispositif is essentially of a strategic nature, which means assuming that it is a 
matter of a certain manipulation of relations of forces, either developing them in a 
particular direction, blocking them, stabilizing them, utilizing them, etc. Dispositif is thus 
always inscribed in a play of forces… (Foucault 1977, 194ff; emphasis added)    
 
In this quotation, Foucault provides a comprehensive definition of dispositif in three distinct but 
related senses: a diverse number of strategic/tactical elements, a specific set of relations between 
the elements, and the governing effects produced by these relations (Agamben 2006; Hardy 
2015). What should be noted in this quotation in relation to our discussion, however, is rather 
that, although a dispositif appears to be dominant, totalizing, and even omnipotent, it is primarily 
“responsive” and “manipulative.”40 The strategic and technical dispositifs respond to and 
                                                 
38 Dispositif has been translated into English as “system,” “deployment,” or more commonly as “apparatus.” The 
latter translation of “apparatus” has often been criticized, not only because it emphasizes the notion’s mechanical 
connotation over its neutral meaning of specific disposition (Kessler 2007) but also because Foucault himself 
distinguishes appareil and dispositif (Bussolini 2010). At the risk of “non-translation” that keeps its semantic field 
empty, I rather use the original term “dispositif” here rather than apparatus to shed light on its function of 
configuring heterogeneous elements. For the debate over the translation of dispositif, see Bussolini (2010) who 
suggests “dispositive” as an alternative translation.     
39 Foucault has developed the concept of dispositif in analyzing the historical dispositif of sexuality in The History of 
Sexuality: An Introduction (1978) and the dispositif of security in the first lecture of Security, Territory, 
Population (2009). Dispositif has repeatedly been pointed out as the key concept to understand Foucault’s later 
works (Deleuze 1987; Lazzarato 2006). For the development of the concept in Foucault’s works, see Agamben 
(2009: 1-24). Agamben presents disposif as a replacement of Foucault’s former concept, historical a priori.  
40 In commenting on Foucault’s concept of dispositif, Deleuze also points out the inherently open and disjointed 
characters of dispositif: “What is dispositif? In the first instance it is a tangle, a multi-linear ensemble. It is 
composed of lines, each having a different nature. And the lines in the dispositif do not outline or surround systems 
which are each homogenous in their own right, object, subject, language, and so on, but follow directions… 
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intervene into existing urgent needs and ongoing “plays of forces” in order to conduct and 
“develop them in a particular direction.” In this way, dispositifs as a set of discursive and non-
discursive technologies, programs, and practices creates multiple loci where the above 
enumerated miscellaneous desires are connected to and organized by governmental programs.41  
In illuminating various conflicting desires that are invested in the fields of social 
economy and social innovation, I approach the fields in terms of dispositifs that respond to the 
minuscule desires and translate them into governable formulations. It is only in this sense that I 
argue that “social economy” and “social innovation” are constitutive to what Étienne Balibar 
(1992) calls “dominant ideology.”42 In elaborating Althusser’s pioneering analysis of ideological 
state apparatus, Balibar problematizes conventional sociological theories of hegemony as well as 
the orthodox Marxist notion of ideology that often view dominant ideologies as reflecting the 
dominant class’s interests and foisting them onto the dominated. He maintains that, if a particular 
                                                 
[However] Each line is broken and subject to changes in direction, bifurcating and forked, and subject to drifting.” 
(Deleuze 1991: 159).  
41 In this regard, topologically speaking, dispositif corresponds to the dimension of “techniques of government” in 
Foucault’s later explanation about the tri-layered structure of his analysis. In one of his last interviews, Foucault 
distinguishes strategic relations, techniques of government, and states of domination:  
   
It seems to me that we must distinguish between power relations understood as strategic games between 
liberties and the states of domination that people ordinarily call “power”… And between the two, between 
games of power and states of domination, you have technologies of government—understood, of course, in a 
very broad sense that includes not only the way institutions are governed but also the way one governs one’s 
wife and children. The analysis of these techniques is necessary because it is very often through such 
techniques that states of domination are established and maintained. There are three levels to my analysis of 
power: strategic relations, techniques of government, and states of domination. (1997: 299; emphasis added) 
 
In other words, the state of domination would be “established” and “maintained,” as the techniques of government 
intervene into the strategic games of power and “immobilize them and prevent any reversibility of movement” 
(Foucault 1997: 293).  
42 Although Foucault remained skeptical of the Marxist conceptualization of ideology (Foucault 1991), Althusser 
(1971)’s redefinition of ideology opens a possibility to explore the affinities between Foucauldian analyses of 
discourse and government and Althusserian investigation of material apparatuses of ideology. Their analyses rely 
on and use the same concepts such as appareil and dispositif. See Hardy (2015) and Montag (1995). 
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dominant ideology works, it should primarily depend upon “the lived experience of the 
dominated masses” which involves not only an acceptance or recognition but also “a protest or 
revolt against the existing world”: “Just as the accumulation of capital is made of living labor,” 
he continues, dominant apparatuses work by using “the popular religious, moral, legal and 
aesthetic imaginary of the masses as their specific fuel” (Balibar 1992: 12-13). In this sense, “the 
dominant ideology in a given society” is nothing but “a specific universalization of the imaginary 
of the dominated” (Balibar 1992: 12-13).  
To follow his point, this dissertation views “social economy” as neither a unilaterally 
constituted reality through governing programs nor an “ideological cloak” imposed by the 
neoliberal dominant class (Cremin 2011); I rather understand it as a particular attempt of 
translating and organizing the lived desires and experiences of the governed including their anti-
neoliberal aspirations. In a sense, this necessitates turning the conventional governmentality 
approach inside out. That is to say, instead of inquiring how power constitutes its objects and 
makes them intelligible and docile, our methodological orientation should be to navigate 
dispositifs as a site of translation and ask how it functions with the conflicting desires and 
dreams as its source of power. 
This “bottom-up governmentality” approach, to borrow Clive Barnett (2005)’s words, not 
only helps to achieve one of the theoretical purposes of this thesis that deconstructs the 
homogenous and totalizing imagery of neoliberalism; it also opens a possibility for a productive 
conversation between ethnography and governmentality studies or what Brady (2014) calls 
“ethnographies of governmentalities.” Again, this is not simply saying that ethnography can 
draw “a more finely grained picture” of the everyday working of a dispositifs that is often 
ignored by more formulaic governmentality studies that “bracket out the multiplicity and 
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complexity” (Brady 2014: 28).43 The contribution of ethnography to governmentality studies is 
rather related to the inquiries about how to disclose undercurrent desires that are invested and 
congealed within dispositifs and how to elucidate subjects’ ethical and practical predicaments 
caused by the gap between their ambiguous desires and their (mis)translation.44 In other words, 
the ethnographies of governmentalities should be a sort of construction of a double-layered 
map—the map of desire and the map of translating dispositifs—and reckoning how the two maps 
are overlaid and detuned (cf. Marcus 1995). If, as Foucault famously remarks, a new 
governmentality or an alternative way of governing “cannot be deduced from texts” but rather 
“must be invented” (2010: 94), such invention would only become possible by attending to and 
grappling with the latent desires and their mistranslations in order to conduct and channel them 
in a different direction.45 The objective of the mapping would thus be not a critique in itself but 
to identify and describe the thin void between two overlaid maps and hence to help imagine the 
conditions of possibility for politics and “the invention of new government.” This work thus 
aims to contribute to drawing and navigating the double-layered map of “the potential” and “the 
present” in contemporary South Korean society.    
 
 
                                                 
43 For a trenchant critique of Brady’s rather simplistic argument, see Dean (2015).  He argues that Brady exaggerates 
the totalizing tendency in governmentality studies and also privileges ethnography as the only method to 
illuminate the “actual” reality and its heterogeneity. My point is that ethnography is less related to heterogeneity 
itself than to explore the working of dispositifs and subjective predicaments caused by the translating work.  
44 It should be noted that my analysis is not an “ethnography” in its strict sense of “writing about a particular other 
culture, people, or ethnos.” For the problems of this conventional definition of ethnography, see Clifford (1988); 
Forsey (2010); Gupta and Ferguson (1992); and Ingold (2014). I rather understand ethnography in a broader sense 
of an attempt to describe and understand in-depth social settings and cultural contexts within which subjects’ 
rather mundane practices and tactics are made and unfold (cf. Rabinow et al. 2008).  
45 Here, James Ferguson’s point—that the question of “what do we want?” is more important and more difficult than 





Chapter 2, “Seeing Like a Social Entrepreneur,” traces how the notions of poverty, development, 
and community have been remolded in South Korea’s search of a new development paradigm. 
By illuminating how poverty is redefined in relational and affective terms in the community 
regeneration project of a small shanty town in Seoul and how the solution is found in the 
promotion of entrepreneurialism among the residents, I particularly focus on how various 
dispositifs and ethnographical methods are adopted and deployed to translate local knowledge 
and communal bonds into business resources. As neoliberal rationality or what I call “the logic 
of human capital” is extended to the level of the collective, a community is now re-imagined as a 
hybrid space in which mutual, affective association and neoliberal enterprise sociality are 
intermingled and become indistinguishable. What is remarkable is that, surrounding this new 
governing space of “enterprise community” or “community enterprise,” the traditional roles of 
the state, the market, and the ethical subjects come to be rearticulated. While the state recedes to 
the role of incubator or facilitator of development rather than the central planner, the 
“empowered” ethical citizens and entrepreneurial residents come to assume the responsibilities 
not only for creating communities or “social bonds” but also for appreciating the asset value of 
the collectivity.  
Chapter 3, “Ethical Citizenship in Practice,” illuminates the changing relations of the 
state, the market, and entrepreneurial citizens in the broader context of the transition from 
developmental (non-)citizenship to ethical citizenship. For the last decade, the South Korean 
government has actively introduced and promoted the social care market not only in response to 
the crisis of care and reproduction, but also as a new source of job opportunities for an 
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underemployed population. The social care market thus serves as a good window through which 
to investigate how ethical citizenship incorporates marginalized populations into a cheap, 
precarious labor market under the name of care and how new lines of exclusion are drawn in the 
blossoming, seemingly inclusive citizenship. In following the vicissitude of an elderly care 
cooperative from its creation to its closure, this chapter demonstrates how the ethical citizens are 
encouraged to constitute themselves as investable subjects and how the nature of their ethical 
caring practices has changed into appreciable projects that are expected to generate measurable 
social impacts within a limited time span. In the process, the relation between the state and 
ethical citizens becomes similar to the one of investor and investee. As a result, in opposition to 
the general belief that the rise of ethical citizenship signals a rupture from ruthless developmental 
(non-)citizenship, I shed light on the continuities between them and argue that the difference 
between the two citizenships should be found rather in the financial logic and “projective 
ethicality” based on which ethical citizenship measures citizens’ contributions and qualifications.  
After examining the transformation in the realm of care, in Chapter 4, “The Affective 
Life of Post-Development,” I move on to the alteration of the other pillar that had undergirded 
the old developmental regime, i.e. work and labor. I begin with the pervasive despair and 
hopelessness among underemployed South Korean youth. The end of rapid economic growth has 
created a growing rift between youth’s lingering desire for a “good ordinary life” and their 
deteriorating, precarious socioeconomic conditions. The social innovation and affective labor 
(hwaldong) have emerged as a stopgap to fill the chasm, by encouraging youth to translate their 
precarity into an opportunity and manage that situation with their own hands. In opposition to 
various works that attend to the political or social potentials of affective labor and affective 
activism, I illuminate instead how the discourses of social innovation and affective labor have 
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been used not only to conceal and justify the precarious working conditions but also to create and 
reinforce hierarchical divisions and disparities among youth. In oscillating between the 
oppressive labor regime in old developmentalism and the precarious promise of neoliberal 
freedom, youth in the social economy have only committed to adapt, negotiate, and manage the 
precarious future rather than successfully formulating their political agenda.  
In continuation of the discussion, Chapter 5, “The Moral Economy of Face” returns to the 
question of the new social imaginary to address the political possibility of social economy 
activism. I begin with the metaphors of “face” that are often found in fair trade and social 
economy activism: fair trade and social economic transactions are frequently described as “trade 
with persons whose faces you know” and their ultimate goal is presented as building “capitalism 
or market economy with a human face.” To understand how and why the activists rely on the 
metaphor of face to problematize market economy, I first examine the intimate connection 
between gift-exchange and face based on Marcel Mauss’ analyses of gift and present face as a 
junction of recognition and disciplinary empowerment. Next, drawing on research in a fair trade 
social enterprise, I illuminate fair trade as a hybrid practice of “marketized gift-exchange” in 
which the multiple faces of “entrepreneurial producers” and “responsible consumers” are 
produced and circulated. In analyzing the essentially marketized features of social solidarity 
pursued by fair trade and the social economy, I maintain that the widespread metaphors of “face” 
in the activism betray the contradictory nature of the market-based solidarity that seeks to 
redefine the economic structure without political challenges to it. 
I conclude this dissertation with “Innovation, Care, Gift, and Gary Becker” in which I 
explore possibilities for a new universal foundation of solidarity in the financialized, “post-
work” society. In recapitulating how the potential candidates—community, care, affective labor, 
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and gift-exchange—are intersected and articulated with a human capital regime to constitute the 
neosocial government, I argue the necessity of re-inventing the universal vision of politics upon 
which the current dispositifs can be rearranged to restore a broken link between social solidarity 
and politics and to challenge the neoliberal human condition.  
In this dissertation, I have tried to make each chapter as independent as possible, despite 
shared themes, questions, and numerous cross-references. The relations between chapters can be 
read in various ways. Each chapter can be understood as a critical investigation of the conceptual 
and practical foundations of the “returned socials”—community, care, affective labor, and the 
spirit of gift. Additionally, each chapter focuses, respectively, on the transformations of 
knowledge production, ethicality, affects, and social solidarity on the neoliberal human condition 
and in the neosocial government. In so doing, each chapter describes some of the representative 
subjects and groups that comprise South Korea’s social economy sector—community/social 
entrepreneurs, intermediary organizations, care workers, government officials, youth innovators, 
NGOs, and ethical consumers. I hope that structuring the dissertation in this manner provides 
readers multiple useful entrances to understand this fast-emerging, highly hybrid, and multi-









SEEING LIKE A SOCIAL ENTREPRENEUR: 
A NEW EPISTOMOLOGY OF POVERTY AND COMMUNITY 
 
“What I like to say is: Human capital puts people at the center of an economy… when we 
think about economies, when we think about development, that’s a liberating point of 





On a chilly evening in March 2014 in Seongbuk, a northeastern city of Seoul, I was sitting in a 
meeting room of the borough hall with a number of local residents and social entrepreneurs for 
the first convening of the “Workshop for Social Economy and Community Development.” The 
promotional leaflet that I received described the aim of the 10-week long workshop as follows: 
“By mentoring and networking future community leaders and social entrepreneurs, the workshop 
helps the participants discover new community business opportunities and seek an alternative 
community development based on social economy.” At the podium, a local administrator, the 
organizer of the workshop, was expressing his frustration over the region’s deteriorated socio-
economic conditions. Despite the district government’s longstanding efforts, the peri-urban area 
was notably suffering from a high poverty rate, substantial income inequality, and community 
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degenerations.1 After the long, depressing speech, he added: “so it is time that local residents and 
innovative entrepreneurs like you have to become the subjects of problem-solving in place of the 
bureaucratic and ineffective state. You are those who best know about your community so you 
can find the best solutions.” He concluded that the poor conditions could provide various 
business opportunities for social enterprises, and even half-jokingly added that Seongbuk thus 
would be “the best district for community business and investment.”  
Some of the attendees chuckled, because obviously it sounded like an ironic parody of 
the notorious slogan “Korea, the best country for business and investment” that repeatedly has 
been used by the government since the wake of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. On the surface, 
the contexts surrounding the two phrases seem to be quite opposite: whereas the central 
government’s old slogan reflects a prevailing neoliberal condition in which the states have to 
compete to create a “business-friendly environment” through tax reduction, deregulation, and 
flexible labor (Duménil and Lévy 2012; Harvey 2005; Ong 2006), social economy and 
community development have been considered largely as solutions for social problems created 
by the very same neoliberal policies, and furthermore, as the antidote to neoliberal 
marketization—this might explain why the administrator’s words were interpreted as a joke. This 
local administrator’s statement, however, intrigued me for somewhat different reasons: above all, 
it was a candid acknowledgement of the government’s failure in directly managing social 
problems, which have been prevalent recently in Korean administrations; furthermore, in so 
doing, the statement seemed to tacitly repeat the neoliberal gesture that exempts the government 
from its old responsibility for social welfare and limits its role in supporting and facilitating 
                                                 
1 As noted in Chapter 1, in contrast to the Gangnam area that is considered the most affluent and developed in Seoul, 
the Gangbuk area where the Seongbuk district is located has been relatively poor and underdeveloped. In 2014, 
Seongbuk ranked third in the number of beneficiaries of national basic livelihood and second in the number of 
impoverished elders among 25 districts in Seoul.  
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voluntary activities of business and communities;2 and finally and most importantly, in the 
statement, social problems such as poverty were framed as “business opportunities” and thus 
were recast as issues that can and should be resolved by social/community economy and 
entrepreneurship.  
In this chapter, I will attempt to illuminate and contextualize the very undercurrent of the 
logic of this statement. In tracing how the aforementioned workshop drew up and devised a 
concrete community development plan for Bukjeong Maul, a small shanty town in the Seongbuk 
district, I focus on how the new conceptions of poverty, development, and community have 
surfaced in the discourses and practices of social economy and community business. To begin 
with, I explore the social contexts in which a new strategy of community development has 
emerged and how this latest strategy has problematized previous state-led developmental tactics. 
Next, I move to trace the concrete techniques and dispositifs that function in the workshop and 
illuminate how they produce and translate local knowledge into resources for profit-making. In 
particular, I center on what can be called the “ethnographic turn” in the community development 
discourse and how it contributes to the reification and commodification of locality. Lastly, I 
maintain that in this scheme of new community development, we witness a new social imaginary 
in which a community as the embodiment of communal values and a community as an enterprise 
are indistinguishably overlapped and interconnected. The chapter’s conclusion will be devoted to 
briefly sketching what the “new epistemology of community” teaches us about the transforming 
relations of market, community, and the state, in critically engaging with James Scott (1998)’s 
                                                 
2 According to Harvey (1989), this transition can be described as from the “managerialism” to the “entrepreneurism” 
of urban governance, in which state-centered regulation is subsequently replaced by more fragmented and flexible 
governance based on non-state entities including voluntary organizations, communities, NGOs, and private firms. 
With the transition, the state focuses on facilitating and inciting the self-governing activities of various 
organizations rather than seeking centralized planning. See also Hall and Hubbard (1998) and Jessop (1997). 
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opposition between the unitary, homogeneous, transcendent state and diverse, heterogeneous, 
immanent communities.     
 
IN SEARCH OF NEW COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 
 
Bukjeong-Maul, the so-called “last shanty town [moon town, tal-tongne] in Seoul,” is located 
around the Seoul City Wall, a national heritage site.3 The town was illegally formed into its 
current shape with a massive migration from rural areas to peri-urban Seoul during the rapid 
industrialization period of the 1960s, and more than half of the residents who have lived in the 
village since then are now over 65 years old. In contrast to Seongbuk’s other neighborhoods that 
have been redeveloped primarily as apartment residential areas, the redevelopment of the village 
has been highly restricted and arrested because of its illegality as well as the existence of the 
Seoul City Wall. As a result, the town has become renowned for its authentic, nostalgic outlook 
of the Seoul of the 1960s and has recently attracted urban tourists who are looking for exotic 
experiences and photo opportunities.  
A viewer’s guide for the documentary film “Connect to Bukjeong Maul” [Chŏpsok! 
Bukjeong Maul] which was broadcast nationwide on a public TV network in 2014, describes the 
town as follows:   
 
 
                                                 
3 South Korea’s rapid economic growth in the development period was accompanied by overnight urbanization and 
the formation of shanty towns in big cities. Because the shanty towns were usually located on the top of hills, they 
were commonly called (often affectionately) “moon towns” [tal-tongne], meaning close to the Moon. As many 
other shanty towns in Seoul have been redeveloped into high rise apartment compounds for the last two decades, 




Bukjeong Maul, where about 500 households are warmly huddled together, is located just 
at the foot of the Seoul City Wall. By taking the community bus no. 3 through the only 
traffic between bustling downtown Seoul and this rustic village, we are gradually 
entering into a wholly different Seoul with cuckoos’ songs heard. Getting to know the 
untainted residents who enjoy happiness and human affection [人情,  injŏng] brought by 
poverty and wandering deeper into the cozy narrow alleys, we also begin to become 
enchanted with the fantastic feeling of traveling backwards in time... [emphasis added]  
 
As the above make clear, viewers of “Connect to Bukjeong” are invited to imagine a visit to 
Bukjeong Maul as a form of time travel in which the geographical distance between “developed” 
downtown Seoul and the “underdeveloped” peri-urban area is replaced by an imaginary temporal 
gulf (cf. Creighton 1997). In this time travel, we would locate what is presumably “lost” in 
contemporary metropolitan life: not only material conditions of poor communities such as 
“narrow alleys” but also pre-existing values such as “happiness” and “human affection.” Such a 
nostalgic, romanticized imagery surrounding the slum appears to be overtly deployed by the 
government to boost tourist visits. For example, a tourism leaflet issued by the district 
government introduces Bukjeong Maul as “our Ancient Future” (to borrow the title of Helena 
Noberg-Hodge (1991)’s famous book on the communal and self-sufficient lifestyle of a Tibetan 
community), which has managed to escape “the massive destructive waves of modernization and 
development” for the past several decades; thus this village is where “people still live like a big 
family within an unmarred environment.” That is to say, Bukjeong Maul is often imagined as in 
a kind of “pristine” state of pre-development that has been relatively unaffected by the rapid, 
destructive industrial urbanization and has maintained traditional communality and familial 
values.   
During my fieldwork research in 2013-15, the Seoul Metropolitan and the Seongbuk 
district governments were seeking to render Bukjeong Maul as an experimental field for 
alternative community development. In 2013, the municipal government nominated the village 
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as “Seoul’s best community (maul)” and launched the “Seoul Wall Neighborhoods Development 
Plan” that sought an “alternative, community-based development” by “reinvigorating and 
reusing the existing community resources” rather than the whole removal type of 
redevelopment.4 Although some residents mounted opposition to the alternative development 
plan and the general agreement over the type of redevelopment was never officially reached 
among the residents,5 local community enterprises and NGOs formed a planning team in 2014 
and embarked upon their own community regeneration activities in Bukjeong Maul with the 
support of the municipal government. Choi Bong-Mun, a local activist who participated in the 
planning team, related to me in an interview: “Bukjeong Maul is a kind of perfect place for 
experimenting with a new community development. It has a lot of potential resources and 
capitals that cannot be found in already developed neighborhoods. If the plan goes well, perhaps 
we could re-experience in Bukjeong Maul how our past development could have been [emphasis 
added].” In order to grasp this rather strange phrase, “re-experience how our past development 
could have been” and why Bukjeong Maul has become a test bed for this experiment, it would be 
necessary to first understand how the current government, activists, and development experts 
assess the former development strategy and what they are proposing with the term “alternative 
community development.” 
According to “Seoul’s Basic Plan for Community Development” issued in 2012 by the 
municipal government, the new community development primarily aims at “restoring human 
values, social trust, and communal networks that have been destroyed for the last 40 years by the 
                                                 
4 The Seoul Metropolitan Government, “The Seoul Government Announces the Seoul Wall Neighborhoods 
Development Plan” [한양도성 성곽마을 조성계획 발표], Press release (May 19, 2013). 
5 Although the existence of the Seoul City Wall has prevented Bukjeong Maul from being redeveloped into a high-
rise apartment area, some residents have still preferred the whole removal type of redevelopment because of its 
high profitability. Since the alternative development plan was announced, they have attempted to put pressure on 
the government to annul the plan, which has caused occasional conflicts among the residents.     
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state-led development policies.” The document offers highly critical reflections on the preceding 
development policies. “Albeit successful in some aspects,” it says, “the policies have focused 
only on material improvement and economic growth, and disregarded social values and identities 
of places and communities.” As a result, “traditional communities and social networks have been 
totally destroyed and the quality of life has deteriorated.”6 This tsunami-like image of economic 
development, which has destroyed all sociality and communality, finds its more sophisticated (or 
at least more pseudo-theoretical) version in the works of Cho HaeJeong, the head of the “Seoul 
Community Committee” as well as one of the leading anthropologists in South Korea. In 
maintaining that the main aim of community development should be to create “caring 
postmodern communities” and overcome “the past condensed modernization process,” she 
argues:   
 
So far Korean society has been obsessed with state-led development and quantitative 
economic growth. In the process, the social problems have been diagnosed and prescribed 
from the perspective of “construction state” [t'ogŏn gukka] with a focus on infrastructure 
and material condition.... In the present postmodern society, highways and high rises are 
not important anymore. What is more significant is to create communities [maul] in 
which self-sufficient population/residents are produced and trained to feel happiness and 
human affection with small relations and affairs. (2007: 153-4) 
 
In these standard assessments of the past development strategy, two repeated phrases of “state-
led” and “material infrastructure-focused” are worth noting in the sense that they reveal the focal 
points of the prevalent critical reflections. Past development strategy is characterized formally as 
a top-down decision-making by the state so that the planning mechanism has been non-
responsive to the “concrete” needs of local communities. Also, in its contents, the state-led 
                                                 
6 The Seoul Metropolitan Government, Seoul’s Basic Plan for Community Development [서울특별시 마을공동체 
기본계획], 2012, pp. 3-6. 
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strategy has invested only in the improvement of material conditions and infrastructures so that 
the result is a lamentable loss of traditional communality and spiritual values.  
Needless to say, such problematization always-already includes particular prescriptions 
for the noted problems. The main features of the alternative community development plan, 
therefore, should be found in its “residents-initiated” and “social” development rather than in 
state-controlled economic improvement. “Seoul’s Basic Plan for Community Development” 
clearly explicates its principles as the following phrases: “Community Development with 
residents’ own hands! 1. Target: Relational communities not administrative or material units; 2. 
Aim: the promotion of communality not the improvement of infrastructure; 3. Method: 
Residents-led bottom-up process not the state-led top-down intervention.”7  
With shifts of focus in development policies, comes a new conceptualization of poverty 
as the main target of development. Above all, as the social and communal dimensions of 
development are emphasized, poverty begins to be explained social and relational issues rather 
than material and economical predicaments (and vice versa). For example, “Seongbuk’s Basic 
Plan for Community Development” identified the causes and effects of the lingering poverty in 
its rental housing areas as follows: “1. High unemployment rate; 2. High suicide rate of 
neglected, lonely elders; 3. The prevalent sense of deprivation caused by discrimination and 
inequality; 4. The lack of communal activities and interactions among residents; 5. The shortage 
of community welfare facilities.”8 Throughout this book-length policy report, poverty seems to 
                                                 
7 The Seoul Metropolitan Government, Ibid., p. 4. The new resident-led development plan works on the assumption 
that the active, participatory citizens become dissatisfied with the state-led social policies and want to deal with 
their situations with their own hands. In this sense, the new development strategy is consonant with what Klein 
and Millar (1995) calls “Do-It-Yourself welfare” as a post-welfare social policy. For DIY trend in poverty 
management, development policy, and the construction of citizenship, see also Huang (2016), Hyatt (1997), Ratto 
and Boler (2014), and Wolch and DeVerteuil (2001).  
8 The Seongbuk District Government, Seongbuk’s Basic Plan for Community Development, [성북구 마을만들기 
기본계획], 2012, p. 246. In contrast to high-rise apartment residential areas, rental housing areas mainly consist of 
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be displaced continuously onto emotional-affective problems such as “loneliness,” “the sense of 
deprivation,” and the lacks of relationality/communality. For that reason, the report faithfully 
reflects the current tendency that aligns poverty with emotional and moral languages rather than 
with the structural analytics of politics and economics (Fine 2001; Harriss 2002; Hyatt 2000; 
Muehlebach 2012). Clearly, such a diagnosis of poverty at the level of individual emotion and 
isolation elicits a series of depoliticized, morally-infused prescriptions such as “building an 
affectionate, caring community,” “promoting volunteer activities,” and “mobilizing poor elders 
to participate in community programs.”9  
These transformations in community development discourse may explain why Bukjeong 
Maul has drawn attention as an experimental field for the new community development plan. As 
seen above, the village has been imagined in a pre-developmental state that preserves social trust 
and networks intact in its incipient state.10 The new community development will be centered not 
on material, infrastructural improvement but on optimizing ‘social’ relations and ‘social’ capital 
that already exist in the village as resources. As Tania Li aptly points out, community-based 
development has a paradox at its heart: although community is assumed to exist naturally and to 
provide the good life unless destroyed by economic development, “experts must intervene to 
secure that goodness and enhance it” (2007: 232). Bukjeong Maul, which presumably has 
                                                 
working-class households including poor elders or underemployed young single adults. For a discussion of single 
women’s experience in rental housing, see Song (2014a). 
9 The Seongbuk District Government, Ibid., 2012, pp. 303-307.  
10 “Social capital” would be the best word to describe such social trust and networks. Since the mid-2000s, the Seoul 
Metropolitan Government has issued irregular reports on the measurement of Seoul’s social capital and has 
attempted to reflect the results in its development plan. The introduction of the notion of “social capital” in 
development discourse in South Korea is particularly interesting, given that the rise of the notion in global 
development agencies including the World Bank was related to the critical reflections on the “East-Asian 
development model” that was considered successful and then collapsed with the 1997 Asian financial crisis. For 
the debate surrounding the East Asian development model and its relation to the notion of social capital, see Hart 
(2001), Harriss (2002), and Fine (2004).  
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precious social, cultural assets and affectionate relations despite its economic poverty, serves as a 
laboratory where poverty alleviation can be attempted by intervening and optimizing the 
relational resources and existing social capital through social/community economy instead of the 
removal and reconstruction of the entire town. This is perhaps what Bong-Mun means by “re-
experience how our past development could have been.”      
In fact, the novelty of this type of approach to poverty becomes more obvious in the 
history of Bukjeong Maul itself. In the 1970s and the early 1980s, the issue of poverty used to be 
addressed in relation to national industrialization and modernization. For example, many of the 
residents in the town have the memory and experience of participating in the “New Village 
Movement” [Saemaul undong],11 the state-initiated nationwide “community modernization” 
campaign in the 1970s. The developmental state found that the main reason for urban and rural 
poverty was a lack of “infrastructure”, in particular the absence of “wide roads” [shinjak-ro] that 
could directly connect isolated villages to urban centers and the “market” (Kim 2009).12 To 
tackle the problem, the government provided sacks of cement and construction equipment for 
each village, and mobilized residents to build roads under the guidance and control of external 
experts. Although located in the urban area, Bukjeong Maul is not an exception: as many aged 
residents proudly recollect, a number of inhabitants at that time actively took part in the 
constructions of a new road and buildings including the community center and finally managed 
to get the extension of a public bus route to the village in 1983 as the indirect result of the 
“community modernization” movement.  
                                                 
11 For the unfolding of “New Village Movement” in the 1970s-80s, see Han S. (2004). The community development 
model has been exported to other Third World countries with the support of the South Korean government. See 
Han J. (2011).  
12 The emphasis on infrastructure that enables impoverished areas an access to the “market” is generally found in 
“development” discourses (Ferguson 1994; Escobar 1995). As pointed out by Ferguson (1994: 195-206), such 
technocratic and depoliticized solutions usually end up only expanding and reinforcing the state bureaucracy.   
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The still-prevailing poverty in the town, however, now has begun to be addressed in 
terms of the necessity of an affectionate, autonomous community. Whereas the “New Village 
Movement” aimed at “extending the state power to the capillary level of small villages” and 
mobilizing the population for the state’s modernization project (Kim 2009: 335), community 
residents are now, in stark contrast but interesting parallel, deployed for building a self-
governing, intimate community to supplement the self-proclaimed failure and retreat of the state.  
The essential question, then, is: what could serve as a “voluntary” motivating force, 
instead of the state, for this new community-based development? The promotion of 
“entrepreneurship” and the creation of “markets” among the poor emerge as the answer. Of 
course, these two answers are not novel at all. If not to mention C. K. Prahalad’s famous 
argument that we should “stop thinking of the poor as victims or as a burden and start 
recognizing them as resilient and creative entrepreneurs and value-conscious consumers” (2005: 
1), the belief in the entrepreneurial and market-savvy faculty of the poor and the conversion of 
the communal social relations into market resources have formed the core imaginary of the new 
poverty alleviation strategy in the global development discourse (Elyachar 2005, 2012; Roy 
2010; Schwittay 2011). In contrast to the past state’s intervention that purported to link and 
incorporate impoverished communities to the “national” market, what is at issue in the present 
plan is, therefore, to establish an internal and co-constitutive relationship between market and 
community that—even without any external intervention—can advance entrepreneurship and 
development. In this context, “social economy” and “community business” can be understood to 
signify such attempts to organize (pseudo-) markets from within communities.  
What should be noted here is that, as Elyachar (2012) aptly points out, the creation and 
dissemination of market rationality becomes possible only through the spread of new social 
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practices and technologies. As modular tools that can be applied to various contexts, such 
techniques and practices contribute “to turn community resources of the poor into a source of 
profit” (6). In what follows, I trace how the residents and social entrepreneurs of Bukjeong Maul 
have formulated tangible community business plans via diverse techniques and practices in the 
aforementioned workshop. In doing so, I will flesh out how community is radically reframed not 
only as a storehouse of business resources but also as a laboratory in which new business models 




Throughout the workshop, I was teamed up with a few community residents, three community 
/social enterprises who were interested in embarking on community businesses in Bukjeong 
Maul, and two community business “incubators” who were trained by the municipal government 
and assigned to the workshop to “mentor” the participants.13 Because the successful completion 
of the workshop can be a benefit in applying for government funding for community businesses, 
all these “players” [sŏnsu] actively participated in the workshop, although the number of 
participants per session varied.14  
                                                 
13 In fact, the workshop consisted of two main parts. While the first part included a series of general introductions of 
social entrepreneurship and community development, the second part comprised of the intensive activities and 
consulting described here. Many residents, local activists, and social entrepreneurs participated only in the first 
part. The second part of the workshop targeted more “serious” participants.      
14  Since the Seoul Metropolitan Government officially adopted community-based social economy as its “new 
development and poverty alleviation strategy” and began to deploy a comprehensive plan to support social economy 
in 2012, the 25 district governments in Seoul have been required to regularly offer social entrepreneurship training 
that target local residents and potential entrepreneurs in the region. With the completion of the training, the 
participants are entitled or encouraged to apply for government funding for social enterprise and community business. 
Being organized by the Seongbuk Community/Social Economy Center and sponsored by the district government, 




Community (Asset) Mapping 
The whole group activity began with “community mapping.” From May 2014 on, my team 
occasionally explored the area on foot to catalog important attributes of the village. Every 
expedition was followed by two or three life history interviews with old inhabitants. The whole 
mapping procedure was coordinated by Hee-Jin, a local anthropology graduate student, who 
introduced herself as an “urban ethnologist.” According to her, community mapping practices 
aim at helping the participants to see their surroundings as places with various potential and 
resources. “A village,” she stressed, “is like a treasure box. Everything is in there. The only thing 
you need to do is to excavate and use them properly.” Although Bukjeong Maul is a small town 
and it usually takes less than one hour to travel it on foot, Hee-Jin kept emphasizing the 
importance of microscopic approaches: “Everything can be the object of community mapping. I 
might be exaggerating, but even trash in a street can be a treasure if you can find a meaning 
there. So please don’t overlook anything.” All the excavated “treasures,” “community 
resources,” or “village assets” were next listed on an online interactive community asset map: in 
addition to the Seoul City Wall, a now-abandoned water well, an “authentic” wooden utility 
pole, weather-worn wreckage conveying a “nostalgic” mood, a place with a nice view of Seoul’s 
skyscrapers were flagged on the map; some households were marked with the residents’ names 









Figure 5. A Bukjeong Maul Community Map Made by Happy Seongbuk. 
According to Bridget Love, who examines the practice of community mapping in rural 
areas of Japan, the activity primarily purports to promote self-recognition and self-stewardship of 
the residents in declining regions: through this pursuit, the participants are expected to 
“reenvision their places not as depleted margins but instead as durable and sustainable localities 
of which they are stewards” (2013: 114). Sletto (2009) goes further to argue that community 
mapping can be understood as a “counter-hegemonic” place-making practice in which the 
dominant meanings and memories of places are challenged and negotiated by the participation of 
residents. It should be noted, however, that in certain contexts the promotion of self-stewardship 
and place-making could serve to exclude the structural sources of poverty and inequality from 
the purview. As aptly pointed out by Love, these practices could contribute to displacing “the 
responsibility of community deterioration from entrenched economic disparities to inhabitants’ 
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misperception of their homes” (2013: 115). Such twofold effects also were found in the 
afterthoughts of a resident workshop participant: in the wrap-up meeting, he thanked the 
workshop organizer and said that although he had lived in the village for 40 years he had never 
thought that the old, dilapidated outlook of the town could be “the object of people’s curiosity 
and attraction.” In the end, he shyly mumbled, “maybe it’s time to stop shaming and complaining 
about our town [uri dongne]”.  
 
Business Analytical Tools 
What needs to be underscored more here, however, is that community mapping is not just for the 
development of community esteem; it is rather a prerequisite for discovering new business 
opportunities. In fact, the remaining part of the workshop was dedicated primarily to conceiving 
and developing business plans using the “unearthed” resources. For this purpose, the community 
business incubators among the team helped the participants to translate their ordinary knowledge 
of the town into business language through various business analytic tools such as Social 
Business Model Canvas (SBMC), SWOT, and PEST.15  
One of the incubators, So-Yun, was a charismatic and energetic senior woman who had 
been a well-respected local activist in the region and now had become a community business 
consultant after being trained at the KAIST Co-operative Mini MBA course.16 She began her 
                                                 
15 Social Business Model Canvas (SBMC) is a slightly modified tool from Business Model Canvas that is popularly 
used to analyze the state of a business. It consists of the following columns: partners, activities, resources, economic 
value proposition, social value proposition, strength, customer relationship, customer segments, cost structure, and 
revenue stream. SWAT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats) and PEST (Political, Economic, Social, 
and Technological factors) are tools for visualizing an enterprise’s strategy and the market environment.  
16 KAIST Social Entrepreneurship MBA program was established in 2013 through the collaboration of SK Group, 
one of the biggest conglomerates in South Korea, and KAIST (Korea Advanced Institute of Science and 
Technology) College of Business. Its homepage says that it is one of the first social entrepreneurship MBA 
programs in the world. The school also provides “mini MBA” courses that abbreviate the two-year course into 3 
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workshop session on how to make and read SBMC, saying, “Local activists like me and some of 
you tended to be hostile to this type of business language and tools. But I think they are simply 
tools that are useful to make your abstract thoughts more concrete and communicable. You and I 
know well this kind of people (activists) whose words are usually very abstract and ideal [laugh]. 
I wish we had learned these tools earlier.” In the practice sessions, she helped the participants to 
correctly “translate” what they found from the community mapping into business resources: in 
guiding the participants in filling out their business model canvas, she pushed them to find more 
useful resources and partners for business in the region.  
For example, a community enterprise in our team was planning to open a guest house in 
Bukjeong Maul for youth and foreign tourists. In their SBMC, the dilapidated outlook of the 
town, abandoned empty houses, aforementioned attractions, the community festival, and old 
residents’ life histories were classified as key “resources”; the local government, the inhabitants’ 
organizations in the town, and the volunteer clubs in the neighborhood universities would serve 
as key “partners”, and are simultaneously catalogued as “resource” and “marketing channels.” 
Through community mapping, they found an elderly resident who remembered some traditional 
games played in the town and a retired traditional-foods cook. To strengthen their tour programs, 
the team was encouraged by So-Yun to utilize them as “resident docents” who would run 
cultural experience programs for youth.17 These two residents were later classified as potential 
“partners” and “resources.”  
 
                                                 
months or 6-months for social economy activists, public officers, and NGO staffs. The “Co-operative Mini MBA” 
that So-Yun attended is one of them and most of the students were funded by the municipal or central government.  
17 For the rise of cultural experience programs and its relation to the new “moral and social development” paradigm 




The workshop booklet indeed enumerates what can be considered “potential community 
resources”: natural environments such as clean air, cultural heritages like community festivals, 
and human resources including residents’ talents or their life stories. According to So-Yun, 
however, what turns such “potential” resources into “actual” community assets is the act of 
“storytelling” that imbues certain meanings and values to ordinary objects. In her study of self-
esteem movements in the U.S., Barbara Cruikshank examines how the practices of writing and 
telling personal narratives serve as important techniques for producing self-empowering subjects: 
through such practices, individuals constitute their selves as an object that has to be reflexively 
managed and cultivated (1999: 92-96). The same technique is applied here for empowering not 
only residents, but also the community itself.  
For example, in the winter of 2014 Bukjeong Maul held a storytelling competition as part 
of its community festival, in which older residents were encouraged to voluntarily share their life 
stories in the town with visitors. Given their abiding poverty, their stories had been expected to 
be, and really were, about experiencing and surviving hardships while living in the town. In fact, 
the attempt drew rather mixed responses from the festival participants. While many of them 
approved of the attempt as a “lived education” for tourists—especially, the younger generation 
who presumably does not know much about poverty—some discreetly raised the concern that 
this shared storytelling could make the residents’ personal misfortunes appear as a spectacle.18 In 
                                                 
18 A similar critique has been raised in other community regeneration sites which depend on urban tourism. The 
controversy over Gwaengi-Buri Maul in Incheon could be an exemplar case. The village has been renowned as a 
Jjokbang-town. Jjokbang means rooms that have been divided into smaller spaces (less than 30 square ft.) to 
accommodate more people. Approximately half of the village residents have been living in such sliced rooms. As 
the local government attempted to develop a Jjokbang experience tour program in 2015, some residents opposed 
the plan, maintaining that “we are not a sightseeing product or spectacle.” “‘Poverty is not a spectacle!’” [‘쪽방촌 
거주도 서러운데.. 가난을 구경거리 만드나’], Kyunghyang Daily (July 12, 2015). The “commodification of 
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a later conversation, Hee-Jin, who participated in designing the competition, sheepishly 
conceded to me, “Well, I was afraid that it might be seen like a terrible ‘native show’”; but she 
was quick to emphatically add, “You know, the poor are described only as victims of the social 
structure in mainstream discourses. I believe that in small narratives about themselves, they can, 
on the contrary, become the true masters of their lives and community. That was the point (of the 
event).”  
Here again, however, storytelling is not just for the sense of community belonging and 
stewardship; it also serves as a resource for community business. The district government and 
the guest house community enterprise are now planning to implement QR code images on the 
doors of ten houses whose residents turned out to have impressive life stories so that, by 
scanning the codes with their smart phones, external visitors and tourists can read about the 
elderly residents’ hardship and survival stories and view their old photos. According to a local 
administrator, it would help the community attract more tourists who want to feel “nostalgia and 
authenticity” through the town’s impoverished look. Such equipment already has been 







                                                 
poverty” or “marketization of poverty” can be a keyword to describe these pervasive phenomena; see Schwittay 





Figure 6. A QR Code Image Implemented in Jangsu Maul:  
“The House of Mr. ‘Wild Flower’” (photo by author) 
 
Maul Branding as Locality Making Practice 
These micro-practices and procedures can be understood as knowledge-production techniques to 
make a community “legible” and thus more “governable” by investigating, mapping, 
documenting, and interpreting its potential material/immaterial resources (Rose 1996, Rose and 
Miller 2008; Scott 1998). Of particular interest, in relation to our discussion, are the 
methodological and theoretical presuppositions that undergird this process of knowledge 
production. In tracing a community development program of the World Bank in Indonesia, Tania 
Li (2007, 2011) witnesses what can be called an “ethnographic turn” in the discourse and 
practice of development planning. Since the mid-1990s when the World Bank started to focus on 
more intimate features of targeted villages—such as social capital, local power relation, and 
informal economy— the development team increasingly has adopted ethnographical methods 
such as in-depth focus group interviews, and participant observation to probe the everyday 
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dynamics of community and has relied on ethnographic data to justify their prescriptions. If the 
success of development depends not upon imposing a homogenous plan from the outside but 
rather on “excavating” and “optimizing” the potential resources inherent in a community, the 
best method to discover the capacities would be ethnographical, detailed investigations (Li 2007: 
243-247).  
Such a so-called “ethnographic turn” is notably found throughout the social economy and 
community development workshop. Not only were the substantial parts of the workshop 
instructed and guided by anthropologists like Hee-Jin, but other non-anthropologist “mentors” 
also joined in to emphasize the significance and merits of the anthropological or ethnographical 
approach in formulating concrete social business and community development plans. One of the 
mentors was Dong-Hun who had earned a doctorate degree for his study on how to use oral 
history materials for business purposes in the Department of Cultural Contents at a local 
university. Straddling academic and social economy sectors, Dong-hun often has worked as a 
community business consultant and gained popularity for his skill in explaining academic jargon 
with everyday terminology and examples. He dedicated his two-hour long lecture titled “Social 
Place and Storytelling” to cataloguing such cardinal virtues of successful social/community 
entrepreneurs for finding potential business opportunities in a locale as follows: “observation, 
empathy, hearing, participation, experiment, and sharing.” At some point during the lecture, he 
even went further to say that “a social and community entrepreneur should become an 
anthropologist in a sense.”19 According to him, the quintessential feature of social/community 
business lies in “its situatedness and rootedness” in the concrete demands of the targeted 
                                                 
19 This is not because I was there. I first introduced myself as a volunteer in the class. In a follow-up conversation 
after the lecture, I confessed to Dong-Hun that I was an anthropologist doing my fieldwork research, and he 
suggested that I give a presentation about how to make an efficient interview at a social start-up entrepreneurs’ 
meeting, which I declined.  
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community. Therefore, the entrepreneur should be able to catch “floating” desires within the 
locale and be innovatively responsive to them. “An anthropological approach would be helpful 
for that.” Dong-Hun added, “The strength of the anthropological thinking is that it creates 
uncopiable, unique knowledge about a community.”   
Whether or not we agree with his rather romanticized view of the anthropological method 
and thinking, his statement reveals how the nature of community development knowledge is 
imagined among the practitioners. The development knowledge sought and produced in the 
workshop is not a homogenous prescription that can be universally applied. It is rather specific, 
contextual, and even “singular” knowledge about a locale. Throughout the workshop, the 
mentors and incubators kept asking the participants to seize residents’ concrete desires and build 
their business plan based on them. Also, each business plan was required to be supported by 
qualitative data. For instance, a social enterprise that wanted to embark on a child care café for 
“multicultural” families was required to complement their SMBC with data acquired through 
focus group interviews of potential customers in the region.20 The life history interviews that 
used to be conducted after community mapping also partially purported to uncover the peculiar 
needs of the community.  
In this sense, the series of micro-techniques are not only governmental techniques but 
also what Appadurai calls “social techniques for the production of locality” (1996: 182). In 
distinguishing locality as “a complex phenomenological quality” constituted by relational and 
contextual practices from a neighborhood as the actually existing social forms (178), Appadurai 
illuminates the performative role and governing function of ethnography in the production of 
                                                 
20 In South Korea, “multicultural” family mainly signifies a couple in which the man is a Korean peasant or urban 
poor and the woman is a migrant bride mostly from China or Southeast Asia. The marriages are arranged via 
commercial brokers. For a discussion of the experience of migrant brides, see Choo (2013, 2016) and Freeman 
(2011). For the governing effect of “multicultural” discourse in South Korea, see Jun (2011, 2016).  
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locality: “The ethnographic project is in a peculiar way isomorphic with the very knowledge it 
seeks to discover and document, as both the ethnographic project and the social projects it seeks 
to describe have the production of locality as their governing telos” (182). Although he 
highlights the increasing fragility of locality under the double threat of the reinforcement of 
nation-state and the expansion of the global market and media, the production of locality is in a 
sense encouraged and promoted more than ever with the ethnographic turn in community 
development practices. Social/community entrepreneurs who are now required to be quasi-
anthropologists actively participate in locality-making practices; they not only simply excavate 
treasures in the neighborhood, but also construct the meanings and contexts, again in order to 
meet their business needs.    
Dong-Hun devoted the last part of the workshop to “Maul branding (Place branding).” 
His hand-out explains “Maul branding” as “an act of organizing and increasing social and 
economic value by symbolizing the cultural meaning of a community.” “What is culture?” he 
commenced his session with this question; he went onto explain: “Culture includes not only 
hereditary resources such as tradition, custom, life style, and artwork in a certain community, but 
also the valuable assets that are now being produced and the potential benefits that will be 
produced in the future.” “Branding,” according to him, “aims to tie these various resources and 
give them a coherent identity and thus to raise their overall value.”21 All the local culture and 
knowledge that have been “excavated” throughout the workshop could be most effectively 
                                                 
21 In discussing “personal branding” as a technology of neoliberal self, Ilana Gershon points out that the branding 
practice helps neoliberal subjects, who are often easily reduced to the various and flexible set of “skills, 
experiences, assets, and alliances,” to maintains his or her own authentic self: “Personal branding allows people to 
represent themselves as both flexible and coherent” (2016: 237). In the same way, the practice of place branding 
imposes an “authentic” identity on a certain community and its various resources. It should be emphasized, 
however, that the branding practice and its identity production also aim to improve the profitability and 
investibility of the object, whether it is a self or a community.  
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deployed with appropriate branding. Dong-Hun gave each team time to discuss how they could 
describe the community’s “culture” in a word. “It can be a phrase, a word, an image, or even a 
color,” Dong-Hun added. In citing Gilles Deleuze and his concept of “singularity,” Dong-hun 
stressed, “It should express the ‘singularity’ [t'ŭkisŏng] of the community that cannot be found 
elsewhere!” Without having much debate, our team agreed on a social entrepreneur’s suggestion 
that modified the title of a popular poem about Bukjeong Maul: “Bukjeong Maul, where time 
slowly flows.”22  
Even though it was dubious whether the workshop participants understood Deleuze and 
his concept of singularity, it seemed that they well comprehended what branding and locality 
production is for. At the wrap-up party after the last workshop, I sat with one of the Bukjeong 
Maul resident leaders, Hyun-Do and asked his thoughts on the workshop. The 67 year-old man 
muttered several general impressions and at the end added the following statement without any 
cynicism:  
 
I am recently enjoying the TV show, The Law of Jungle [a then-popular local reality TV 
show in which celebrities live for a while with “native tribes” in the jungles of the 
Amazon, Indonesia, and the Pacific Islands]. Whenever I watch the show, I feel like that 
is what we should do. We are making Bukjeong Maul into a native tribe with its own 
culture so that people like foreigners and youths come for sightseeing [kwan-kwang]. 
[emphasis added] 
 
While I was struck speechless by the striking analogy, an incubator on another team, who was 
sitting next to me, interrupted, “We are recently trying to avoid using terms like sightseeing, 
because they are corrupt words that objectify [taesang-hwa] the residents. We instead call it 
                                                 
22 The original title of the poem is “Bukjeong Maul, Flow” which was written by a local poet, Choi Sung-Su. The 
entire poem is imprinted on the bus stop at the entrance of Bukjeong Maul. This rather long poem begins with the 
following: “If you want to flow slowly, come to Bukjeong Maul, where its narrow alleys and small houses stop 
your footsteps. Your wounds and pains caused by the lightning speed of life will find solace from the scenery.”    
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‘value sharing’ [kach'i gongyu].” She continued to explicate, “The residents create the cultural 
values of a community as masters and others come and share them as guests.”   
 
Translation / Mistranslation  
In his groundbreaking work, Harvey (1989) points out that, in the face of the central 
government’s austerity policies, the commitment to “flagship projects” and “place marketing” 
has become increasingly imperative for many local governments to regenerate their declining 
neighborhoods and promote urban entrepreneurialism. All the practices described above could be 
identified and explained as micro-level operations for building an “entrepreneurial city” that 
often seek to create “a new combination” of economic and non-economic elements and to 
reinvigorate “tribal” identities for enhancing the dynamic competitiveness and consumerist 
appeal of a region (Brenner and Theodore 2002; Harvey 1989; Jessop 1997; cf. MacLeod 2002). 
What I want to highlight here, however, is not the general contexts and effects of these practices, 
but rather the fact that the new imaginaries of urban space and community emerge only as a 
result of translating and organizing ambiguous, various aspirations in a certain way through 
diverse micro-techniques (Callon and Latour 1981; Miller and Rose 2008: 61-65). The business 
consulting language and techniques, pace the incubator So-Yun, are not “simply tools”; rather, 
they performatively construct reality by problematizing urban settings in a certain way and 
rendering them “technically manageable” (Li 2007). The various techniques deployed 
throughout the workshop contribute to interpreting the problems of a community in light of 
“business opportunities” and to constructing the issues as something that can be dealt with by 
social/community businesses. A closer look, however, would reveal that the translation is not 
always successful and often leaves ambiguous discrepancies.  
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Throughout the workshop, social entrepreneurs and village residents showed a 
differential intensity of participation. Unlike the social entrepreneurs who could raise their 
chance of obtaining government support by completion of the course, the residents seemed to get 
tired, as the workshop proceeded, of having to sit for long hours without any tangible benefits. In 
Bukjeong Maul, only two residents completed the entire workshop: first Hyun-Do, the village 
headman and second Kyung-Su, the community leader of the New Village Association.23 
Although they were interpellated as “community entrepreneurs” and encouraged to submit their 
own community business plan, all the practices of the sessions—such as community mapping, 
business model making, storytelling, and branding—apparently did not draw great attention from 
these almost 70-year old seniors. Rather, they preferred to take a back seat and provide advices 
to other community entrepreneurs who wanted to launch a business in Bukjeong Maul.  
In one session, however, Kyung-Su came up with a community business idea which 
aimed to produce and sell fermented soybean blocks for visiting tourists.24 Seo-In, another 
incubator of our team, wanted to develop the idea into a concrete business plan because she 
thought that it could be an additional source of income for poor elders in the village. Seo-In 
helped Kyung-Su to make a Social Business Model Canvas (SMBC) for applying for district 
                                                 
23 The New Village Association was organized nationwide by the government in the 1970s during the New Village 
Movement. Even after the end of the movement, the association had survived as a capillary organization of the 
state power. The association is still active especially in rural and peri-urban areas in organizing charity or 
volunteer activities. The alternative community development strategy, which contrasts itself with the old state-led 
New Village Movement, is also sometimes dependent upon this old para-governmental organization to mobilize 
residents. I will touch upon the history of the New Village Women’s Association in discussing Fortune Care’s case 
in the next chapter.    
24 Making soybean blocks is a kind of “invented tradition” of Bukjeong Maul (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1992). Until 
recently, the town has been usually called “Sŏng Madang” simply following a place name of the town. As the 
village needed to be constructed and identified as “a community (maul)” for the regeneration process since the 
2010s, the resident leaders including Kyung-Su traced back the origin of the village with the help of the district 
government and found its historical name “Bukjeong” that originated from the sound of making soybean malt. 
Since then, the making of soybean blocks has been performed at the annual community festival and considered the 
symbol of the town. 
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government funds. The following dialogue was made in the process:   
 
Kyung-Su: …But to start the business, it should be generally agreed among the residents. 
Some of the residents still want to redevelop the village as an apartment complex. The 
municipal and district governments should ban their attempts…  
Seo-In: If this community business succeeds, it could be easier to persuade the residents 
to adopt the alternative community development plan. So let’s put the issue aside for the 
time being. 
..... 
Kyung-Su: Well, there is an old resident who is really expert at making soybean blocks. 
Seo-In: Good! [Writing it down on SBMC] It can belong to key resources or key 
partners. Also, I’ve heard that the name “Bukjeong Maul” originated from the food. 
Kyung-Su: Yes. It came from the sound of making soybean malt.  
Seo-In: Great! It can be used for storytelling marketing.  
..... 
Seo-In: I saw a lot of abandoned houses in Bukjeong Maul. We call them “idle resources” 
[yuhyu-jawŏn] that can be re-used. I guess they can be renovated and used for business 
shops or guest houses. It could also help to regenerate the village.  
Kyung-Su: They are usually very flimsy and dangerous. Some owners of the houses 
purposely abandon them, putting pressure on the government to adopt a removal and 
redevelopment plan instead of community regeneration. The abandoned houses are 
deteriorating our neighborhood. I think the government should persuade or force them to 
fix the houses... 
Seo-In: [Interrupting] But we can’t manage the problem now. Let’s move on. If we find a 
safe vacant house, we could bring our costs down and it could also serve as a community 
center to gather residents and help regeneration.      
..... 
Seo-In: Overall, your plan seems to have a weak profit structure. We need to find a way 
to earn more profit, like raising participation fees.   
Kyung-Su: [Rather curtly] I don’t care about profit. 
Seo-In: What do you mean? It’s a business. You need some profit. It’s not volunteer 
work. 
Kyung-Su: I don’t know... I just want to do it as a pastime.   
 
First of all, the dialogue shows how local knowledge is framed and interpreted as 
business resources. Vacant houses and a resident are immediately translated by Seo-In into 
elements that fill the columns of a Social Business Model Canvas. Furthermore, in the process, 
the act of translation screens out more structural and political contexts. While Kyung-Su points 
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out that consensus over the type of development among the residents is the presupposition for the 
business and continues to raise the government’s responsibility for producing or forcing the 
agreement, Seo-In solely repeatedly suggests that the success of the business would contribute to 
the solution for the issue. Although the workshop itself is organized by the district government, 
the political issues are considered as what “we cannot manage now” and thus something that 
should be “put aside.” Therefore, the focus of the discussion centers only on the technical issues 
of the business such as how to bring costs down and profit margins up.  
Lastly and most importantly, the dialogue between Kyung-Su and Seo-In, nevertheless, 
reveals a particular relationship between experts and residents in community development. As 
Rose (1999) notes, similar to the state-led development which has relied heavily on bureaucratic 
experts, community government also requires a number of professionals and experts who render 
a community intelligible and legible by investigating, mapping, and documenting it. The relation 
between residents and external experts, however, has transformed here: because the community 
residents are interpellated as a subject of knowledge rather than as an object of knowledge, the 
“consultants,” “mentors,” and “facilitators” do not assume the authoritative roles of making a 
plan and applying it to a community as did state bureaucrats.25 As Li points out, the new experts 
are “no longer to plan but to enable, animate, and facilitate” (2011: 101); they instead take the 
position of “midwives” who assist in “the birth-to-presence of natural communities rather than as 
ethnocentric outsiders imposing their views” (Li 2007: 246). In this sense, their primary task has 
become to uncover and identify the residents’ existing desires and to translate or organize them 
for development purposes.  
                                                 
25 This transformation in the role of experts was prefigured in the wake of the 1997 financial crisis when the 
government mobilized intellectuals and activists from civil society in order to re-arrange the field of government; 
see Song (2009). It marks the moment that the traditional power of bureaucrat in the developmental state began to 
decline and various specific intellectuals filled the void.  
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As felt in the last conversation, however, the translation is not always felicitous. Kyung-
Su’s last remarks that he does not need profits and he wants to do it as a pastime might be true; 
but they also could be expressing his dissatisfaction with Seo-In’s technical and business 
approach. During a break between the sessions, in smoking together outside the building, Kyung-
Su discreetly told me, “Indeed, I don’t know exactly what they are saying. The words are too 
difficult for me and they use too much English... I just want to do somewhat meaningful work 
with lonely elders in the village. That’s all. I don’t need this complex scheme…” It seems that 
the translation tools that So-Yun and Seo-In adopted are not always working.  
 
NEW EPISTEMOLOGY OF POVERTY AND COMMUNITY 
 
The market-oriented, entrepreneurial language and practices in community development may 
correspond to a discussion on the increasing role of community in neoliberal governmentality 
(Joseph 2002; Craig and Larner 2005; Rose and Miller 2008) or contribute to an ongoing debate 
of whether social or community economy is simply a variation of neoliberalism or an alternative 
to it (Davies 2012, 2015a; Graefe 2013; Gibson-Graham 2006a; Vogelmann 2012). What should 
be noted here, however, is rather how community itself is re-imagined and re-conceptualized in 
the discourse and practice of this new community development strategy. Admittedly, nostalgia 
bemoaning the loss of community is as old as modern capitalism itself and has regularly emerged 
along with critiques of capitalism’s alienating effects. As noted by Rose, however, the form of 
communities that is appealing to people has been various in different periods and cases (1999: 
172).  
In analyzing the rise of the political significance of community in the Western societies in 
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the late 20th century, Rose situates the emergence of what he calls “government through 
community” in the contexts of the demise of society as a universal public sphere and the decline 
of “social government.” According to him, what we are observing is “a reshaping of the very 
territory of government” (1999: 136). Community has come to the focus of a new governmental 
space, as “the continuous thought-space of the social” has been increasingly fragmented and the 
concerns in “multi-culturalism” and identity politics have been significantly voiced (Rose 1999: 
135-137). That is to say, community and its communal values have begun to serve as a source 
for different identities replacing the universal politics and the totality of society. Despite its 
validity, such “sociological” explanation that focuses on the connection between identity politics 
and community government sheds light on only half of the story.26 In the post-authoritarian and 
post-developmental states such as South Korea, the rise of “government through community” 
should be examined rather in the context of the search for a new development or poverty 
alleviation strategy through an articulation of market and community.  
A re-conceptualization of poverty that we already explored is symptomatic of the 
emergence of the novel development strategy based on the grafting of market and society. As 
noted by various scholars (Castel 2003; Dean 1990; Donzelot 1994; Himmelfarb 1983; Procacci 
1987, 1991, 2007), in modern societies, the issue of poverty or pauperism has served as a central 
locus for devising and sharpening a new form of government as well as a laboratory where the 
various concrete governing techniques have been tested. For example, social government in the 
Western society has taken pauperism as its primary target and thereby has aimed at constructing 
and intervening the realm of society to alleviate the vice of market (Dean 1990; Donzelot 1994; 
                                                 
26 This argument is consonant with the increasing critique of the limit of governmentality studies that it has 
relatively neglected the workings of market and economy by simply reducing them into governmental 
constructions of power; see Lemke (2013) and Tellmann (2011). 
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Procacci 1991, 2007). The changed conceptualization of poverty, therefore, could be a privileged 
window to trace the genealogical transformations in governmental strategies (Dean 1990; 
Walters 2000).  
The recent effort to find a new development strategy in South Korea, as noted above, 
resonates and reflects two heterogeneous, but often convergent, perspectives on poverty in global 
development discourse since the late 1990s. The first one is to illuminate poverty less in light of 
the structural inequality and the deprivation of material wealth than in terms of social and 
communal relations. Such a perspective—comprising a relational approach—finds the solution 
for poverty mainly in fostering affective relations and re-generating communities, which mirrors 
the emphasis of social capital in “post-Washington consensus” neoliberalism (Fine 2001; Harriss 
2002). The other perspective strives to alleviate poverty through business and entrepreneurship 
that unearths and reuses the existing community resources including poverty itself. In a global 
context, this latter trend is close to the “Bottom of the Pyramid (BoP)” strategy or what Roy calls 
“poverty capital” that draws upon a firm belief in the innovative entrepreneurial faculty among 
the poor (Elyachar 2012; Prahalad 2005; Roy 2010). What is interesting is that community and 
its romanticized notion of “the local” serve as the key points in both perspectives: If potential 
social capital in a community provides an objective space through which experts intervene and 
optimize, various resources in a community would serve as a test bed upon which micro- and 
social entrepreneurship are experimented with.  
Such heterogeneous perspectives have conjoined together to form a new conception of 
poverty in South Korea’s local contexts. The strategy of community-based poverty alleviation 
and pro-poor initiative in Korea can be traced back to the strong tradition of the grassroots poor 
people’s movements since the late 1970s and early 1980s. Influenced by the works of the 
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American community organizer Saul Alinski, the grassroots activists viewed a community as 
“the ultimate objective” of their movements as well as a site for autonomous, voluntary 
associations of the underprivileged against the brutal military regime (Kim 2015). That is to say, 
the sprouting of recent alternative community development with its focus on “communal 
mutuality” and “autonomy” was deployed as part of radical activism against a developmental, 
authoritarian state (Kim 2017: 97-104). The communality and resident-initiative in the 
community organization activism, however, began to converge or to be overwritten with more 
technical and presumably neoliberal language in the rise of “entrepreneurial culture” after 
Korea’s neoliberal turn in the late 1990s (Seo 2011; Song 2009, 2011). While communality and 
mutuality began to be reinterpreted as “social capital” and networking, the voluntariness and 
autonomy of residents now overlap with the language of entrepreneurship and empowerment. 
The heterogenic trends of radical activism and neoliberal language, as already seen in the 
previous chapter, have come to be smoothly articulated and intersected under the names of 
“social economy” and “community business” in the mediation of key notions such as “social 
capital” and “entrepreneurship.”  
It is in this process that we find a new conception of community in which its 
“affectionate” residents are required to concurrently become “entrepreneurs” in their moral 
practices, and their humanist sentiments are imbricated with the logic of human capital. This is 
more than simply saying that in neoliberalism “all dimensions of human life are cast in terms of 
market rationality” (Brown 2003: 9) or moral virtues are mobilized to supplement the retreat of 
the state and the expansion of market rationality. What should be highlighted would rather be the 
birth of a hybrid space in which humanist morality and the logic of human capital are 
intermingled to the point that they become difficult to tell apart. Through various techniques and 
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dispositifs that we have explored, a community is now imagined as a voluntary and affectionate 
social bond where every resident has become a self-empowering entrepreneur; moreover, a 
community is encouraged to elicit and develop its own communal values, potentials, and stories, 
but these are simultaneously recast as business resources for social/community enterprises. As 
aptly pointed out by Song (2014b), the newly emerging form of community involves the 
“indeterminacy” between the association of gift (communitas or com+munus) and the neoliberal 
enterprise sociality.  
An excellent example to demonstrate this new hybrid imaginary of community is 
Seongbuk district’s official slogan “Human City Seongbuk: Investing Human Capital, Seeking 
Human Value.” In an interview with me, Kim Young-Bae, the district’s mayor as well as a self-
proclaimed Polanyian, explained the meaning of the motto: “I believe that the appreciation of 
human capital [injŏk-chabon, 人的資本] and the promotion of more humane and communal life 
are not at odds; they rather should be sought together in the name of humanism [inbon-juŭi, 
人本主義].” He was quick to add, “I think that it is what Polanyi meant when he talked about the 
mutual embeddedness of market and society.” His explanation, however, is interestingly 
reminiscent of Gray Becker’s recent defense of his theory of human capital rather than Karl 
Polanyi. In responding to the prevalent criticism that his human capital theory is inhumane and 
purely utilitarian, Becker maintains that this theory “puts people at the center of an economy” 
and thus contains very humanistic and even liberating discourse: “I think whatever theory you 
approach economic development with, you have to make some judgments of that type… Do you 
want to ignore people? Human capital says you can’t ignore people…. When we think about 
economies, when we think about development, that’s a liberating point of view. People are the 
center of the economy” (Becker, Ewald, and Harcourt 2012: 11). 
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As discussed in Chapter 1, the new neoliberal form of subjectivity of human capital is not 
a split subject between moral virtue in the private realm and profit-seeking rationality in the 
public sphere; it rather becomes a kind of transcendent “portfolio manager” who considers 
everything as potential resources to improve their stock value: “In short, the things that I inherit, 
the things that happen to me, and the things I do all contribute to the maintenance or the 
deterioration of my human capital” (Feher 2009: 26). By the same token, the moral or affective 
values such as ethical practices, affective relations, and communal network, which were viewed 
as irrelevant to market economy, can now serve as potential resources for appreciating human 
and community capital. In this light, what is notable in the new imaginary of community is an 
extension or expansion of human capital subjectivity as a portfolio manager to collectivities, 
here, to a community. As seen so far in this chapter, the new community development pursues 
the cataloguing of every resource of the community, not only its physical environment and 
infrastructure but also its immaterial and affective assets such as individuals, cultural resources, 
and informal associations (see figure 7). The role of community experts and the government 
focuses on “optimizing” and utilizing the resources through the participation of entrepreneurial 
residents to increase the total value of community (Li 2007). In this sense, it can be said that a 
community itself is ordained to be a sort of “human capital” which owns the communal assets 





Figure 7. The Various Types of Community Assets (Kim et al. 2012: 76). 
 
Of course, as hinted in the conversation between Kyung-Su and Seo-In, the construction 
of an affectionate-entrepreneurial community is not always smoothly achieved; the tension 
between community as a mutual association and community as an enterprise becomes palpable at 
times. In the Community Business Conference organized by the Seoul Metropolitan Government 
in January 2014, Kim Sung-Sup, the head of the Association of Seoul Community Enterprises, 
was the star of the day. As an invited panel discussant, he cast aspersions on the municipal 
government in his high-pitched voice. According to him, social/community businesses have two 
different, even conflicting identities: a community identity that pursues the communal good and 
an enterprise identity that seeks business success. The point of his criticism of the government 
lay with its policies that have exclusively focused on community business as a profit-making 
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enterprise: “As a result, community business become like venture enterprises that consider a 
community only as customers of their business.”27 “If this trend continues,” he added, 
“community business would serve only as a cheaper care/social service subcontractor of the 
government rather than contributing to an alternative economic system and reinforcing 
communal values within the community.” His stirring and zealous statement that “community 
entrepreneurs should be prepared for the showdown against neoliberal market economy by 
reinvigorating the spirit of gift and ‘reciprocity’ [hohye-sŏng]” drew large acclamation from the 
audiences along with apparently subtle embarrassment of the other panel discussants and public 
officials attending the conference.  
Sung-Sup’s discussion betrays the fact that the grafting of humanist value and human 
capital in new community development discourse and practice is not entirely non-contradictory 
and seamless. Rather, the palpable friction between them opens a seemingly political space for 
social/community economy activists. As is repeatedly pointed out throughout this text, the 
dichotomy between caring gift-spirit and entrepreneurial market rationality is still found in the 
social economy discourse and many of social economy activists attempt to find the significance 
of their activities in reestablishing communal values rather than in promoting entrepreneurship. 
For them, the language of business, entrepreneurship, and human capital is simply an 
“appearance” or even “necessary evil” for pursuing their moral and communal initiatives, as So-
Yun disregards business analytic techniques simply as useful “tools.”  
The cacophony, however, should not be exaggerated: the conflicts between the spirit of 
gift and market rationality often end up as a modest request for more “accurate” and 
                                                 
27 His discussion script can be found in The Community Business Conference Packet titled as Community 
Enterprise: Alternative Economy and New Hope [마을기업: 대안경제와 새로운 희망], 2014, pp. 57-63.   
84 
 
“transparent” translation between them. In wrapping up his long lambaste, Sung-sup enumerated 
a series of demands to the municipal government for strengthening the “community identity” of 
social/community enterprises: offering a community-building experts’ consulting service; 
strengthening the community-oriented education program; and reflecting “community values” in 
the government’s selection of funding recipients, all of which have been habitually raised at this 
kind of conference and indeed supported and considered favorably by the government (see 
Chapter 3). From his rather tepid voice reading the list of demands, the attendees, who had 
acclaimed his eager critique of the government, might have begun to feel that he too has no 
tangible plan for preparing for “the showdown against the neoliberal market economy.”  
 
CONCLUSION: SEEING LIKE A SOCIAL ENTREPRENEUR 
 
In his famous book Seeing Like a State, James Scott analyzes the reason why state-centered 
development plans have consistently failed. According to him, state-initiated social engineering 
has a tendency to rely exclusively on a homogenous, simplified master plan and dismiss “the 
necessary role of local knowledge and know-how” (1998: 6). As a result, such a “utopian 
project” has often led to the destruction of autonomous communal capacities that are 
indispensible for the successful execution of the social plan. Thus Scott suggests that alternative 
development should be based on “mētis”, a practical and vernacular knowledge that can be 
applied to a concrete situation: “Even in huge organizations, diversity pays dividends in stability 
and resilience... An institution, social form, or enterprise that takes much of its shape from the 
evolving mētis of the people engaged in it will thereby enhance their range of experience and 
skills” (1998: 355-6).   
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Although his critique could be still valid in criticizing authoritarian bureaucracy and 
institution-driven standardization, Scott’s binary oppositions between abstraction and 
concreteness, universal plan and particular know-how, centralized homogeneity and localized 
diversity seems to become more and more fragile and problematic. Above all, it is the state that 
actively takes advantage of the oppositions for exempting itself from its old responsibilities for 
social welfare. Whereas the past developmental state embodied “the subject supposed to know” 
as the central planner, the neoliberal government pretends skillful humility and ignorance, as 
seen in the local administrator’s speech in the introduction of this chapter. In this way, the 
government devolves its traditional roles to “voluntary” communities which are assumed to best 
know about their own situations, and limits its job as an “incubator of development” for making 
a “friendly environment” for (community) businesses (Rudnyckyj and Schwittay 2014: 3). 
Furthermore, the romanticized preference for local community knowledge found in the 
oppositions makes it difficult to problematize and criticize the newly emerging community 
development that efficiently transforms and exploits local community knowledge and capacities. 
In fact, the expansion of the mutually embedded areas of community and market seems to 
practically erode and outdate Scott’s series of oppositions that focus on criticizing state- or 
market-initiated homogenization against autonomous and diverse communities.  
In this chapter, I have attempted to show how the new community development that 
relies on social/community economy redefines the substance of development in relation to 
affective, communal concerns and how it mobilizes and exploits community resources and 
practical knowledge for business purposes through various techniques and dispositifs. In 
particular, I have identified two heterogeneous perspectives on poverty and have illuminated 
how their convergence has contributed to producing what can be called “a new epistemology of 
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community” in which community as a mutual association and community as an enterprise are 
indistinguishable. Again, this is not simply saying that traditional communities are marketized or 
colonized by neoliberal rationality. The point is rather that the hybrid space of social logic and 
market rationality is not only created in a community with neoliberalization but also the sociality 
and collectivity of the community are reorganized and managed by a new form of economic 
rationality—which can be described as an expansion of human capital logic of portfolio 
management to the level of collectivities.  
The emergence of such hybrid affectionate-entrepreneurial communities urges us to 
rethink the transforming relationships of market, community, and the state. The following 
questions arise from these observations: as enterprise communities surface as the main space of 
government, how have the roles of the state changed and how has the articulation of society and 
market been transformed? If the state identifies itself as an incubator of social entrepreneurship 
or socialized human capital subjects—either individual or community— how is the state 
governing and conducting the citizens’ ethical aspirations and entrepreneurial spirit to pursue a 
new development? To address these questions, we need to examine them in a wider context of 
the transformation of the public, social spaces in South Korea, which I will pursue in the next 
chapter by exploring the emergences of the social care market and the ethical citizenship project 






ETHICAL CITIZENSHIP IN PRACTICE: 
MAKING THE SOCIAL CARE MARKET, 
PRODUCING PROJECTIVE ETHICALITY 
 
“The machinery giving access to the institutions on which the rights of citizenship 
depended had to be shaped afresh… All this apparatus combined to decide, not merely 
what rights were recognised in principle, but also to what extent rights recognised in 
principle could be enjoyed in practice.” –T.H. Marshall (1992: 10) 
  
“The cornerstone of orthodox economics, dating back to Adam Smith, is that self-interest 
in the market place is ultimately beneficial for society. The era of social optimization 
looks set to stand this claim upside down: being social in your everyday life is worth it, 




In October 2014, when the popular television drama series Yuna’s Street was approaching its 
final episode, online fan bulletin boards were seething with worries and expectations about the 
ending. The 50-episode long drama drew massive public attention from its beginning as the 
second sequel of The Moon of Seoul that had recorded 50% ratings in 1994 and had been called 
“the national drama.” Being written by the same scriptwriter, Kim Woon-Kyung, Yuna’s Street 
was expected to depict the stories of poor people, as did The Moon of Seoul 20 years before.2  
                                                 
1 William Davies, “How Friendship Became a Tool of the Powerful,” The Guardian (May 7, 2015). 
2 “Yuna’s Street: 20 Years After The Moon of Seoul” [‘서울의 달’ 20 년 후, ‘유나의 거리’는 여전히 질펀하다], 
Ohmynews (May 20, 2014).  
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In the last golden days of South Korea’s developmentalism prior to the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis, The Moon of Seoul received much adoration for its rare feat of exploring the dark 
side of South Korea’s rapid economic growth by depicting the everyday lives of “losers” 
including frauds, gigolos, and day workers in a realistic but comical way. With a Seoul shanty 
town as the backdrop, the drama focuses on two young male yokels, Hong-Sik and Chun-Sik, 
who have come to Seoul to find a job.3 Throughout the 82 episodes, the drama humorously 
shows their struggles to adapt to the metropolitan city, procure a job, find love, and climb up the 
class ladder: While Hong-Sik becomes frustrated with a draconian reality and decides to become 
a gigolo looking for a wealthy woman, Chun-Sik hopelessly bounces around various jobs as a 
day laborer.  
What made the show memorable as a national drama in people’s memory for twenty 
years, however, may be its shockingly tragic ending in which two stories unfolded in parallel. In 
the last installment, Chun-Sik attends a party to celebrate his neighbor Chil-Sung’s purchase of a 
high-rise apartment. As an industrious daily worker, Chil-Sung and his family have managed to 
save enough money to escape from the shanty town and move into a modern apartment 
compound, a symbol of South Korean middle class family. During the party, a neighbor suggests 
a toast with an overly didactic tone: “Let’s give applause to Chil-Sung’s family. If we also work 
diligently and continue to save, we too could buy an apartment someday like them.” In the 
meantime, Hong-Sik, who has successfully married a wealthy widow but soon becomes 
disappointed by the snobby lifestyle, returns to the shanty town to meet up with an old love. But 
he is attacked and stabbed by hit men hired by a call girl, his ex-business partner who loved him 
                                                 
3 As noted in Chapter 2, shanty towns in South Korea were euphemistically called “moon towns.” The drama’s title 
“The Moon of Seoul” reflects the idiom.  
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and felt betrayed by his marriage. Bleeding and crawling up the hill of the moon town, he moans 
and murmurs his life-long watchword as he dies: “Boys, be ambitious!”4  
According to the trailer, Yuna’s Street begins with the question of “What would Hong-
Sik and his love live like today if he were not killed twenty years before?” Again, the drama 
sheds light on a multiplex house in Seoul’s poor district and its rag-tag residents including 
pickpockets, ex-gangsters, and daily workers. Their lives do not look much different from those 
in the shanty town twenty years ago, except for the fact that they do not seem to have the strong 
aspirations toward upward class mobility that haunted Hong-Sik, Chun-Sik, and Chil-Sung. The 
main plot proceeds as the heroine Yuna, a master pickpocket who just has been released from 
prison, reunites with her mother, who abandoned her a long time ago and ended up remarrying 
the CEO of a big conglomerate. After some hesitation, Yuna decides to forgive and live with her 
mother, but, like Hong-Sik, soon becomes dismayed with the high class lifestyle. 
For the last several installments, two stories again are developed in a parallel format. One 
episode is about an old ex-mobster, Mr. Jang, who lives alone in the multiplex house. As he 
starts to suffer from senile dementia, the neighbors help him be hospitalized in a nursing home 
with financial support from the state. The other storyline is Yuna’s decision to come back to the 
poor neighborhood and meet up with her old love, Hee-Jun. The aforementioned viewers’ 
concerns over the show’s ending were focused mainly on whether the same tragedy as Hong-
                                                 
4 The saying, “Boys, be ambitious,” is known to have come from a speech by William Clarkes; he was an American 
chemist and botanist who was invited by the Japanese government to teach at the University of Hokkaido and 
“modernize” its higher education system in the late 19th century. The words were immediately understood as 
encapsulating modernist-developmental spirit and became a maxim among Japanese “enlightened” youth 
throughout the Meiji period [1868-1912]. During its colonial period under Japan, the phrase became popular 
among Koreans as one of the developmentalist slogans and still appears in many South Korea’s English textbooks. 
The history of the phrase shows that it is not coincidental that Hong-Sik, an epitome of developmental aspirations, 
takes the phrase as his watchword and dying words. In addition, given that the saying interpellates young males 
(boys) as the subject of development, the phrase divulges the deep-rooted “gendered” imaginary surrounding 
developmentalism. See also Chapter 4. 
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Sik’s would happen to Yuna: will Yuna be betrayed and killed by the fellow pickpockets who 
feel jealousy about her good fortune? In fact, the worries turned out to be for naught, with an 
unexpectedly happy ending. Moved by the caring actions of Mr. Jang’s neighbors, Yuna decides 
to found a “social enterprise” that delivers meal boxes to the elderly who live alone. She hires 
her fellow ex-pickpockets to carry out this work5 and her rich step-father finances the business. 
Hee-Jun becomes the co-founder of this enterprise; the last scene implies that he and Yuna will 
get happily married. 
 The finale indeed fueled heated debates once again in the online fan forums. Although 
many fans were relieved with Yuna’s happy ending and glimpsed “social progress” in the 
different endings of the two dramas, some fans who tacitly had expected a more stunning and 
tragic conclusion began to ask what made the scriptwriter compromise his critical reputation; one 
viewer even lamented that Kim might be getting too old to directly face up to the harsh reality of 
the poor and thus he fell into “the trap of a naïve moral fantasy.” Instead of excavating the 
writer’s intention, however, I want to illuminate the differences in these two endings in light of 
the transformation and expansion of “social care” in South Korea during the last decade. Above 
all, Yuna’s happy ending simply would have been impossible in 1994: it was not until 2007 that 
the establishment of social enterprise was legally acknowledged. Moreover, the national Elderly 
Long-term Care Insurance [changgi yoyang bohŏm], in which the state provides financial 
support for the ailing elderly like Mr. Jang, was introduced as recently as 2008. Although the 
Moon of Seoul also described mutual care among poor neighbors, the care remained private, 
given that the state and the market were completely absent in the practices. On the contrary, in 
                                                 
5 In the drama, Yuna’s step-father kindly explains that the new social enterprise can be modeled after a famous U.S. 
social enterprise, Pioneer Human Services, that aims to “provide individuals with criminal histories the 
opportunity to lead healthy, productive lives.” See the homepage http://pioneerhumanservices.org/.  
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the ending of Yuna’s Street, social care emerges as a central theme both in a nationalized form 
(as in Mr. Jang’s case) and in a marketized way (as in Yuna’s foundation of social enterprise). In 
this sense, it can be said that Yuna’s happy ending not only becomes feasible as a result of the 
rapid development of social care in South Korea, but also is reflective of this growth.  
In this chapter, I will examine the development of social care in South Korea within the 
context of the transformation from “developmental citizenship” to “ethical citizenship.” 
Although a critic once argued that Kim’s dramas touch upon the lives of “contemporary homo 
sacer,” that is, people without citizenship (Lee 2014: 51), I think that his work could be better 
understood to describe and question the boundaries of citizenship. For example, the tragic ending 
of The Moon of Seoul shows what can be called “developmental citizenship” and its natures. As 
Chang points out, “developmental citizenship” is a peculiar form of (non-) citizenship based on 
“the sacrifice of basic social rights” for national economic growth (2012: 184): while “the 
mercantilist developmental state” exclusively concentrates on economic development instead of 
enfranchising and protecting people’s political, social, and cultural rights, individuals can benefit 
from contributing to the national economic growth only as “private economic players in the 
market” (2012: 183). As discussed in Chapter 1, under the developmental state social welfare 
and care thus remained the responsibilities of families, while various social insurance programs 
of the Western welfare state were never on the agenda (Chang 2011; Kwon 2005). Although very 
limited social security was offered to the economically unproductive populations, it was not 
considered as the right of the citizens but rather as a paternalistic supplement to dysfunctional 
families and failing quasi-citizens.6 The juxtaposition of Hong-Sik’s pathetic death and Chil-
                                                 
6 This view still remained in South Korea’s social welfare system as “the Obligation of Family Support.” See 
footnote 14 in Chapter 1.  
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Sung family’s success dramatically shows who are the winners and who are the losers of the 
game of developmental citizenship. Every character in the drama demonstrates strong “will to 
improve,” but the legitimate way to benefit from national development and rise up the class 
ladder appears to be pre-determined: industrious labor and a thrifty household. Whoever follows 
this path could buy a modern apartment and obtain the membership of “model citizens,” whereas 
those who challenge family values and cannot conduce to the national economic growth would 
be abandoned and excluded as was Hong-Sik.  
By contrast, Yuna’s ending exhibits a seemingly more inclusive, sympathetic form of 
citizenship. The focus shifts from the exclusion of “outcasts” to the incorporation and care of 
them. No one would be abandoned or killed: the ex-gangster is taken care of by neighbors and 
the state, while the ex-pickpockets who repented their past misdeeds find new jobs in a social 
enterprise. Although some may criticize that this is a “naïve moral fantasy,” the shift seems to 
reflect the rise of a new form of citizenship and social imaginary that can be termed “ethical 
citizenship.” In tracing the rise of “ethopolitics” in the post-welfare societies, Nikolas Rose 
(2000) argues that the new forms of ethical citizenship and social collectivity have surfaced to 
replace or rival the old notions of social citizenship and solidarity. In the project of ethical 
citizenship, according to him, a citizen-subject is considered to be ethical and caring at root, and 
social problems “are increasingly made intelligible as ethical problems” that can be solved by 
voluntary, moral practices of the empathetic subjects (Rose 2000: 1398). Conversely speaking, 
the subjects’ ethical practices serve as the basis and evidence to demonstrate their readiness for 
contributing to communities as citizens. Furthermore, the new ideal subjectivity is coupled with 
a new imaginary of the public sphere as being “emotional bonds of affinity” or “moral, 
responsible communities” that should be created and constructed through citizens’ caring 
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commitments (Rose 1996; Muehlebach 2012; Kim 2016). Put otherwise, ethical subjects become 
“ethical citizens” when their membership in a community is dependent upon their moral 
practices and when society itself is considered to be directly built upon such caring practices. For 
this reason, the project of ethical citizenship is very much anchored in the civil practices of care 
and is often presented as “a replacement for state-mediated modes of care” (Muehlebach 2012: 
46).7  
This chapter thus examines the “the social care market” in South Korea as a useful entry 
by which to explore the concrete workings of ethical citizenship. In the process, I focus on 
“citizenship” not so much as a formal provision of right and legal status but as a socially 
recognized position and belonging that can be achieved, threatened, and negotiated (Choo 2016; 
Cruikshank 1999; Fikes 2009; Muehlebach 2012). This view might need more explanations. 
First, the notion of citizenship includes moral, social norms that are generally considered to be 
more appropriate to being a citizen and obtaining “a membership in a community” (Marshall 
1992: 6). For example, if developmental citizenship is based on the nexus of work-family and its 
economic contribution to national development, the new ethical citizenship also presupposes 
particular social norms, based on which some ethicality would be favored over others and serve 
as rationale for the new form of inclusion. Second, if citizenship exceeds a bestowed set of rights 
and obligations and thereby involves “a modality of belonging” (Muehlebach 2012: 18), its 
boundaries of membership should be repeatedly recognized and confirmed through one’s 
everyday practices and performances. In this sense, as Cloke et al. (2007) points out, ethical 
                                                 
7 The fact that care becomes an experimental field is also significant, considering that citizenship is gendered and 
male citizenship in the public sphere has been “predicated on the exclusion of women who sustained that 
participation by their labour in the ‘private’ domestic sphere” (Lister 2003: 70). In this sense, the project of ethical 
citizenship—which is based on the public recognition of private care—includes the re-articulation of the public 
and the private as does the human capital regime. 
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citizenship includes the continuous practices of converting and translating “ordinary ethics” into 
practices in “service spaces” that are socially recognized. What fails to obtain the recognition as 
appropriate ethical practices would be excluded from the remit of the citizenship. That is to say, 
although the utopia of ethical citizenship seems to be inclusive and universal, it, like other forms 
of citizenship, relies on the division of “the deserved” and “the undeserved” and the containment 
of the latter.8 What I attempt to examine in this chapter is where the boundaries are drawn in the 
contemporary project of ethical citizenship in South Korea. 
The responses to the Yuna’s Street ending may provide a clue to address this question. 
The day after the final episode, I asked members of Fortune Care, a local elderly care 
cooperative, about what they thought of the happy ending. In fact, I anticipated favorable 
responses because the conclusion seemed to show at least a growing attention to the social 
economy and social enterprises. Sun-Bok, the head of the cooperative, however, cynically 
responded: “It’s not a happy ending! How can it be a happy ending to launch a social enterprise? 
Their hardship just begins. You cannot earn money with the elderly living alone!” Similar 
responses were also found among staff members at the Seongbuk Community/Social Economy 
Center. So-Yun, a community business consultant, also half-smirkingly said, “I think no one 
would invest in the company because they lack a profit model. Were I their consultant, I would 
have prevented them from launching the business!” Although their reactions were close to self-
mocking jokes, I will show where the cynicism originates by looking into the question of how 
subjects’ ethical practices are intermingled with and restrained by market rationality and how a 
particular ethicality—what I call “projective ethicality”—is constituted and recognized as the 
                                                 
8 This exclusion inherent in citizenship as a membership of community is relevant to the exclusionary nature of 
social contract. As pointed out by various studies, the modern myth of social contract is deeply gendered and 
racialized, and thus it has faced continuing challenges (Pateman 1988; Mills 1997).  
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substance of ethical citizenship.  
This chapter is organized as follows. The first part sketches the development of “the 
social care market” in South Korea and explains how it came to serve as an experimental field of 
ethical citizenship. It then goes on to detail the modus operandi of the social care market and 
ethical citizenship, dwelling upon an ethnographic case study of Fortune Care. In tracing the 
vicissitude of the organization from its establishment in 2014 to its shutdown in 2015, I focus on 
the question of how its aspirations were converted into a form of “projective ethicality” through 
competition in the quasi-market of social care. The conclusion recapitulates the main arguments 
and the complicated relations of various forms of citizenships: developmental, social, and ethical 
citizenship.   
 
THE CRISIS OF REPRODUCTION  
AND CREATING THE SOCIAL CARE MARKET 
 
A standard narrative that explains the recent expansion of social care in South Korea is 
frequently shared in government-sponsored social economy and cooperative workshops. Since 
social enterprises and cooperatives were legalized in 2007 and 2012 respectively, those who 
wanted to establish such organizations were encouraged to take prerequisite trainings from 
intermediary support organizations such as the Seongbuk Community/Social Economy Center. 
The three- to four week-long curriculum usually involves the history of social economy and the 
cooperative movement, the present condition of the social care market, and the success stories of 
cooperatives. In spring 2014, I attended one of the classes accompanied by a community 
enterprise consultant, Ji-Young—who had been a district leader of a leftist party and became a 
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consultant following So-Yun (introduced in the previous chapter).9 In a small room in the 
Seongbuk Center, more than ten local residents were gathered for the first class, Introduction to 
the Social Economy and Cooperative. Ji-Young began her lecture by showing a graph of South 
Korea’s declining fertility rate. She asked, “We have the lowest birth rate in the world. Why do 
you think young people give up having babies?”10 Without waiting for the answers, Ji-Young 
continued her lecture: “In fact, we had a long, strong tradition of mutual care. As you know, our 
parents and grandparents used to raise babies together with their neighbors.” Such tradition, 
according to Ji-Young, has been destroyed by rapid development and neoliberal 
individualization: “the economic growth that only concerned materialistic values had recklessly 
destroyed the caring communities…. The succeeding neoliberalism has exacerbated the problem 
by making us see each other only as competitors.” According to her, the low fertility rate should 
be understood as “evidence” that our society is “on an unsustainable path.”  
 
There is an African proverb that “it takes a whole village to raise a child.”11 We have lost 
that kind of village. Caring for a child alone is too demanding in this competitive society. 
I think this is why young people increasingly give up having babies…. But the situation 
                                                 
9 Ji-Young and So-Yun had been long-time regional leaders of the leftist party that was disbanded in 2014 by the 
government for the party’s pro-North Korea position (I mentioned the political accident in Chapter 1). They both 
had left the party long before the dissolution due to a political disagreement with the party leadership.  
10 As of 2013, South Korea’s fertility rate is 1.19 births per women. As Ji-Young said, this is one of the lowest in the 
world leading only Taiwan and Singapore. In 2014, the Korean National Assembly Research Institute announced 
that if this birthrate continues Korea’s population of 50 million will become extinct by 2750. The news drew much 
attention in Korea. “Could South Korea’s Low Birth Rate Really Mean Extinction?” NBC News (Aug. 27, 2014). 
11 This is a very popular cliché in South Korea’s social and community economy sector, along with “If you want to 
go fast, go alone. If you want to go far, go together”—which is also often dubiously attributed as an “African 
proverb.” During my fieldwork research, I encountered these sayings in many promotional booklets, posters, 
training sessions, personal interviews, and even academic theses on the community/social economy. Whenever I 
heard these lines, I used to ask about the origin if I got the chance. No one gave me a clear answer, however. The 
use of these doubtful “African” proverbs produces an effect that romanticizes presumably “undeveloped” Africa as 
an “unmarred” space of mutual care and communal life—which is often described as what “we” have “lost” as a 
result of rapid economic growth. See also the representation of Bukjeong Maul in Chapter 2 and the episode of 
Mount Kilimanjaro in Chapter 5. After coming back to the U.S., I came to realize that these proverbs are also 
being used in the U.S. media with the same dubious attribution as African proverbs. See Joel Goldberg, “It Takes a 
Village to Determine the Origins of an African Proverb.” NPR News (Jul. 30, 2016).  
97 
 
is changing. People start to voluntarily gather and make a caring community. Like us! 
The government comes to recognize the seriousness of the problem and starts to support 
the social economy and offer social care programs.  
 
Ji-Young’s typical narrative—which in fact faithfully followed an instruction manual 
from the Seoul Maul Community Center12—seems to be problematic in a number of ways: it not 
only echoes the “lost paradise” picture that romanticizes past communities, similar to the 
representation of Bukjeong Maul in Chapter 2; but it also relies on the dubious dichotomy 
between materialistic development and caring communities, as already noted in the Prologue and 
Chapter 1. The schematic narrative, nevertheless, contains a grain of truth. Above all, it is 
generally agreed that contemporary South Korean society has faced a serious “crisis of 
reproduction” as indicated by grim statistics: the country has the highest suicide rate and lowest 
birth rate in the world.13 It is not a novel argument that capitalism’s propensity for unlimited 
accumulation has generated a constant tension with the process of social reproduction and care 
upon which the system inevitably depends (Bezanson 2006; Federici 2012; Fraser 2016).14 It is 
also well-known that the neoliberal human capital regime exacerbates the perennial contradiction 
between capital accumulation and care by replacing the state’s public welfare with individual 
                                                 
12 The Seoul Maul Community Center, A Manual for Maul Community Instructors [마을공동체교육 매뉴얼], 2013.  
13 Of course, social reproduction is not limited to the biological dimension. To follow Razavi (2012), I understand 
the concept as “the social processes and human relations associated with the production and maintenance of people 
and communities on a daily and generational basis, upon which all production and exchange rest” (1). This 
definition of social reproduction comprehends the three different dimensions of “reproduction” that Edholm, 
Harris, and Young (1977)’s pioneering work tried to differentiate: social reproduction, reproduction of the labor 
force, and biological reproduction. As Edholm, Harris, and Young also admit, in reality, these forms of 
reproduction are functionally entangled with one another.    
14 Although capitalism necessitates the incessant reproductions of a labor force and social bonds on biological, 
ideological, and societal levels, it has no room for the long-term, sustainable reproduction in its competitive 
pursuit of maximum profits in the market. For that reason, throughout the history of capitalism, the reproductive 
activities, especially care, have been primarily assigned to the “modernized family” and women’s unpaid labor 
(Donzelot, 1979; Federici, 2012; Weeks, 2011); the state has also guaranteed social reproduction through 
deploying various security dispositifs including social welfare (Donzelot 1994; Foucault 2010).  
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responsibility and applying the financial logic of return on investment to household and care 
activities.15 To borrow Nancy Fraser’s words, in destroying “its own conditions of possibility,” 
neoliberal capitalism “effectively eats its own tail” (2016: 103). 
In South Korea where universal social insurance and care systems were absent before the 
late 1990s, the contradiction between capital accumulation and social reproduction had been 
suppressed and controlled by the rapid economic growth and the strong familalism in which 
married women shoulder the care responsibility without substantial social help (Chang 2011; 
Han and Ling 1998; Lee 2012; Moon 2005; Truong 1999). As noted in Chapter 1, during its 
rapid growth in the 1960s-1980s, continuous development and low unemployment rates served 
as the primary social security dispositifs to maintain “the tight interlock between familialism, the 
male breadwinner household model, and women’s unpaid care” (Peng 2012: 31). As a result, as 
the 1997 financial crisis and the accompanying neoliberal reforms undermined the foundations of 
the old family-centered social reproduction system, the crisis of development has been directly 
extended to the crises of family, care, and social reproduction.  
Against this backdrop, the South Korean government has actively expanded not only 
universal social insurance—that I already noted in Chapter 1—but also various social care 
programs to manage “the crisis of care” throughout the 2000s. For example, the government 
universalized the “The Early Childhood Education and Care Support” in 2004 for all children 
under age six. “The Long-term Care Insurance”—which offers in-home or institutional care 
services for the ailing elderly—was introduced in 2008. In 2011, “The Personal Assistant 
                                                 
15 In this sense, it is symptomatic that Gary Becker’s theory of human capital originated from his interests in 
household economy such as marriage, nurture, and education (Becker 1978, 1993). In framing and interpreting all 
the human activities in a single frame of investment and return, he blurs the boundary between the private and the 
public and undermines the legitimacy of social care.   
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Services for People with Disabilities” was launched for all seriously handicapped persons.16 
Along with the implementation of these official care services, central and local governments 
have attempted to promote and organize informal care activities of local residents. For example, 
they have promoted volunteering activities nationwide and funded co-parenting and mutual care 
groups initiated by residents. Local governments have endeavored to organize these formal and 
informal care activities into a “Local Care Network” [chiyŏk tolbom net'ŭwŏk'ŭ] bringing 
together governments, volunteer organizations, social care institutions, and grass-roots co-
parenting and care groups.  
 The introduction of these various care programs was expected to reduce the 
responsibility borne by women for family care and promote their economic participation to 
complement the loss of family income (Ryu 2012). The government argued that the provision of 
social care would not only “liberate” women from domestic work but also “foster the social well-
being of the entire population” by offering more job opportunities and additional income.17 
Although a number of critical scholars raised concern about the policies’ market-friendly 
orientation, the expansion of social care itself has been welcomed not only as the first step for the 
“de-familiarization” of care (Ryu 2012; Peng 2010; cf. Crompton 2006; Esping-Anderson 1999) 
but also as an accomplishment of the feminist movement that pursued the social recognition of 
women’s unpaid reproductive labor and of “the welfare movement” that aimed to expand public 
social welfare (Chon 2014; Kwon 2005). A scholar even describes the expansion of care as a 
paradigm shift from the “cold modern” to “the caring state” [tolbom gukka] and the “warm 
                                                 
16 Besides these “universal” care programs, various small care service programs with more specific targets have 
been implemented in the same period: for example, the rehabilitation development care service for children with 
disabilities and the in-school care service for elementary and middle school students in urban poor neighborhoods 
were launched in the late 2000s and early 2010. 
17 The Government’s Special Task Force, Vision 2030: Final Report [비전 2030: 최종보고서], 2006, p. 116. 
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modern” (Cho 2006; cf. Vrasti 2011).  
What should not be forgotten, however, is that the socialization of care has proceeded 
under governmental exigencies to manage the crises of unemployment and economic growth. 
The care expansion was thus also framed, from the beginning, “as a way to improve the 
development potential to create jobs for youth and housewives” and “to relieve economic 
hardship by providing new business opportunities to struggling small-scale entrepreneurs.”18 In 
other words, women’s “liberation” from care responsibility has remained linked with the 
economic necessities to find “the new growth engine for future economic development” (Peng 
2012: 37). A government document issued in 2008 demonstrates this ambivalence:   
 
Creating social service jobs has boosted our economy’s growth potential as it has helped 
the economically inactive population, including housewives and the aged, to be 
integrated into the economically active population. In particular, the provision of social 
services, such as childcare, housekeeping and patient care, has liberated women from 
domestic work, which in turn, has increased employment levels. The project of creating 
social service jobs has created jobs for vulnerable groups of workers.... The project has 
great significance in that it has opened up new horizons by creating jobs in the social 
service sector, which is often called “the third sector,” beyond the private and public 
sectors and needs to expand its share of employment, through cooperation between 
NGOs and the government.19  
 
Given the above quote, through the expansion of social care the government has attempted to 
catch three birds with one stone: filling the lacunae of care caused by declining familialism; 
creating a job market for “inactive,” “vulnerable” groups; and advancing the cooperative 
governance between NGOs and the government in “the third sector.” Notably, these goals have 
                                                 
18 The Ministry of Labor, The Ministry of Welfare, and the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, The Plan for 
Expansion of Social Service [사회서비스 확충전략], 2006, p. 2-6. 
19 The Ministry of Labor and Employment “News Update: Social Services Expansion” (Jun. 17, 2008) (quoted from 
Peng 2012: 43). 
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been pursued by meticulously applying the market principle of “competition” to the whole 
process of designing and implementing social care services. First of all, the government has de-
regulated the restrictions that prevented private for-profit enterprises from participating in the 
social care market, in order to “increase and diversify the supply of care services through 
competition.”20 Furthermore, instead of directly offering public care services, the government 
has adopted voucher systems for most care programs, in which voucher beneficiaries can freely 
choose private care providers in the market. Finally, as the government outsourced the processes 
of recruiting, training, and certifying care workers, care worker certificates have been over-
issued and the workers are often exposed to precarious job security and fierce competition to 
entice their own beneficiaries. Therefore, the role of the government in the social care market, in 
general, has been limited to setting the price of the care service voucher, deciding the number of 
beneficiaries, auditing care workers and providers, and “facilitating the competition among the 
providers.”21 As a result, the bizarre quasi-markets have been artificially created, in which the 
supply and price of the commodities are unilaterally determined by the government, but the 
participants in the market are still expected to compete with limited resources. In this 
“economization” process, the government could organize the social care domain according to the 
model of the competitive market and simultaneously remain the auditory manager of the system 
at minimal social welfare cost.22  
                                                 
20 The Ministry of Labor, The Ministry of Welfare, and the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, Ibid., p. 8. 
21 The Ministry of Labor, The Ministry of Welfare, and the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, Ibid., p. 13. 
22 As discussed in Chapter 1, neoliberal rationality can be characterized as “the economization of heretofore 
noneconomic sphere” including society and politics (W. Brown 2015: 30-31; see also Çalışkan and Callon (2009)). 
Such economization is not necessarily equivalent with marketization or privatization. It is rather the issue of 
organizing the entire social filed according to the model of the market and homo œconomicus. Also, it should be 
noted that, as Foucault trenchantly points out, neoliberalism is based on the different logics of the market and the 
model of homo œconomicus from classical liberalism: it emphasizes “competition” over exchange and lassez-faire 
and renders its subjects as self-entrepreneurs rather than as subjects having irreducible economic interests. In this 
sense, South Korea’s social care market is a representative example of neoliberal reform, in which the logic of 
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On the surface, the government’s strategies of economization seem to have been 
successful. For the last decade, the growth of the “social care market” has been dazzlingly faster 
than any other economic sectors: the number of workers in the care service sector has exploded 
from 590,000 in 2004 to 1,851,000 in 2016,23— recording the biggest and the only continuous 
increase among all the sub-categories of service sector employments (Song, 2015). If examined 
closely, however, it turns out that the growth of the market has only been maintained and 
undergirded by the vulnerable working conditions of the care workers. From the beginning, the 
government blatantly declared that the social care market would be “appropriate” for vulnerable, 
unskilled, low-wage, female workers as well as petty, small-scale entrepreneurs.24 Despite the 
government’s empty promise for “decent jobs,”  the minimum cost and the low-price voucher 
policy has never been changed and thus a substantial portion of the aforementioned dramatic 
increase in social service employment consists of older female workers in their 50s and 60s who 
were pushed into the labor market because of their precarious economic condition and an 
insufficient national pension system (Park 2014). In this sense, the expansion of social care and 
the “liberation” of women can be viewed in a completely different perspective: as a process of 
relocating and outsourcing care work to low-waged, precarious, and marginal female labor 
forces. In a word, the de-familialization and socialization of care in South Korea has been deeply 
entangled with its economization and commodification to the point of undecidability.  
In relation to our discussion, several points should be noted concerning the formation of 
                                                 
competition is imposed and the players in the field are assumed as homo œconomicus in the neoliberal sense, as 
discussed in detail later.  
23 The Korean Statistical Information Service. <http://kosis.kr> 
24 The Ministry of Labor, The Ministry of Welfare, and the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, Ibid., p. 16. The 
document enumerates “targeted” laborers and entrepreneurs for the social care market: “housewives, economically 
inactive females, low-waged laborers, semi-skilled independent contractors, small-scale entrepreneurs.”  
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the social care market. Above all, the creation of the care market has been concomitant with the 
governmental promotion of social enterprises and cooperatives. As seen in the emphasis of “the 
third sector” in the above quotation, social enterprises and cooperatives were assumed by the 
government to be the main care providers for the future from the beginning: “It is desirable that 
the social care services are provided by social enterprises in the tertiary sector” says a 
government’s policy report; “The private corporations are restrained by profit-seeking and the 
government cannot offer good quality services because of its bureaucratic inefficiency and the 
limit of financial budget.”25 According to the report, because the practices of care include moral 
and ethical values beyond “the pursuit of economic profit,” the government should “foster social 
enterprises” and cooperatives as the primary care providers—for the long-term, “It is ideal that 
the social care market is operated by them.”26 This is not only because social enterprises and 
cooperatives “embody the social and moral values” but also because “they can provide care at 
affordable prices since making profit is not their priority.”27 That is to say, the ethical dedication 
of social enterprises and cooperatives not only helps to provide more hearty and committed 
services, but also helps to maintain the precarious and low-wage market conditions at the 
government’s minimum cost. Whether either one is closer to the government’s real intention, it is 
true that the government has provided various supports including subvention, business 
consulting, and trainings for cooperatives that want to participate in the social care market. In 
addition, to foster potential cooperatives and community enterprises that provide social care, the 
government has located informal, private care groups and actively encouraged them to shift their 
                                                 
25 The Korea Research Institute for Vocational Education and Training, Strategy for Improving the Quality of Jobs 
[일자리 선진화 전략], 2008, p.183. 
26 The Korea Research Institute for Vocational Education and Training, Ibid., p. 192 
27 The Korea Research Institute for Vocational Education and Training, Ibid., p. 194 
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organizational forms into cooperatives so that they can apply for various governmental 
subventions and get official recognition as a “governance partner” in the care market.   
 
 
Figure 8. The Seoul Municipal Government’s Cooperative Promotion Advertisement: 
“Do you have five people having the same idea? Make a cooperative. Seoul will help.” 
 
The newly created social care market is unusual and deviates from the perspective of the 
old developmental model of government and its citizenry: it is neither the conventional market 
where individuals’ economic contributions are measured and determined, nor the private realm 
where unpaid free care works are provided. As a hybrid space where the formerly marginalized 
populations under developmentalism—for example, unskilled workers, housewives, ailing 
elders, and the handicapped—are incorporated into the system either as care providers or care 
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recipients, the social care market has been formed into and operates from new social norms and 
new dynamics of inclusion and exclusion. In particular, the caring, ethical subjects in the market 
are forced to adapt to and survive the peculiar market conditions; and in the process, they 
embody a new ethicality as the basis of social recognition and ethical citizenship. In the rest of 
this chapter, I trace the process through the case of Fortune Care.  
 
THE CASE OF FORTUNE CARE 
 
Establishment 
Fortune Care is an elderly care worker cooperative [yoyang bohosa hyŏptongjohap] established 
in April 2014 by five local workers in the Seongbuk district. The prehistory of the cooperative is 
worth exploring because the founding process itself encapsulates how the formation of the care 
market interestingly overlaps with the old developmentalism and furthermore how the old 
remaining institutional resources are mobilized for the current programs of ethical citizenship.   
The founders of Fortune Care came to know each other in volunteer programs for the low 
income elderly that were operated by the New Village Women’s Association. As already noted 
in the previous chapters, “New Village Movement” [Saemaul undong] was initiated by the 
military government in 1971 to “improve material conditions” and “reform people’s 
consciousness” in impoverished rural communities; the military junta had expanded the 
movement into poor urban areas like Bukjeong Maul in the late 1970s.28 The New Village 
                                                 
28 The Ministry of Home Affairs, “The Ten Year History of New Village Movement” [새마을운동 10 년사], 1980. 
Despite its overt objectives, many scholars point out that the ulterior motive of the movement could be found in 
the political necessity that prevented the then-prevalent distress among the rural population as a result of the rapid 




Women’s Association is a parastatal organization established in 1977 by the administrative order 
that integrates various women groups including the Family Planning Motherhood and Life-Style 
Reform Women’s Group.29 With financial aid from such government and international 
organizations as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), this 
nationwide organization had run various moral programs to promote “family values and work 
ethics” that included birth control, anti-gambling, thrift, and temperance campaigns until the 
organization and movement drifted away from people’s attention with democratization in the late 
1980s (Han 2004; Yoon 2016).30  
It was again in the wake of the IMF crisis that the New Village movement and 
organization had a new turning point and rebirth: in the midst of the unprecedented economic 
turmoil, the organization redefined its role as “a volunteer organization” and launched a new 
“Nationwide Campaign for Private-led Social Safety Net” [min'gan sahoe anjŏnmang 
pŏmgungmin undong] that sought to “provide mutual charity and care for the underprivileged 
who are not covered by the dysfunctional social insurance programs.”31 What should be noted is 
that the turnaround was well matched with the government’s then-policy orientation to promote 
volunteerism to complement its scant social welfare system.32 The government established 250 
                                                 
29 For a general history of the New Village Women’s Association and its activities particularly in family planning 
during the 1970s and 1980s, see Moon (2005: 78-89).   
30 The dynamics of this ideological mass movement, which aimed to “modernize” and “enlighten” backward 
communities, were highly gendered. While male “leaders” were expected to commit to advancing economic 
infrastructure and local income, women were primarily committed to various moral and mutual care campaigns 
(Kim 2009; Moon, 2005). 
31 “The ‘Private-led Social Safety Net Campaign’ Is Launched” [민간사회안전망 범국민 운동 본격화], Joong-Ang 
Daily (July 17, 1999). 
32 As pointed out by numerous studies, the governmental promotion of volunteerism has been commonly found in 
various countries of the world since the turn of the 21st century: From the US (Hyatt 2000) to Japan (Ogawa 
2009), Italy (Muehlebach 2012), Greece (Rozakou 2016), Chile (Paley 2001) and China (Fleischer 2011). These 
researches commonly point out that voluntarism serves to supplement neoliberal welfare reform and produce 
moral, active, and self-governing citizens. See also Vrasti and Montsion (2014) for the development of 
transnational volunteerism.  
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Volunteer Centers in all city and country administrative districts in 2002, and furthermore 
enacted in 2005 “the Framework Act on Volunteer Service Activities” which stipulated that the 
promotion of volunteer activities is the “responsibility of the state and local governments.”33 As 
one of the leading and largest volunteer organizations, the New Village Women’s Association 
has been actively involved with various community activities and thus has grown to the extent 
that it has more than 1,500,000 female members.34 Given that volunteering serves as one of the 
main human and material resource pools for the social economy and its ethical projects, the short 
history of the organization—which can be summarized as a shift from a parastatal moral 
campaign organization to a grassroots volunteer institution—creates a portrait of this current 
project of ethical citizenship that shows that it is not a simple replacement of the old moral 
campaigns under the developmental state. This endeavor rather marks both a continuation and 
transition from it.    
As noted above, to create “the social care market” the Korean government has relied on 
the already existing “informal” care and volunteer organization infrastructures that had rapidly 
increased in the late 1990s. Since the mid-2000s, the government has put a lot of effort into 
incorporating informal care activities into a sort of “local care network” among the local 
governments, NGOs, and welfare/care organizations. These informal groups have been 
encouraged to shift their organizations into publicly recognized forms such as social enterprises, 
                                                 
33 With this effort, the number of the registered volunteers for the Korea Volunteer Center has dramatically 
increased from 2,083,704 in 2005 to 11,383,726 in 2015. The number of those who participate in voluntary 
activities at least once in the year has also skyrocketed from 995,870 in 2007 to 3,746,577 in 2017. Korea 
Volunteer Center, The 2016 Statistics for Volunteer Center [2016 자원봉사센터 현황: 통계편], 2017.  
34 In 1977 when the organization was established, the number of members was estimated to be 420,000. The 
Ministry of Health and Welfare, New Village Movement and Women [새마을운동과 여성], 1981, p. 47. It should be 
noted that this type of parastatal organization often exaggerates the number of members. It is also true, 
nevertheless, that the New Village Women’s Association has the most extensive and well-organized nationwide 
network among volunteer organizations due to its grassroots chapters in almost all administrative districts and 
cooperative relationship with local governments.    
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community enterprises, and cooperatives; moreover, the vast network of volunteering and care 
also has served as a human resource pool for social care workers and social economy activists. 
For instance, it was in the middle of such volunteer activities that Woo-Sun came to know about 
elderly care work. A private broker, commissioned by the government to recruit, train, and 
certify care workers, came to her and asked: “Don’t you want to do a good job and 
simultaneously earn some money? You may do what you are doing now, but with some 
compensation.”35 Struggling economically due to her husband Ki-Sung’s long-term 
unemployment, Woo-Sun decided to start work as an elderly in-home care worker in 2010 as did 
other members of Fortune Care.  
The Elderly Long-Term Care, which was introduced in 2008 to reduce family members’ 
(especially housewives’) burden to care for the elderly with geriatric diseases, has been 
considered as “the most notable achievements of the Korean government’s expansion of welfare 
service” (Chon 2014: 705).36 The program is designed as follows: if any ailing elderly people 
submit applications to the National Health Insurance Corporation along with a doctor’s report, 
staff members will visit and assess these elders’ mental and physical condition.37 If the 
applicants meet the eligibility criteria, they are given a service voucher with which they find and 
draw up contracts with in-home or institutional care service providers. Because the service 
market is completely open to private organizations and their financial gains are determined by 
                                                 
35 Interview with Woo-Sun and Ki-Sung (June 15, 2016). 
36 “The Act on Long-Term Care Insurance for Aged” states that its purpose is “to relieve family members from the 
burden of supporting elderly citizens and to enhance the quality of life of citizens by providing for matters 
concerning long-term care benefits” (Article 1). 
37 The staff members consist of a nurse and/or a social worker. In their assessment, the applicant’s physical and 
mental limitations are evaluated into five different levels and the service benefits depend on the assigned level. In 
an episode of Yuna’s Street, Mr. Jang pretends to have impaired hearing to raise his limitation level and benefits. 
Such practices are reportedly very common in the process of assessment, which is also confirmed by my fieldwork 
experience.    
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how many patients they have, the care providers and workers are expected to compete with each 
other to attract more “patient customers.”38  
Since its establishment, this quasi-market system has been criticized on many counts. 
Above all, as noted above, to encourage the participation of more private care agents in the 
market, the government has minimized regulations over the certification process of care 
providers and workers. Consequentially, the market has become over-crowded with petty private 
institutions and temporary care workers with over-issued state certificates.39 Furthermore, to 
minimize expenditures, the government has been very conservative in assessing applicants’ 
disabilities, which in turn has intensified competition in this already saturated market. As of 
2014, the number of older beneficiaries had remained approximately 460,000, while the number 
of state-certified care workers had reached 1.23 million.40 A community enterprise consultant 
once described to me this competitive market condition as “a small pond where anglers are much 
more than fish.” As expected, such conditions have exacerbated care workers’ job insecurity. 
Since certified care workers far outnumber beneficiaries, they can be replaced easily and, once 
becoming unemployed, it is hard to find a new patient-customer. Furthermore, since the 
government has set benefit levels very low and private agencies attempt to maximize their profits 
                                                 
38 As of 2014, only 228 institutions are public, government-owned (this is 1.3% among 16,525 elderly care 
providers). The other providers consist of for-profit organizations, private social welfare organizations, social 
enterprises, and cooperatives. In fact, South Korea’s elderly care was basically designed with reference to Japan’s 
model. South Korea’s system, however, is highly marketized in comparison with Japan’s in which the provision of 
care service is not open to for-profit organizations (Chon 2014; Ochiai 2009).  
39 To obtain a care worker certificate, one is required to take 240 hours training and the qualification exam. Since the 
government out-sourced the process to private institutions, the training programs have been repeatedly criticized 
for their low-quality and expensive price. Also, the high passing rate of the exam, which reached around 80~90%, 
has exacerbated the over-supply of care workers.     
40 National Health Insurance Corporation, 2015 Long Term Care Statistical Year Book [2015 장기요양보험통계연보], 
2015. As of 2014, the number of beneficiaries is only 6.6 % of the people aged over 65 (6,462,740 in total). The 
coverage rate is very low compared to 14.5% in Germany and 18.5% in Japan. Among 1.23 million certified care 
workers, only 264,085 are currently employed and matched with beneficiaries. 
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in the middle, the salary and working conditions of care workers have remained consistently 
poor: they receive barely above the minimum wage, with excessive workloads and without 
proper labor rights.41 As a result, the system often has been blamed for producing only “cheap 
unstable jobs led by the government” and fostering the worst, distorted form of “marketization of 
care” (Jegal 2009). 
What directly led the Fortune Care members to form their own cooperative was their 
experience of vulnerability as care workers for the elderly. For example, Woo-Sun, who got 
chronic knee pain while caring for a handicapped elder, lost her job after she took a three-day 
break for getting treated for the pain since her beneficiary simply decided to call another care 
worker on the long waitlist. Sharing each other’s negative experiences, the care workers decided 
to build an elderly care cooperative in the spring of 2014 with the expectations that their basic 
labor rights and working condition could be improved. It should be noted, however, that what led 
them to build a cooperative was also the mingled effect of governmental efforts to officialize 
informal, volunteering care work along with participants’ inclination for social good and 
recognition. Woo-Sun and Sun-Bok once recollected to me their excitement when they met with 
a member of the first government-certificated elderly care social cooperative, Dounuri, in a 
government-organized cooperative expo; “I got goose-bumps when I first heard their 
                                                 
41 Although the wages of care workers vary depending on organizations, in-home care workers usually receives 
6,500 ~ 7,000 won (approximately $ 6) per hour as of 2014. The hourly rate is slightly above the minimum wage 
(5,210 won). They are required to work for 4 hours a day, 5 days a week per patient. In sum, their monthly income 
is about 500,000 Won ($450) if they care for only one patient-customer. If they work 8 hours a day for two 
patients, their monthly salary would be about 1,000,000 Won ($900). (As of 2014, South Korea’s average annual 
income per capita is $28,180). In addition, given that they visit and work in patients’ home, they are easily 
exposed to the risk of emotional, physical abuse or even sexual harassment from the patients. Furthermore, some 
for-profit care providers used to deny providing mandatory social benefits such as health insurance and national 
pension for care workers, arguing that they are “freelancers” rather than “laborers.” The low wages and the poor 
working conditions lead to the high turnover rate of the care workers. It is reported that the half of newly certified 
care workers leave the market within less than six months (Park 2014). 
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catchphrase: ‘Provide care from cradle to grave with our own hands.’”42 Woo-Sun, a social 
welfare beneficiary herself, and Sun-Bok, a long-time housewife and temporary worker, related 
in chorus that the slogan “enlightened” them about the significance of care cooperatives and 
convinced them to establish their own. In exploring the rise of ethical citizenship in the volunteer 
sector in Italy, Muehlebach (2011) notes the “magic” of ethical citizenship that incorporates 
marginalized labor populations as the subjects of voluntary care work by instilling their actions 
with moral meanings and social recognition. The same magic seems to be found in the social 
care market in South Korea: those who had been considered marginal and dispensable in the 
developmental labor regime are now summoned to voluntarily shoulder the responsibility of 
social welfare and become armed with the ethics of care. Just as the New Village Movement 
provided opportunities for national belonging and recognition for residents in dilapidated, 
abandoned rural areas on the condition that they contribute to “economic development” (Kim 
2009; Yoon 2016), the experiment of ethical citizenship also offers marginal groups the 
experiences of “empowerment” and incorporation. Of course, once again, such inclusion does 
not come without a cost.  
 
Becoming a Pro with Moral Authenticity  
It was at the abovementioned cooperative workshop that I first met Fortune Care members. They 
stood out in the class because they were seemingly perplexed at Ji-Young’s 90-minute 
condensed summary of the global economy and of the cooperative movement, which had 
bounced around roughly from Margaret Thatcher to Thomas Picketty. When Ji-Young wrapped 
                                                 
42 The cooperative’s slogan is obviously a parody of the famous Beveridge Report’s proposal. Given that it tacitly 
changes the subject of welfare provision from the state to citizens themselves, the parodied slogan reflects what I 
have called “do-it-yourself welfare aspirations” in the previous chapters.  
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up her lecture by re-emphasizing the significance of care and cooperation as the antidote to 
growing global inequality and turned to the audience for a Q & A, a member of Fortune Care Ki-
Sung raised his hand from a backseat and asked: “How can we receive a government subsidy?” 
Looking slightly disgruntled—perhaps because her enthusiastic moral talk drew only a question 
about subvention, Ji-Young shrugged and answered: “If you show real ‘passion and 
commitment’ for solving social problems, the government would support you no matter what.”   
This answer, however, is neither satisfactory nor accurate. Although it is true that there 
are various governmental subsidies for social care organizations, to obtain them, applicants have 
to go through a complicated and competitive application and selection process. That is to say, the 
candidates are required to demonstrate and provide evidence in a particular way that their 
“passion and commitment” deserve financial support and investment. In fact, the second time 
that I met Fortune Care members was at one of the screening interviews for the district 
government’s social care subvention. On a late spring day of 2014, the basement auditorium of 
the Seongbuk district government was filled with local care groups who needed financial 
support. Due to the high volume of applicants, each organization was given only five minutes to 
present their business plan and explain the necessity for support in front of the selection 
committee that consisted of local public officials, professors, and social economy activists. The 
assessment was made based on four sub-categories: economic value in the grades of profitability 
and sustainability and social value in the grades of moral commitment and community 
adaptability;43 25 points were assigned to each category, for a total of 100 possible points. While 
                                                 
43 It is noteworthy that sustainability is classified as an “economic value.” In South Korea’s social economy, 
“sustainability” has been used mainly in two meanings. First, it means the principles of “sustainable” development 
that include reflections on the environment and future generations, in contrast to former development policies that 
have focused exclusively on material and economic growth. Second, it often indicates certain organizations’ 
economic performances to sustain their business and survive in the market. Although sustainability clearly means 
the latter in this case, the everyday usage of the term in the social economy sector often includes a slippage 
between these two meanings. To illustrate, it is often said that the sustainable survival of social enterprises would 
113 
 
explaining the Fortune Care’s business plan for the elderly care market, the presenter Sun-Bok 
looked highly nervous, unlike some of the other teams who seemed accustomed to this type of 
presentation. When she was asked about what makes Fortune Care competitive in the market, 
Sun-Bok failed to give a convincing answer as she repeated: “we all have actively participated in 
volunteer programs for a long time and know how to care for the elderly… So please help us.” 
Fortune Care ended up getting high points in the “social value” categories, while scoring the 
lowest in the columns of profitability and sustainability. During a break, one of the selection 
committee members related to me that the elderly care market was already so saturated that he 
did not really believe that the Fortune Care cooperative could survive. Looking slightly guilty for 
what he just said, he quickly added justification to his view: “Indeed, they look like very 
committed and good people. But, as you know, our subventions come from taxes. So we need to 
be meticulous so it is not heard that we waste taxes. What if they go bankrupt after getting the 
funding?” As a result, instead of financial support, the committee decided to support Fortune 
Care with business consulting by the Seongbuk Community/Social Economy Center in order to 
help them to build a stronger and more profitable business plan.   
This episode demonstrates what kinds of virtues are concretely expected for social care 
organizations to obtain the government’s recognition and support. A series of anthropological 
studies about the rise of volunteerism and the formation of ethical citizenship have commonly 
pointed out a prevalent distinction in the field between spiritual, relational “values” and material, 
economic “interests” (Hyatt 2000; Muehlebach 2012; Rozakou 2016; Vrasti and Montsion 
2014). Volunteers position themselves as sacrificial, ethical citizens who contribute to the 
                                                 
contribute to and guarantee the sustainability of the whole society or sustainable development. In this way, 
“sustainability” serves as a hinge between “social value” and “economic value” (cf. T. Brown 2015; Davidson 
2010). For the imbrications between “sustainable development” as a development discourse and “sustainability” as 
a disciplinary imperative for self-reliant, autonomous subjectivity, see Swidler and Watkins (2009).    
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construction of social bonds vis-à-vis others who pursue only material and private interests. This 
distinction—which can be traced back to the old anthropological binary between gift exchange 
and market transaction—often works as a dividing line of inclusion and exclusion in the project 
of ethical citizenship.44 In South Korea’s care market, where the government purposefully has 
introduced market doctrines through the institutionalization and professionalization of volunteer 
activities, this dichotomy has still remained effective, as seen in the aforementioned evaluation 
categories that differentiate “social” and “economic” values. The Fortune Care’s episode, 
however, shows that the expected virtues for ethical citizens have become more hybrid and 
composite in the marketized care sector. That is to say, the ethical citizens’ moral aspirations and 
commitments are now required to be convertible into market rationality, or at least become 
compatible and consonant with it.  
The ambivalent parlance of the term “pro” [sŏnsu], which is prevalent among social 
economy activists and care workers, seems to show the complicated nature of this task. On the 
one hand, the term is often used to depict a habitual “subsidy hunter” who joins the social 
economy to pursue the government’s “easy money.” In the field, rumors are always circulating 
about one or two social economy organizations that received multiple massive funding from the 
government and conglomerates; social economy activists and public officials whom I 
interviewed commonly expressed a concern that these “pros” who lack enduring community 
commitment and moral responsibility tend to monopolize the limited opportunities for 
investments from the government and corporations. In responding to my question about how to 
identify “pros,” a public officer on the selection committee explained that “You can easily pick 
                                                 
44 For example, as Muehlebach (2012: Ch. 7) shows, the hierarchical division of relational labor and material labor 




out the pros. Their words are too glib and lack ‘authenticity’ [chinjŏng-sŏng]. You can feel it.” 
He added that he always prioritized “authenticity” in selecting the recipient of subvention. 
Regardless of what he means by authenticity, however, those who have only moral enthusiasm 
and lack a profitable business plan like Fortune Care did, conversely, are required to be “pros.” 
In their first consulting session, Min-Suk, another community enterprise consultant, emphasized 
to Fortune Care members: “You need to be pros. You cannot survive only with good will… It is 
also naïve to believe the state will help you only if your intentions are good. No. The government 
does only monitoring and auditing.”45 The term of “pro” here represents professional, 
empowered subjects who embody market rationality enough to survive in the market. Thus, it is 
not the point that ethical citizens’ moral enthusiasm should be distinguished from market value 
and rationality; what is significant, rather, is to strike a balance between their moral enthusiasm 
and market expertise.  
In a nutshell, the ethical citizenship project interpellates its subjects to become seemingly 
contradictory figures, “pros with moral authenticity”—another variation of what I described in 
Chapter 1 as “aspiring human capital” or “socially responsible entrepreneurs.” Exemplary ethical 
citizens are required to retain moral value and simultaneously acquire market knowledge and 
competence; more precisely, their moral aspirations are required to be translated and converted 
into resources for exhibiting and raising their “investability” in the market. In fact, all the 
processes—from the cooperative prerequisite courses through a series of applications and 
screenings to repetitive business consulting—aim to facilitate the translation and produce this 
peculiar subjectivity. What needs to be highlighted more clearly is that the nature of their ethical 
                                                 




practices has been redefined and transformed in this process as well, which I turn to now.   
 
“Projective Ethicality” and the “Investable Subject” 
Throughout the business consulting that continued from July to October in 2014, Min-Suk and 
Ji-Young put pressure on the Fortune Care members to build a three-year development plan. The 
whole plan included ways of not only increasing the number of customers and cooperative 
members, but also developing market competitiveness, internal democracy, and social value. The 
anticipated growth was visualized with several business analysis tools.    
 
 
Figure 9. A Visualization of Fortune Care's Three-year Plan46 
 
                                                 
46 This is one of the analytical tools, which was called “Wagon Wheel” by the community enterprise consultants. 
Each angle of the octagon signifies social or economic values, such as community adaptability, democratic 
participation, marketability, and financial capability. The substantial parts of the consulting sessions were devoted 
to explaining how to define the values and how to measure them. The three lines inside the octagon show Fortune 
Care’s plan to continuously improve the entire values throughout three years. The practice of visualization was not 
simply for self-inspection. In fact, the government required that all the applications for the government-certified 
community enterprise should include at least two or three forms of visualized plans.  
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Although the consulting sessions often digressed to explain the meaning of unfamiliar 
and vague terms such as internal democracy, community adaptability, and social value,47 the 
most urgent agenda involved how to attract more patient-clients. At every meeting, the 
consultants asked the members: “What makes you more competitive and attractive than other 
organizations in the market?” In response, Fortune Care drew up two business strategies. The 
first was to actively publicize their good will and moral motivation to local elders who are their 
“potential customers.” In the quasi-market where the price is controlled, the appeal of moral 
commitment could be a good strategy to “snatch” customers from other for-profit competitors. 
The second strategy was to utilize “social capital” that had been obtained by their long-term 
volunteer work. Min-Suk particularly emphasized the importance of social capital: “For social 
economic organizations, the relationship is money. That is why we call it social capital [sahoejŏk 
chabon].”48 For these purposes, the members decided not only to participate in more local 
volunteer programs but also to run various projects for the local elderly under the banner of 
Fortune Care. They re-organized their ordinary volunteer efforts—such as irregular visits to local 
senior citizen centers—into a series of “projects” with concrete schemes, objectives, funding, 
and timetables.  
What should be noted is that turning ordinary volunteer works into government-funded 
and market-related projects also transforms the manner and nature of their ethical practices into 
what can be termed as “projective ethicality.” In exploring the “new spirit of capitalism” in the 
post-industrial network society, Boltanski and Chiapello maintain that the logic of “project” has 
                                                 
47 A government report provides a guideline of how to define and calculate these values. For example, “internal 
democracy” means whether the organization has “a democratic decision-making process” and can be measured by 
the number of internal decision-making meetings and the number and range of participants; The Ministry of Labor 
and Employment and the Korea Social Enterprise Promotion Agency, Manual for Performance Report Writing 
[사업보고서 작성 매뉴얼], 2014.  
48 For the usage of social capital in the social economy sector, see also Chapter 2.  
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emerged as a new formula through which people understand and justify reality: it restricts “the 
possibilities of action… whose logic they embrace and also legitimate” (2005: 107).49 As a 
technology of organizing the world, the logic of project dissects social phenomena and 
rearranges them into a “problem-solving cycle.” The rationale defines clear and achievable 
objectives in a limited time span and deploys a series of practices in a successive process of 
planning-performance-evaluation: “Projects need planning. Aims need to be defined, a road map 
drawn up, a time frame, costs and means determined, participants need selecting, motivating and 
their collaboration organized… and at the end the results must be evaluated” (Bröckling 2016: 
181). This project rationality seems to have a homology—or at least is well-tuned—with the 
workings of ethical citizenship, in the sense that the latter also reduces socio-economic structural 
problems such as poverty, unemployment, and income inequality into manageable and solvable 
objects through individual ethical practices. Whereas the language of social activism mainly 
diagnoses social problems as the result of social contradictions or limits of existing (capitalist) 
structures, the newly emerging language of ethical citizenship renders these structural 
dimensions invisible and instead represents social problems as targeted objectives of citizen-
subjects’ moral projects. In fact, the government’s mentoring, consulting, and auditing practices 
have contributed to such framing of citizens’ ethical aspirations and practices in terms of project 
rationality and thus to the effective promotion of “projective ethicality.” 
To illustrate, Fortune Care’s first project was a short-term singing class for the elderly 
who live alone. Although they had offered occasional dancing and singing classes for these 
                                                 
49 In developing Boltanski and Chiapello’s idea in Foucauldian perspective, Brökling (2016) also points out that 
“project” has become historical a priori in our times, “an inescapable, fundamental category within which we 
understand ourselves and shape ourselves” (191). He goes further to maintain that contemporary governmentality 
can be defined as “the governing of projects and governing by projects” (172). It is notable that Brökling tries to 
illustrate various dispositifs to undergird “the governing of/by project,” while Boltanski and Chiapello’s Weberian 
approach ends up extracting an ideal type of “project rationality” out of the numerous management works. 
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seniors as part of their New Village volunteer activities, this time Fortune Care members decided 
to apply for a government’s subvention partially because they wanted to become accustomed to 
the process. In the application document, they clarified the aim of the class: “The poor elders 
living alone are suffering from isolation and loneliness. This project aims to lessen their 
emotional pain and prevent suicides by building sympathetic bonds among participants”; to this 
end, they planned to host bi-weekly singing classes for 10-15 local elders who are over 65 and 
under the poverty line; results would be reported to the government with a participant 
satisfaction survey. It is remarkable that the plan attempts to problematize elderly poverty in 
terms of individuals’ emotional-affective predicaments so that the issue becomes manageable 
through such ethical projects as a singing class with clear targets and a limited timetable (see also 
Chapters 2 and 4). The performance of the project, furthermore, would be measured and be used 
to attract more participants and investment. In fact, the singing class project did not go well, 
since not enough elderly registered for it. Fortune Care could not cancel the class, however, 
because they already had received the government’s subvention; instead, they had to bring their 
own patients to the class, despite the fact that some of them suffered from senile dementia and 
thus could not follow the class well. This “hodgepodge” reality was surely erased in their final 
report; the number of attendants and their satisfaction grades measured in a 5-point scale were 
used as “data” to show their credibility and effectiveness for their next project which was an 
online crowd-funding campaign for the seniors who could not afford the medical report fees for 
their elderly care applications. Among Fortune Care members, there was a strong expectation 
that the performance of these serial projects would render them more favorable and investable 
not only in the market but also in the eyes of the government.  
In fact, besides mentoring and consulting, the quantitative measurement of social 
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economy organizations’ “performances” and the objective assessment of their investability are 
where the government’s efforts are most focused in the social economy and social care market. 
For example, the Ministry of Employment and Labor and the Korea Social Enterprise Promotion 
Agency have developed a social value assessment index and have annually evaluated the amount 
of “social impact” produced by government-certified social enterprises. A government’s report 
states the main purposes of the development and application of the evaluation tools as follows:  
 
The development of the Basic Index of Social Value (BISV) seeks to stimulate capital 
investment in the social economy by providing an objective criterion for evaluating the 
performances of social economy organizations… [Such assessment] enables the 
government to identify excellent social enterprises and judge the efficiencies of its 
subventions. It also provides various investors with the necessary information for their 
investments and furthermore helps social economy organizations to review their actual 
achievement of social impact and enhance the transparency and accountability.50   
 
That is to say, the social value measurement not only serves as social economy organizations’ 
“technology of self-examination” (Kim 2016: 192); but it also aims to provide objective and 
comparable information about the agents’ ethical performances and social value for potential 
investors, including the government itself.51  
                                                 
50 The Ministry of Employment and Labor and the Korean Social Enterprise Promotion Agency, A Study on the 
Development and Application of the Basic Index of Social Value for the Social Economy [사회적경제 사회가치 
측정지표 정교화 및 활용을 위한 연구], 2014, pp. 4-5. 
51 The development of the evaluation tools is also regarded as significant for implementing “fair and transparent 
competition” among social economy organizations. The South Korea’s government has recently attempted to enact 
“The Framework Act on Social Value” that enforces the state and local governments to consider bidding 
organizations’ estimated production of social value when they make public procurement and contracts. The law 
was prepared and proposed in 2014 by Moon Jae-In, then-Assemblyman and now the President. The enactment of 
the law has been suspended because of political conflicts with the then-ruling party. With the transfer of power, 
however, the enactment is considered as one of the new President’s main policy goals. Moon argues that, in 
opposition to the custom that the government purchases services or goods from an organization that bids the 
lowest price, the new act will advance “the ‘ethical economy’ [ch'ak'an gyŏngje] that prioritizes community, 
cooperation, and mutual care over profit by promoting the social economy and social value.” “President Moon 
Promises the Introduction of Social Value Assessment in Government-Related Organizations” [공공기관에 
‘사회적가치’ 평가 도입], E-Daily (May 28, 2017). See also Moon Jae-In, How do we make ethical economy? The 
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What is interesting in regard to our discussion is that the assessment process involves 
specific interpretations of what can and should be considered as “ethical” and “social” impact. 
For example, a government-certificated social enterprise Dasomi Foundation—which hires 
social welfare recipients to provide patient care service—was assessed to generate the social 
value worth of over 5.2 billion won (approx. 4.5 million dollar) in 2012.52 To describe a few of 
the calculations: as they hire social welfare recipients, the reduced amount of the government 
subsidies for the former recipients is calculated as “social value” produced by the enterprise; 
since Dasomi Foundation provides a relatively low-priced service, the total amount of the 
difference between the organization’s price and the average market price is also counted as social 
impact; if their care service enables a former caregiver in the family to get a new job, this income 
too would be included as created social value. In this assessment, therefore, the reduction of the 
state’s social welfare expenditures and the provision of low-priced services are unconditionally 
considered “social good” and their ethical practices and the accompanying intangible moral, 
social values are measured in a tangible, monetary form.53 In the consulting process, Fortune 
Care was also once advised to calculate the “social impact” of their various projects in a similar 
way and include the figures in their portfolio or future applications. For example, their volunteer 
                                                 
Meaning and Perspective of Enactment of the Framework Act on Social Value [착한경제, 어떻게 만들 것인가? 
사회적 가치 기본법 도입의 의미와 전망], 2014.  
52 Dasomi Foundation, The 2012 Performance Report [2012 성과보고서], 2014, pp. 66-68.  
53 This social value estimation method in a monetary form is called “Social Return on Investment (SROI),” 
developed by the Robert Enterprise Development Fund in the Silicon Valley in 1996. Although SROI is one of the 
most popular methods in calculating social value, there are other ways of quantifying qualitative values; to name a 
few, Global Input Investing Rating System (GIIRS) and Shujog’s Impact Assessment, both of which use rating 
scales instead of monetary forms. For interesting analyses of the meanings and predicaments in quantifying 
intangible objects, see Espeland and Sauder (2007), Espeland and Stevens (2008), and Fourcade (2011). The 
Ministry of Employment and Labor has changed its assessment method from SROI to a rating system in 2013, in 
part because of social enterprises’ antipathy to the monetary calculation. Further research should be directed at 
exploring how such changes in assessment knowledge and tools have performatively constructed and demarcated 
the plane of “the social” in different ways, which will be my next “project.” 
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visits to elderly living alone were calculated into the monetary value by multiplying the number 
of visits and the average price of in-home care service; likewise, the social value of the singing 
classes was estimated based on the number of participants and the elderly counseling service fee 
in the social care market. The data never appeared on their promotional leaflets or funding 
applications, however, because the amount of the impact was less than they expected and the 
members obviously had moral qualms about using these simply calculated figures. Nonetheless, 
the experience pressured them to compare their “impact” with other organizations and to weigh 
their value and investability in the social market, as noted in the above government’s report. 
The quantitative measurement of social impact and ethical value not only adjusts the 
imaginary of what is social and ethical; but it also further rearticulates the relationship among the 
state, the market, and ethical citizens (cf. Callon 1998; Latour and Lepinay 2009; Mitchell 2002). 
The ethical subjects who committed to a series of projects do not directly follow the utilitarian 
axiom, that is, “the maximization of profit.” As Fortune Care’s case shows, these projects instead 
aim to build connections, social capital, and potential opportunities (cf. Botanski and Chiapello 
2005: Ch. 2). This does not mean, however, that their ethical practices are free from or are even 
an antidote to market rationality; rather, the “ethical” citizens are required to follow the financial 
or human capital logic and construct themselves as investable subjects before the eyes of the 
market and the state. Their ethical practices are not only molded into appreciable projects that are 
expected to generate measurable social impacts, but they are also required to organize and utilize 
the social capital, trust, and networks to enhance their portfolio and investability.  
In this sense, the government is both absent and present simultaneously in the social care 
market. On the one hand, the government is absent as the principal and ultimate care provider, 
given that the market is completely open to private organizations and government-owned public 
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care providers comprise only about one percent of the market. On the other hand, the 
government is strongly present nevertheless, as the manager of the care market that acts to 
maintain this market as competitive, low-priced, and low-waged, as “a mentor or consultant” 
who promotes projective ethicality, and ultimately as an investor concerned about their returns in 
the form of social impact.54 Just as the selection committee member who asked “what if they go 
bankrupt?” the government subvention is now considered not so much as support to the 
underprivileged subjects but rather as an investment for promising projects that are expected to 
produce sufficient social and moral impact. As a result, the imaginary relationship between the 
state and its ethical subjects in the social care market becomes more analogous with the relation 
between investor and investee in the stock market.55  
In completing a series of projects with the government’s subventions, Fortune Care’s 
portfolio was markedly improved: Although the small grants could not dramatically improve 
their financial situation, these projects enabled them to build a vast network in the local social 
economy sector. Ji-Young and Min-Suk even recommended that they apply for one of the largest 
social economy subventions: the government-certified community enterprise. The Fortune Care 
members wanted to secure an office space with the funds and lessen their rent burden. Their 
application this time looked more slick and businesslike with the inclusion of visualized three-
                                                 
54 Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller suggest “government at distance” as a key characteristic of “(advanced) liberal 
government.” (Rose 1999; Rose and Miller 2008). The South Korean government’s positioning itself not as a 
direct caregiver but as an auditor and investor can be viewed as a typical way of “governing at a distance.” The 
point is, however, that “at a distance” should not be understood to indicate the intensity of the state’s intervention 
but to describe the hegemonic form of the state’s interacting with society. As discussed so far, the government’s 
role in the social care market has increased, even while devolving its care responsibilities to the ethical citizens.  
55 The transformation is not parochial to the social care market. In fact, what can be called “the financialization of 
social policy” has occurred across all the government’s policies since the mid-2000s when the government 
declared the state should be reformed into “Social Investment State” [sahoe t'uja gukka] promoting human and 
social capital (Lim 2006; Yang 2007). For example, the Social Impact Bond (SIB), in which the government or a 
commissioned private organization raises investment and repays to investors based on the policy’s return, is being 
actively experimented with in South Korea. For the basic notion and operation principles of SIB, see The Young 
Foundation, Social Impact Investment: the challenge and opportunity of Social Impact Bonds, 2011. 
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year plan and various business analysis tools that explained their current and future financial and 
organizational circumstances. They even used such terms as “Creating Shared Value (CSV),” 
coined by the Harvard Business School Professor, Michael Porter, to describe their social 
mission.56 Although no one in the cooperative seemed to have read the article nor understood the 
exact meaning of the term, Sun-Bok joked with me that she had seen every other organization 
use the same term and she thought it would give their application a “professional impression.” 
By practicing projective ethicality, this organization seemed to have become accustomed to 
rendering themselves “investable subjects.”  
 
Closedown 
Despite much effort, Fortune Care’s strategies turned out to be insufficient to attract the major 
investment and survive in the market. Although the organization excavated potential 
beneficiaries and helped them to apply for care vouchers, many of the elders failed to receive the 
benefit, because the government conservatively selected the beneficiaries as part of its austerity 
policy. As a result, the number of Fortune Care’s patients never exceeded five (it is usually 
considered that at least 20-30 customers are needed for an elderly care organization to stay in the 
black). The cooperative’s increasing debt exacerbated the economic situation of its members; in 
particular, Ki-Sung and Woo-Sun, who were themselves social welfare beneficiaries, suffered 
the most. Fortune Care’s hope—which was to be certified as a “community enterprise” by the 
                                                 
56 The notion of “Creating Shared Value (CSV)” was introduced and has become famous by Porter’s article in The 
Harvard Business Review (Porter 2011).  In the article, Porter argues a corporation’ productivity and 
competitiveness are deeply and mutually related to the development of the broader communities around it. He 
urges companies to go beyond the practices of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and more directly engage 
with the communities in the process of value production. His argument and the notion of CSV have been accepted 
as a golden rule among South Korea’s social economy activists and social entrepreneurs. I hope that further 
research is conducted to trace the circulation of such “imported” knowledge in South Korea’ social economy 
sector (cf. Collier 2011).   
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government—was also crumbled, when they managed to advance to the final round but failed to 
be selected.57 According to Ji-Young who attended the selection process, the committee 
members again were satisfied with Fortune Care’s moral commitment and community 
adaptability, yet concerned that the cooperative would produce very little “social impact” in the 
community because of their small number of customers. In a word, the selection committee was 
not confident that their “investment” would produce enough “return.”  
In the end, Fortune Care was officially closed down in April of 2015, exactly one year 
after its establishment. This case is not exceptional at all. Since its legalization in 2012, 
cooperatives have mushroomed across South Korea with active promotion by the state and local 
governments: more than 6,235 cooperatives have been newly established in only 2 years (as of 
2016, the number reached to 10,637); it is reported, however, that more than half of these have 
ceased their activities.58 Fortune Care was just one of those unfortunate. Still, the results were 
dire to the individual members of Fortune Care. They all were trapped into an incurred debt 
cycle while Woo-Sun and Ki-Sung’s marriage began to be threatened by this economic hardship.  
When I revisited my field again in the summer of 2016, Woo-Sun was working at a 
nursing home and Ki-Sung was participating in the Seoungbuk district government’s short-term 
Public Work Program, while Sun-Bok had returned to being a regular volunteer and full-time 
housewife. They all still wandered around the social care market which might be the only 
available labor market niche for undereducated and underskilled workers like them. When I met 
with Ki-Sung, who had begun to live alone at that time, I asked him why he thought in retrospect 
                                                 
57 Another local cooperative, Happy Seongbuk was selected as a community enterprise and managed to turn red into 
black, whose case I will deal with in the next chapter. 
58 The Ministry of Strategy and Finance and the Korean Institute for Health and Social Affairs, The 2015 Survey on 
Cooperative [2015 협동조합 실태조사]. 2015. A private report calculates that only 10% of the registered 
cooperatives are actually operating. “Drifting Cooperatives” [겉도는 협동조합 절반은 폐업상태], Segye Ilbo (June 
8, 2015).  
126 
 
Fortune Care had failed. In fact, I anticipated that he would express feelings of betrayal by the 
government and its consultants: at the very least, their promises of generous support had turned 
out to be an empty pledge. Instead, I received a rather surprising answer: Ki-Sung attributed 
Fortune Care’s failure to their lack of decent computer skills. He observed that it not only held 
them back in the efficient operation of the organization but also made it hard to design a fancy, 
professional-looking proposal or presentation document and thus it let them down in the 
competition with other organizations. Consequentially, he was now learning for himself how to 
use computer software such as Photoshop while doing public work. His statement might be an 
apologetic testimony that he finally, albeit late, becomes a “pro,” who is equipped with 
competent capabilities and continues to increase his/her own employability or investability. 
Throughout the government’s education, consulting, and selection processes, these former 
volunteers had been urged to take advantage of their human and social capital, to get accustomed 
to projective ethical practices, and to transform themselves into “professionals with 
authenticity.” In this discursive scheme, even their failure is attributed to their 
“underperformance” in translating their good-will into a profitable business plan and in 
producing sufficient social impact. Just as with Sun-Bok’s quip about Yuna’s Street, the ending 




This chapter has attempted to address two interconnected questions: first, how can we understand 
and contextualize the rapid de-familiarization and expansion of social care in “neoliberal” South 
Korea? Second, what does this transformation inform us about the rise of ethical citizenship and 
127 
 
its inclusive and exclusive dynamics? These questions seem to resonate with Wendy Brown’s 
inquiry in her recent work Undoing the Demos (2015). Influenced by Michel Feher, she argues 
that modern homo œconomicus as a subject of exchange is now replaced with a new economic 
figure: a “bit of human capital tasked… with enhancing its (monetary and nonmonetary) 
portfolio value” (10). With this observation, she raises an interesting and significant question: 
what is then the “gender” of such human capital? In other words, if a modern liberal “economic 
man” was assumed to be a male in the market sustained by women’s “shadow work” in the 
private sphere (Illich 1981), how does the truth-regime of human capital—that blurs the 
boundary of public/private and turns every aspect of life into manageable assets—transform and 
reposition the gendered, shadowy nature of care work? Brown suggests two possibilities: “Either 
women align their own conduct with this truth, becoming homo œconomicus, in which case the 
world becomes uninhabitable, or women’s activities and bearing as femina domestica remain the 
unavowed glue for a world…in which case women occupy their old place as unacknowledged 
props and supplements to masculinist liberal subjects” (2015: 104-5). South Korea’s “marketized 
socialization” of care seems to proclaim that these two possibilities are both viable and not 
mutually exclusive. As women’s care work in the private realm has been drawn into the social 
service market with the pretext of “emancipation,” the mostly female care workers have been 
incorporated as precarious and marginal labor forces into a sort of “governmentally embedded 
market”—that is carefully organized by the government as a space for fierce competition and 
low wage labor. At the same time, they are required to follow the norms of human capital that 
turns their caring attitudes and moral aspirations into manageable assets so that they can survive 
the competition and attract more investment. In this way, women and their care work could be 




Such dynamics of inclusion and subordination are also applied to the workings of ethical 
citizenship. Although ethical citizenship appears to be more inclusive and embracing—in 
comparison with developmental citizenship that brutally disenfranchises the subjects without 
“productive” economic capabilities, the new form of citizenship is still based on setting the 
boundaries of recognition as well as on privileging some forms of ethical practices over others. 
What needs further attention is thus the question of what kind of ethical practices are encouraged 
and stipulated as conditions of the inclusion. If citizenship, as I noted above, involves the 
embodiment of appropriate moral, social norms for being a citizen, what I call “projective 
ethicality” serves as the very basis of the enfranchisement for ethical citizenship. Moral citizens, 
who are “considered to be, at root, ethical creatures” (Rose 2000: 1398), are, nevertheless, 
required to convert their inherent, ordinary ethics into socially acknowledged projective forms to 
attract investment and survive in the care market; conversely speaking, in the process of 
competing in the market, their ethical practices come to be organized mainly in the form of 
“projects” that can be planned, performed, and measured to increase their investability. In this 
respect, understanding the expansion of care and the production of ethical citizens as the antidote 
to unbridled market rationality—the binary often found in the scholarly works about care as well 
as Ji-Young’s standard narrative in the workshop—seems to be misleading. What this simplistic 
narrative is missing is that the nature and characteristics of the “ethical” themselves in ethical 
citizenship have changed, as care ethics and market rationality become intermingled and 
overlapped. In this chapter, I have strived to trace such conversion of ethicality through the case 
                                                 
59 In this sense, as Nancy Fraser aptly points out, it is a mistake to understand the entrepreneurial spirit of 
neoliberalism capitalism simply as “a masculinist romance of the free, unencumbered, self-fashioning individual” 
(2009: 110). Rather, it is necessary to explore the articulation and mutual transformation of care and 
entrepreneurial spirit in more detail.   
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of Fortune Care. 
I would like to close the discussion by briefly discussing the relations that the newly 
emerging ethical citizenship has with other forms of citizenship such as social citizenship and 
developmental citizenship. These heterogeneous forms of citizenship—which consist of different 
ideal subjects, social norms, and social imaginaries—are neither mutually exclusive nor 
completely replaceable with each other. As seen in the government’s attempts to find a “new 
engine of economic growth” in the social care sector and as witnessed in social economy 
activists’ hope to advance “society’s self-defense” based on citizens’ ethical practices, they 
rather co-exist in combined or competitive forms. As we have already discussed, ethical 
citizenship and projective ethicality are contingent on the translation of social problems in the 
language of ethics and the discovery of the solutions less in material and structural 
transformations than in individual ethical and caring practices. In this sense, it stands in parallel 
with the languages of social activism and of social citizenship that respectively appeal to 
universal social rights and to the state’s active intervention (Muehlebach 2012; Rose 2000). On 
the other hand, ethical citizenship seems to share a peculiar affinity with developmental 
citizenship that has long superseded social citizenship in South Korea. Despite their different 
languages, both commonly work to empower and mobilize subjects to contribute to either 
national economic industrialization or to managing the reproduction crisis of the neoliberal 
human capital regime; furthermore, market rationality and government control, either explicitly 
or implicitly, preside over the processes of measuring the contributions and constraining the 
membership. If there is a major difference, however, it can be found in the transformation of 
market rationality by which to measure citizens’ contributions: the shift from the maximization 
of individual contribution to national economic growth to the production and enhancement of 
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investable human and social capital.  
Of course, this should not be understood to mean that ethical citizenship is simply a 
mutated prolongation of developmental citizenship (cf. Chang 2007; 2012). Above all, in 
contrast to developmental citizenship that finds its foundation in the social and economic nexus 
of work-family, ethical citizenship emerges on the brink of the shared crisis of work and family. 
As represented in Yuna’s Street, the populations that would have been marginalized or excluded 
from developmental citizenship—such as unskilled housewives, unemployed youth, vagabond 
day laborers, and criminals—are summoned up and interpellated as active moral citizens who 
can contribute to the caring community in the project of ethical citizenship, although it is also 
true that they would be still bestowed subordinate positions. At the same time, when ethical 
citizenship incorporates these marginal populations within the labor market, it not only alters the 
qualitative nature of ethical practices and care work—which I have termed “projective 
ethicality,” but the understandings of work and the identities of the laborers are also modified in 







THE AFFECTIVE LIFE OF POST-DEVELOPMENT: 
YOUTH, PRECARITY, AND AFFECTIVE LABOR 
 
“In the end, it is always society that pays itself with the counterfeit money of its dreams.” 
– Marcel Mauss (1950: 119) 
 
“We cannot give them a good salary. Instead, we give them a dream, a vision, and love.” 
– Park Won-Soon1 
 
BLUE SPRING (YOUTH) 
 
It was on a cold winter day of 2014 at the office of a local cooperative called Happy Seongbuk. 
There, Jong-Min, a co-founder of the organization, rather abruptly confessed to me his feelings 
of “being screwed” that have always loomed over him: “It’s not just me. Our generation has got 
this sense of hopelessness and entrapment. Whatever we do, it will turn out to be a failure and 
has no bright future, just like this country. I made this cooperative, but my aim isn’t success but a 
better defeat or simply survival.” Since Jong-Min, who had just turned twenty-seven, had been 
well-known for his easygoing, humorous personality among local social economy activists, I 
could not help but be wide-eyed at his negative response and ask him why he thought his and his 
generation’s future was so dark and gloomy. He replied as follows:  
                                                 





Objectively speaking, today’s society might be more affluent than ever. But I think that in 
the past people could build a plan for an ordinary life [p'yŏngbŏm-han sam, 평범한 삶], 
when to buy a home, get married, and have a baby. For our generation, it’s simply 
impossible to think out our future because having a stable job is just out of reach for most 
of us. So we feel like we’re doomed from the starting line. We are the most educated 
generation ever and still making a lot of effort, but society does not reciprocate our 
efforts any more.2 It’s like, (pause) if you were to continue running fast on a treadmill 
while it slows down and stops, you would lose control and eventually fall off the 
treadmill, right? I think that’s our generation’s situation. That kind of sense of unease and 
instability keeps haunting me and us. [emphasis added] 
 
Jong-Min used to describe himself as “destined to be a social economy activist.” Having 
grown up with parents who were devoted to socialist movements in the 1980s, he attended an 
alternative secondary school instead of “swirling into” South Korea’s notoriously competitive 
education system. In studying sociology at a local progressive university, Jong-Min started to 
participate in student activism, but soon quit the university because he felt that he “has already 
learned everything he could learn in university.” After spending two years as an unemployed 
“deadbeat” [ing-yeo],3 he began to work as a “social innovation youth activist” [sahoe-hyŏkshin 
ch'ŏngnyŏn hwaldong-ga] (whose role I will explain later in detail) and established the “youth 
cooperative” called Happy Seongbuk in 2013 with his fellow social innovation activists. Along 
with his telling metaphor of running on a treadmill, Jong-Min was quick to add: “I’ve talked 
                                                 
2 This statement can be supported by various statistics. For example, in 2014 approximately 80% of secondary 
school graduates attended university in South Korea, which is an exceptionally high rate in comparison with 
approximately 40 % in Europe, 50 % in Japan, and 65 % in the United States. By contrast, the real youth 
unemployment rate exceeded 30% in 2014, which is more than twice the general unemployment rate; “Youth 
Getting Trapped in Poverty” [청년, 빈곤의 미로에 갇히다], Hankerye 21 (Aug. 24, 2015). 
3 “Ing-yeo” literally means “surplus” or “excess” in Korean. The word, which contains the implications of 
“valueless” and “disposable,” has become commonly used by unemployed youth to self-deprecatingly refer to 
themselves. The commonly used word “ing-yeo” is reminiscent of Zygmunt Bauman’s provocative argument that 
in neoliberal society the unemployed become the surplus and the disposable, that is, “wasted lives.” Bauman 
argues that, whereas unemployment was considered an exceptional and temporal status in the past social welfare 
state, it has become a permanent condition and has begun to be considered “disposable surplus” that cannot be 
incorporated into the system anymore (Bauman 2004: Ch. 2). For the historical context and cultural politics 
surrounding the subjectivity of “ing-yeo,” see Yang (2015).     
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about this feeling with my friends at Happy Seongbuk and they all agreed. Maybe it’s our 
generation’s common despair, the feeling of futurelessness.”  
Jong-Min might be overgeneralizing his personal feelings to extend to his whole 
generation by interchangeably using “me” and “us.” Nonetheless, his analogy of a treadmill 
runner appears to palpably encapsulate the pervasive anxiety, hopelessness, and precarity among 
contemporary South Korean youth.4 After the unprecedented rapid economic growth and 
“compressed modernization” led by the “developmental state” during the second half of the 20th 
century (Chang 2008; Chang 2010; Woo-Cumings 1999), South Korea, like many other 
“developed” capitalist countries, recently has begun to suffer from low economic growth and a 
high unemployment rate. As explicated in Chapter 1, such an “end of development” has caused 
not only political and economic distress but also individual, subjective, and even affective 
troubles. As implied by Jong-min’s remarks, developmentalism as a project of government has 
derived its cogency and ideological-affective power from providing the mobilized mass with a 
specific vision of the good ordinary life and its particular “temporality.”5 Under 
developmentalism, an individual’s thriving and national development has been imaginarily 
aligned and harmonized through the temporality of a linear, progressive future in which 
individual aspirations for the good life could be achievable through continuing national 
development (Chang 2014; Hage 2003; Nam 2009; Rudnyckyj 2010). Based on the projection of 
a continuous sense of time or what can be called a “developmentalist chronotope”—a 
                                                 
4 During my fieldwork, I happened to encounter this metaphor of a treadmill runner twice more: in a public lecture 
by Je Hyun-Ju, a cooperative activist as well as the bestseller writer of A Guide for Nomads Who Work in the 
Declining World (2014), and in an interview with a young basic income activist. Although I could not check from 
where the metaphor originated, the experiences seem to testify to the persuasive appeal of this lucid analogy. 
5 As Sam Binkley points out, disciplinary power and biopower have commonly constituted “time” as their 
governmental objective. If discipline aims to organize everyday use of time, biopower concerns people’s life 
course such as birth, marriage, and death. According to Binkley, “temporality, in this sense, is an irreducible 
function of government” (2014: 58).  
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modification of Muelebach’s term “Fordist-Keynesian welfarist chronotope” (2012: 149)— 
individual life cycles, which mainly consist of the promise of a secure job, a patriarchal middle-
class family, and social recognition via work and family, have been organized and promised to 
the masses so that they could move along the time-line on the condition that the national 
economy continues to grow and advance.6 It is true that the promise has been fulfilled only for a 
limited number of people, as seen in the previous chapter.7 No matter that the hopeful dream was 
actually achievable or not, however, the particular, homogenous notion about “ordinary life” or 
even “good life” based on labor has been imagined, outlined, and promoted under 
developmentalism (cf. Ahmed 2010; Berlant 2007).8  
In this sense, the imagery of a collapsed treadmill runner reflects the troubling anxiety 
and distress that young individuals may feel when such developmental temporality has been 
fragmented and their projected “good ordinary life” has become increasingly unimaginable. The 
economic, social, and institutional basis of the “developmentalist chronotope” has been eroded in 
South Korea since the 1997 Asian financial crisis. First of all, as noted in Chapter 1, with the 
capital-friendly labor laws passed in 1998 that legalize the layoff system and the massive use of 
                                                 
6 It should be noted that the old “developmental dream” or “developmental chronotope” is highly gendered (Bae 
2015; cf. Muehlebach 2012). Given that the life cycle has been organized and imagined based on the male bread-
winner model (Nam 2009), it is not surprising that the crisis of developmentalism  has often been represented and 
understood as “the crisis of masculinity” or “the collapse of (patriarchal) family” in South Korea (Chang 1999; 
Kim 2004; Song 2009). The differential subject positions along gender lead to different reactions to the crisis of 
developmental model of “ordinary life”: while male subjects tend to accept it as the crisis of masculinity and 
develop nostalgia for the old way of life, women’s position entails ambivalent reactions (Kim 2014). This 
significant issue, however, is beyond the scope of this chapter. For a noteworthy attempt to introduce a discussion 
of gender difference into youth discourse in South Korea, see Bae (2015).   
7 In this sense, the promise of “the good ordinary life” was a myth and remains in the present, as what Žižek (2000) 
calls a “melancholic” object that is considered something “lost” without ever having it (cf. Brown 2003; 
Muehlebach and Shoshan 2012). Despite of or because of it, the myth still has effectual power on the present.   
8 In tracing the trajectory of the notions of happiness and “good life,” Sara Ahmed points out the conventional 
relationship between a good life and temporality: “for a life to count as a good life, it must take on the direction 
promised as a social good, which means imagining one’s futurity in terms of reaching certain points along a life 
course” (2010: 71). 
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irregular labor, the ratios of unemployment and temporary workers have soared.9 Furthermore, 
the problem of weak domestic spending caused by the rise of unemployment and low-paid jobs 
has been addressed through the deregulation of consumer credit and a boost in the real estate 
market (Jang 2011). As the exponential upsurge of housing prices and the rise of living costs 
have far surpassed stagnant wages, South Korea has moved quickly from a nation of high savers 
to a country with one of the highest ratios of household debt to disposable income.10 The 2008 
global financial crisis and the following economic downturn have exacerbated these economic 
situations. Local youth have become the immediate casualty of the ongoing recession. Since they 
must face this shrinking and precarious labor market,11 the old dream of a stable job, a steady 
income, and an affordable house has more and more turned out to be an elusive, impractical 
fantasy. Conversely, the further that hope has slipped from their hands, the more the youth have 
become exposed to the pressure and imperative of self-development and market competition. 
Although young individuals’ effort and struggle to achieve “the myth of the good ordinary life” 
are continuously and vigorously undertaken in such an increasingly competitive environment, the 
high-unemployment and low economic growth society seems to have stopped providing a secure 
ground upon which individuals’ dreams can be drawn (Berlant 2007). While youth are still 
                                                 
9 With the crisis the share of irregular workers soared up from 41% in 1997 to 56.6% in 2002 and still remains more 
than 50% in 2011. The increase in the unemployment rate was more dramatic: from 3.1% (1997) to 10.8% (2000) 
and still over 10% (2011). For more on the effects on the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis to South Korea’s labor 
market, see Lee (2011) and Shin (2013). 
10 Before the 1997 crisis, South Korea’s rate of saving to GDP was more than 24%, the highest among OECD 
countries from 1987 to 1999. Since 1997, however, the household debt has rapidly increased in South Korea: the 
total amount of household debt rose from 184 trillion won (55.6% of GDP) in 1998 to 439 trillion won in 2002 to 
1000 trillion won (90.5% of GDP) in 2012. While its saving rate has plummeted from 23.2% (1998) to 2.3% 
(2007), its ratio of debt to disposable income has soared up to 157.6% (2011), which is higher than that of other 
countries suffering from the same problem like the U.S. (124.4%), Spain (127.8%), and Italy (65.1%).   
11 South Korea’s real unemployment rate of youth has not dropped below 25% since 2008. Furthermore, the quality 
of employment has also deteriorated as seen in the fact that the ratio of temporary workers among the newly 
employed youth hit 64% in 2015 (The Korea Labor Institute, “The Report for the Recent Trends in the Temporary 
Labor Market” [최근 비정규직 노동시장의 변화], 2016. 1.). 
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running fast or faster than ever, the socioeconomic conditions that reciprocate their hope have 
been stagnating and slowing down. The time of the developmental treadmill is now out of joint.  
 
 
Figure 10. The contrast of Development Ratio between Generations12  
 
Jong-Min’s deep pessimism, however, stands in interesting contrast with the rosy, 
hopeful “missions” and activities of his cooperative, Happy Seongbuk. Being established by ten 
“social innovation youth activists” in their late-20s and early-30s, Happy Seongbuk defines its 
aims as “solving youth’s various problems with our own hands” and “giving hope and joy to the 
younger generation.”13 Dong-Su, another co-founder of Happy Seongbuk, once related to me 
why they established the cooperative: “Today’s youth are all exploited and discarded by the 
older generation. Our aim is to show that we can make the crisis of youth into an opportunity for 
                                                 
12 The graphic’s message is that those born in 1988 are experiencing 2.8 % growth in 2013, while those who were 
born in 1958 underwent 12.2 % growth ratio in 1983. This graphic was captured from the TV documentary, 
“There is no country for youth” [청년을 위한 나라는 없다], that illuminates the economic predicaments of the 
younger generation. The documentary was featured in November, 2014 and ignited fierce debates on online 
bulletin boards about “which generation is the most pathetic generation?” Is it “the war generation” that 
experienced the Korean War or is it “the industrialization generation” who underwent military dictatorship and 
brutal labor regime? Or is it the contemporary youth who “are deprived of their hopes and dreams”?  
13 Happy Seongbuk, The Declaration of Foundation [창립 선언문], 2014. 
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youth by thriving both in business and in the local community.” For this purpose, Happy 
Seongbuk’s activities have focused on building affective and caring networks among precarious 
local youth: they have been operating a co-working innovation space for youth and have 
organized a series of art festivals for young poor artists in the district; they have initiated 
promotion campaigns for youth through the use of traditional markets to bridge generation gaps; 
and they also have participated in various community development projects including Bukjeong 
Maul (see Chapter 2). As Happy Seongbuk has successfully completed several community 
regeneration-related projects, Jong-min and other members have been invited frequently to give 
speeches to youth who are interested in social/community economy and innovation. At these 
invited talks, Jong-min would use language imbued with hope and aspiration: “Happy 




Figure 11. The Seoul Metropolitan Government's Youth Policy Advertisement: 
“Seoul Finds Hope in Youth!” 
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This rather baffling coexistence of gloomy despair and rosy optimism found in Jong-Min 
and Happy Seongbuk seems to divulge a paradoxical affective-discursive space that surrounds 
not exclusively young activists in the social economy, but also contemporary Korean youth in 
general. For the last decade in South Korea, there has been an “explosion” of youth discourses 
and representations that have projected conflicting but mutually reinforcing attributes upon the 
younger generation. On the one hand, a number of discourses and media representations have 
framed contemporary youth as “helpless victims”: the “gloomy generation” who is suffering 
from the end of rapid growth and a prolonged economic downturn; the “880,000 won 
(approximately 800 dollars) generation,” which is cursed to live with only precarious part-time 
jobs and minimum wages; the “give-up generation,” which abandons the hope of courtship, 
marriage, childbirth, house-purchasing, and even the future because of economic hardship; and 
the “minus generation,” which will become the first generation to be poorer than their parents in 
South Korea’s history, to name a few.14 In a society that has experienced unprecedented rapid 
economic growth, the doomed fate of this cohort is accepted as a major betrayal of the 
“modernist ideal” that each generation is supposed to be better off than its predecessor 
(Comaroff and Comaroff 2000: 307).  
On the other hand, youth have been actively summoned and regarded as a new subject 
who will turn the crisis of development and of work into an opportunity for finding a new vision 
of development. Ever since the President Park Geun-Hye suggested “creative economy” 
[ch'angjo gyŏngje, 創造經濟] as a core philosophy of state affairs, the administration has 
                                                 
14 For a detailed explanation of the “880,000 won generation,” see the mega-bestseller of the same name (Park and 
Woo, 2007). The name was borrowed from the “1,000 Euro generation” that was then a prevalent neologism in 
Europe; for the “give-up generation” [sampo Saeda], see the entry of Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/ 
wiki/Sampo generation; and for the “minus generation,” see “Entrapped Youth” [인생 저당 잡힌 ‘쳇바퀴 청춘’] 
Segye Ilbo (Mar. 23, 2016). 
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repeatedly emphasized that youth be at the heart of the growth engine by embodying “creativity, 
flexibility, and innovative spirit.”15 As part of this initiative, the government has promised to 
establish the “Youth Hope Fund” and the “Youth Hope Academy” that will help to “empower” 
youth as “creative innovators and global leaders” and support “young entrepreneurs.”16 The 
Seoul Metropolitan Government has joined in to urge youth to found social ventures and 
community enterprises by providing subventions to young social entrepreneurs who want to run 
start-ups. Mayor Park Won-Soon, repeatedly has emphasized at every opportunity that “the 
prevailing youth unemployment can rather be a chance for them to make new innovations and 
creations. Youth and their innovative spirits are the only hope in our society.”17 Despite slight 
differences in policy emphasis, both the President and the Mayor frequently encourage youth to 
translate their current economic hardships into opportunities for innovation and thus foreground 
youth’s creative ideas, energy, and enthusiasm as solutions for stagnant economic growth and 
perennial underemployment. In the midst of the recession, youth thus have emerged as a source 
of energy, entrepreneurship, and inspiration “to identify new opportunities for value extraction” 
(Lukacs 2015: 388). As a consequence, for the last decade, South Korea’s youth have been 
represented and interpellated as a peculiar doublet who are the immediate victims of “the end of 
development” but simultaneously active agents who can solve the economic slowdown and its 
accompanying social problems. An old Korean idiom that calls the youth “blue spring” [ch'ŏng-
ch'un, 靑春] has seemed to acquire more vivid reality than ever. 
                                                 
15 “Park Geun Hye’s Inauguration Speech” Yonhap News English (Feb. 25, 2013).   
16 “The Government’s Youth Policy: Youth Hope Fund, Youth Hope Foundation” [청년정책: 청년희망펀드, 
청년희망재단 조성], Korea Policy Briefing, <http://www.korea.kr/policy/economyView.do?newsId=148810067> 
(Mar. 2, 2016).  
17 “Seoul Government’s Youth Policy” [서울시 청년정책, 어디까지 알고 계신가요?], The Seoul Metropolitan 
Government Information Center, <https://opengov.seoul.go.kr/mediahub/7108179> (Dec. 10, 2015).  
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In this chapter, I take the experiences of the younger generation in the social economy as 
a window through which to illuminate the discursive-affective heterogeneity surrounding South 
Korea’s youth within the context of post-development and post-work society.18 As explicated in 
Chapter 1, South Korea’s social economy sector has served as a main laboratory for various 
governmental experiments that aim to tackle the crisis of the old development model and its 
laborism. In this chapter, I focus on how the government exploits the social care sector in order 
to turn the current crisis into a post-work “utopia” of affective labor for the purpose of promoting 
innovative entrepreneurship and expanding the productive network of affective labor. In this 
way, social innovation and affective labor emerge as a temporary fix to the disjointed 
“developmentalist chrotonope” by filling the gap between stagnant socioeconomic conditions 
and youth’s lingering desire for the “good ordinary life” (cf. Lukacs 2015; Zhang 2015).  
Among various experiments, I examine in particular the “Social Innovation Youth 
Activist (SIYA)” program operated by Youth Hub and by the Seoul Metropolitan Government. 
In exploring SIYA’s experiences, I pay close attention to the following three points. First, in 
briefly sketching the history of youth subjectivity in South Korea, I show how the crisis of 
industrial development generates a new interpellation of youth as “social innovators.” The 
representative figure of youth as “energetic laborers” under the developmental state recently has 
been replaced with “innovative entrepreneurs” who address with their own hands various social 
problems, including unemployment. Second, I investigate the concrete activities of SIYA in 
terms of affective labor. In so doing, I show how underemployed youth are incorporated as a 
                                                 
18 In using the notion of “post-work” society, I will not address the question of whether it is a real transformation or 
a repeated ideological hoax (cf. Beck 2000; Rifkin 1996; Weeks 2011). I will consider it as a reality only as far as 
the idea captures the imaginations of governing discourses and programs. In this sense, the idea has material power 
and should be examined as part of reality. Also, as in the ambivalent connotation of the prefix “post” in post-
development, “post-work” cannot be simply equated with the end of work. It rather means both change and 
continuation of the past work regime.   
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marginal, cheap labor pool in the social care sector, and further shed light on the gap between the 
rhetoric and the harsh reality surrounding their cohort. Third, by illuminating their heterogeneous 
aspirations and the dividing lines among them, I examine how youth in the social economy 
manage the gap. To this point, I argue that the conflicting and even contradictory discourses on 
youth partially reflect this generation’s own ambiguous and ambivalent desires towards both the 
old laborism and the new human capital regime.   
Throughout this chapter, I attempt to address how the interpellation of the ideal subject of 
“social innovation activist” becomes felicitous, by focusing on the dimension of affects working 
in the human capital regime. This is not only because contemporary capitalism intervenes in the 
realm of affect for its accumulation strategy (Clough 2008); it is also because the human capital 
regime, as noted in Prologue, relies on targeting and refiguring the affective and emotional 
dimensions of subjectivity (Anderson 2015; Feher 2009; Mcdonough 2015). As Lawrence 
Grossberg points out, ideological effects are yielded through “the affective investments in 
particular significations” (2010: 194). This chapter thus purports to show how such affective 
investments in the new ideal subjectivity of youth are produced and shared.   
 
POST-DEVELOPMENT YOUTH AS “SOCIAL INNOVATORS” 19 
 
Considering the longstanding relation of youth subjects and national development in Korea’s 
contemporary history, it would not be surprising that the end of rapid economic growth has led 
directly to the current representational crisis of youth subjectivity. Since having emerged as the 
                                                 




leading agent of national enlightenment and modernization projects in the early 20th century 
(Lee 2012), youth, especially male youth, have continued to be represented as a group of avant-
garde that will complete the national development (Choi 2011). In particular, during the 
developmentalist period between the 1960s and the 1980s, the younger generation was described 
as shouldering the national duties of economic growth and political democratization. While the 
developmental, authoritarian state idealized male youth with physical strength as “labor-
machines” and the primary agents of industrialization (Choi 2004), the oppositional and anti-
dictatorship groups often interpellated male youth as “militants” who would accomplish 
democratization or socialist revolution to rescue the “motherland” from the military junta’s 
oppression (Kim 2004). In both cases, (male) youth were undoubtedly represented as the subjects 
of national developments, whether of economic growth or political democratization.20  
The democratization of South Korea throughout the 1990s and the economic downturn 
since the late 1990s thus sparked a crisis and a transformation in the representation of youth: 
youth began not to be considered anymore as the key group for national development. A short 
speech made by Lee Eun-Ae, the head of the Seoul Support Center for Social Economy, at a 
SIYA training session that I attended in 2013 seems to summarize youth’s altered, precarious 
status in the recent discourses. In her welcoming speech, Lee asked the young trainees, “What 
are your dreams?” Without waiting for the answer, she continued:  
 
I think your generation is blessed but also cursed. My generation devoted our youth to 
democratization, and prior generations had achieved the modernization and 
industrialization of this country. These are the stories of the generations. What is your 
generation’s story? What is your generation’s dream? It is sad and unfortunate that the 
younger generation has no story and no cause to devote themselves to.  
                                                 
20 For a more detailed history of youth discourse in modern and contemporary Korea, see Lee (2012).  
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In counterpoint to former generations who had achieved such historical feats as the 
modernization, industrialization, and democratization of South Korea, contemporary Korean 
youth are represented instead as doubly-failed subjects. As seen above, they are not only 
“problematized” as the victims of the end of rapid economic growth but also represented as a 
“conformist, conservative, and apolitical” group in sharp contrast with politically and culturally 
progressive generations who attended university in the 1980s and 1990s (Cho 2015). The 
younger generation often has been the target of the accusation that they concentrate solely on 
self-help and self-improvement without socio-political consciousness.21 That is to say, in the 
post-industrialized and post-democratic South Korea, youth increasingly have lost their former 
political and economical leading roles and rather have become positioned as “problematic 
subjects.” For example, the various abovementioned buzzwords indicate that the now failed and 
despondent young generation is considered as a “social problem” and “social burden” (Choi 
2011).   
As pointed out by Ryu (2014), however, two new tendencies should be noted in the 
recent youth discourse to turn the crisis into an opportunity and thereby maintain the agency of 
youth subjects. First is what could be called “the social turn” of youth discourse. In the 
abovementioned speech, Lee actually concluded: “Society can be your generation’s territory. We 
now have developed economy and democratized politics. But we have a very weak society and 
social solidarity… I hope that building a society will be your generation’s story.” Much like this 
conclusion, since the early 2010s a number of youth discourses have suggested “society” or “the 
social” as an alternative field or territory for youth. For example, a book titled We Have a New 
                                                 
21 For example, younger generation’s low voter turnout has been (rather groundlessly) blamed as the main culprit of 
the births of the conservative governments in the 2007 and 2012 presidential elections (Ryu 2014).  
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Territory! (Han and Song 2014) that consists of interviews with various “social innovators” 
suggest social business and the sharing economy as new territories for youth. By providing an 
exemplary definition of the new territory of the social—“In pursing the new territory, we reject 
both extremes of a selfish lifestyle that pursues only self-interests and the sublime life that makes 
self-sacrifice for others” (Han and Song 2014: 5), the book urges the youth to pursue self-
development and social responsibility together and become pioneers of the new territory. In 
addition, when the Seoul Metropolitan Government announced a plan for promoting 10,000 
creative youth start-ups in 2013, they also specified “the sector of social economy” as the 
primary domain for youth innovators (Ryu 2014: 44). In a word, for the doubly-failed subjects in 
politics and economy, “society” is now given as a new territory to pioneer.  
Furthermore, as development is not imagined in relation to labor anymore, youth begin to 
be interpellated not as an industrious “labor-machine” but rather as post-work subjects of 
innovation, care, and social responsibility. Although the governmental efforts that put forward 
youth’s creativity and entrepreneurial spirit as “a new source of neoliberal value production” has 
a long prehistory in South Korea that can be traced back to the wake of the 1997 financial crisis 
(Song 2009: Ch. 4), the government now focuses on rendering youth as subjects who tackle their 
own unemployment problems by establishing start-ups and becoming entrepreneurs. In 2010, the 
government admitted that government-driven job creation has a limit in the “post-work society”; 
instead, they began the project of “Youth Creating My Own Job” that aimed to promote one-
person start-ups and youth social enterprises for placing youth themselves at the center of the 
problem-solving. Here again, the area of the social service market and care sector was suggested 
as a new territory in which youth entrepreneurs confidently could expect profits (refer to 
Chapters 2 and 3).  
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The Social Innovation Youth Activist program initiated in 2013 by Youth Hub and by the 
Seoul Metropolitan Government has faithfully reflected these new tendencies. The program aims 
to provide unemployed Seoul youth between the ages of 20 and 39 with one-year internships in 
“social economy organizations,” including “social enterprises, non-profit organizations, co-ops, 
and community enterprises.”22 Based on the organizations’ demands of internship, Youth Hub 
receives applications, hires, and sends SIYAs off to the organizations; then the wages during the 
internship period are paid by the Seoul Metropolitan Government. Meanwhile, Youth Hub also 
provides workshops and seminars for SIYAs about the social economy, entrepreneurship, and 
general humanities. In an interview, the program manager of Youth Hub stated that “everybody 
can luck out” with the program: social economy organizations can train and hire young 
employees without financial burden; the municipal government can lower the youth 
unemployment rate with a minimal budget; and youth may be able to find employment or 
business opportunities in the social economy sector. The Happy Seongbuk Cooperative, which 
was established by a group of SIYAs after completing their one-year internship, serves as a good 
example.  
Besides the interesting irony that the government actively educates and trains young 
“activists,” the SIYA program deserves special attention in several respects. Above all, the 
program has been understood to mark a “social turn” in South Korea’s youth unemployment 
policy from the former government’s “neoliberal” internship program model. In contrast to the 
previous program that had focused on supplying a cheap and young labor force to big 
corporations and governmental organizations, it is argued that the SIYA internship aims to 
                                                 
22 Youth Hub, “2014 Youth Hub Annual Report,” 2015, p. 8. The period of the internship has now been increased to 
up to two years. 
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provide “socially meaningful and valuable” experiences for youth.23 Furthermore, as detailed 
below, the interpellation of the program participants as “social innovation activists” seems to 
epitomize the ideal subjectivity sought by what I call “neosocial government”: through various 
activities and training programs, the participants are expected to embody various virtues such as 
creativity, innovation, and social responsibility. Last, the program itself apparently serves as a 
microcosm of a contradiction surrounding South Korean youth: although the program offers the 
participants only a minimum hourly wage and precarious short-term internships, it nonetheless 
trains and requires the participants not only to accept economic precarity as an opportunity for 
self-development and dream-chasing but also to become “social innovators” who actively solve 
various social problems. This gaping chasm provides an effective entrance through which to look 
into the socio-cultural dynamics surrounding youth in contemporary South Korea.  
 
THE MOBILIZATION OF HWALDONG AS AFFECTIVE LABOR 
 
What are the SIYAs expected to do? The SIYA promotion booklet describes the purposes of the 
program as follows: “securing one’s place in society not through competition but through job 
experiences” and “restoring self-esteem and overcoming the fear of business.” To understand 
this rather obscure explanation, it is necessary to explore the meanings of “activity” [hwaldong] 
in the term “social innovation youth activist.” Hwaldong (activism or activity) and hwaldong-ga 
(activist) have carried particular connotations in the history of South Korea’s social movements. 
Generally speaking, “activism/movement” can be translated into Korean in two ways: undong 
                                                 
23 Youth Hub, “2014 Youth Hub Workbook” [유스 허브 2014 워크북], 2015, p. 1. 
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[運動] and hwaldong [活動]. In the 1980s and the early 1990s when South Korea’s 
democratization and labor movements were at their zenith, undong and undong-ga were widely 
used to label radical political activism and activists. In contrast, hwaldong and hwaldong-ga 
came to be used frequently, as local or civil society movements started to challenge the 
hegemony of the traditional (socialist) labor activism after democratization in the mid-1990s 
(Cho 2005; Song 2012). A social economy activist once related to me the difference between the 
two terms as follows: “Although the distinction is not always clear-cut, undong has undertones 
of the old left, oppositional movements against the state, capitalism, or American imperialism. 
By contrast, hwaldong implies constructive movements for building an alternative model and 
vision.”24 In conversations with other social economy activists, the validity of this distinction has 
been confirmed repeatedly, and I found that many social economy activists started to identify 
themselves as hwaldong-ga instead of undong-ga since the mid-1990s. The term undong is now 
rarely used to describe their activities.  
It seems apparent that the Seoul Metropolitan Government and Youth Hub considered the 
established usage of the term when they adopted the use of hwaldong instead of undong to 
describe their internship program. Youth Hub’s definition of the spirit of SIYA that “youth’s 
problems have to be solved with their own hands” is consonant with the aforementioned 
connotation of hwaldong.25 Youth Hub, however, also has tried to provide a new conceptual 
topology for the notion of hwaldong in its relation to work [nodong, 勞動]. The attempt was well 
detected in the forum, “What do youth do in the social economy sector, work or activity?” held 
in March 2014. In this forum organized by Youth Hub, panelists from various social economy 
                                                 
24 Interview with Song Jae-Min (Sep. 15, 2014). 
25 This is reminiscent of Happy Seongbuk’s aforementioned slogan. For DIY (do it yourself) spirit as a new form of 
citizenship, see Ratoo and Boler (2014) and also Fortune Care’s case in Chapter 3.  
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organizations commonly agreed that hwaldong should be distinguished not only from a 
movement [undong] but also from work [nodong]. On the one hand, hwaldong is distinct from 
undong, in that undong has relied on activists’ long-term commitment and sublime sacrifice 
without economic rewards.26 On the other hand, hwaldong also should be separated from the 
notion of work [nodong]: whereas nodong primarily means an economic activity for subsistence, 
hwaldong is assumed to pursue “social” meanings. The director of Youth Hub who participated 
in the forum as a panelist emphasized: “Many youths do not simply regard their jobs as 
economic means to survive. They also hope that their jobs give them the meaning of life and 
social recognition. That is why we prefer to use the term of ‘job place’[il-jari] instead of ‘job’ 
[il]… Hwaldong includes the practices and experiences of finding your ‘place’ in society.”  
In this sense, hwaldong emerges as a sort of aufhebung of work [nodong] and movement 
[undong]: it overcomes but preserves the meanings of work as an economic activity and of 
movement as a committed sacrifice. That is to say, hwaldong signifies a hybrid activity that 
pursues both financial compensations and social meanings simultaneously; it includes but goes 
beyond the logic of gift or sacrifice as well as economic calculation.27 The job-placement list in 
SIYA’s promotional booklet illustrates what kinds of works can be labeled as such hybrid, in-
between activities: to name a few, “community promoters” who build a local community by 
operating diverse participatory programs for local residents; “space sharing curators” who seek 
                                                 
26 As half-jokingly stated by a panel from a social enterprise, “You can distinguish hwaldong-ga and undong-ga on 
the basis of how much they earn. When you are doing undong, you would be paid below subsistence level, while 
by doing hwalodong you would be paid a little more than the minimum wage.” 
27 Such hybridity of hwaldong is interestingly reminiscent of Michel Feher’s description of the human capital regime 
that we have already discussed. According to Feher (2009), in pre-neoliberal capitalism it was assumed that the 
private sphere such as family served as a domain of gift and care, while the public sphere including the market was 
dominated by the principles of interest and economic calculation. Feher argues that under the neoliberal human 
capital regime, the distinction between the private and the public becomes more and more obscure and thus the 
logic of gift and interest are mutually infiltrated. See also the discussion of “face” in Chapter 5. 
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to create a new model for public space with citizen participation and social sharing; “social IT 
developers” who develop platforms for social enterprises; and “community culture planners” 
who organize community festivals. The list goes on to include: “social housing managers,” 
“social dining coordinators,” and “design thinkers for social space.”28 These descriptions of 
various activities share common keywords such as: “the social,” “community,” and “network.” 
In other words, what SIYAs are expected to do under the name of hwaldong centers around 
building up affective communities and social networks. 
Woo-Young’s case, which is presented as an exemplar in Youth Hub’s book “Ten Job 
Place Stories,” is worth a closer look in that it shows the typical character of hwaldong.29 After 
working as a global volunteer in Tanzania for three years, Woo-Young decided to apply for the 
SIYA program in 2013, because he wanted to find “meaningful work in his own city as well.” 
He and six other SIYAs were sent to a rental apartment complex for poor households in Seoul. 
The old project complex of 4,000 residents had become the center of media attention in 2012 
when eight residents committed suicides from May to August because of persistent poverty and 
increasing debt. The municipal government and local social work agencies adopted various 
suicide prevention measures; the deployment of SIYAs to the compound was one of them. Being 
appointed as “apartment community promoters,” Woo-Young and other young activists started to 
live in the apartment complex and organize such diverse resident participation programs as mural 
painting, creating a community newspaper, urban farming, and knitting with elders in their 
apartments. These programs were designed to “prevent suicides and alleviate distress” by 
                                                 
28 Youth Hub, “2014 Youth Hub Workbook,” 2015, p. 3. 
29 Youth Hub, “Ten Job Place Stories,” [10 가지 일자리 이야기], 2014, p. 21. 
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building “affectionate communities and networks” among the poverty-stricken residents.30 The 
SIYAs also held mourning ceremonies for the past suicides in the compound. Woo-Young 
describes his hwaldong as a SIYA for a year as follows:  
 
If one asks, ‘What did you do as a SIYA?’ I don’t know how to answer.… We, who had 
been ‘deadbeats’ [ing-yeo] ourselves, simply spent time with the unemployed, welfare 
recipients, and elder residents, in eating, chatting, knitting, gardening, and simply playing 
together. Using the criteria of economic productivity, these might seem to be just useless. 
But I think what we did can be understood as an activity [hwaldong] to save lives and 
furthermore save the earth.… Our activities relied on a very different notion of 
productivity.31 [emphasis added] 
 
Given our discussion of hwaldong so far, it becomes obvious that hwaldong is 
comparable in many aspects to what Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt call “affective labor” 
which “produces and manipulates affects such as a feeling of ease, well-being, satisfaction, 
excitement, or passion” (2004: 108). As a new hegemonic labor-form in post-Fordist capitalism, 
affective labor contributes to “the production of collective subjectivities, sociality, and society 
itself,” that is, “what is created in the networks of affective labor is a form-of-life” (Hardt 1999: 
98). Such a definition is obviously consonant with Woo-Young’s experience and SIYA’s aim to 
“help youth to experience an alternative way of life through the opportunities of social 
construction and community activities.”32 Furthermore, it is said that affective labor based on a 
highly communicational and cooperative labor process disrupts the Habermasian division 
between instrumental and communicative action as well as blurs the Arendtian distinctions 
                                                 
30 Youth Hub, Ibid., p. 23. These programs involve a particular perspective on poverty-driven suicide that finds its 
causes not in socio-structural inequality and economic hardship but in the lack of human, affective relations. In 
these programs, “social” problems are re-written with affective, psychological terms. See also Chapter 2 and 3.   
31 Youth Hub, Ibid., p. 28.  
32 Youth Hub, “Youth Hub’s 2014 Workbook,” 2015, p. 1. 
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among labor, work, and action (Hardt 1999; Virno 2004; cf. Arendt 1958). This hybridity 
enables affective labor to function both as economic deeds and social or even political actions, 
just as hwaldong operates as a sublation of work and social movement. Last, Hardt and Negri 
argue that the global expansion of affective labor is a consequence of “the refusal of work” under 
the Fordist capitalism: the workers’ struggles to escape from alienated, meaningless labor and to 
secure their autonomy have produced an immanent plane of affective labor in which they 
become active, caring, and constituent subjects (Hardt and Negri 1994; 2000; Virno and Hardt 
2006).33  Much the same can be said of hwaldong: it is said that hwaldong is an alternative 
territory for youth who do not comply with the past labor regime and pursue social meanings that 
cannot be achieved by work or nodong.  
If hwaldong can be regarded as virtually identical with affective labor, the debate over 
the political potentialities of affective labor could be applied to hwaldong as well. In fact, Negri 
and Hardt go further to foreground the radical potentialities embedded in affective labor that 
create a spontaneous form of communism and set up “autonomous circuits of valorization” in 
opposition to capitalist valorization (Hardt 1999: 100). That is to say, affective labor produces 
the sociality and communality that cannot be measured by capitalist value-form; it rather 
challenges the old value-form and opens up the possibility for the new “communist” or 
“communitarian” politics. While not necessarily agreeing with the view that affective labor 
serves as a communist hotbed, a number of anthropological studies, especially those on 
                                                 
33 For this particular “autonomist” perspective that labor’s struggle is more primary than capital’s strategy, see 
Tronti (1979). Tronti argues: “we have to turn the problem on its head… the beginning is the class struggle of the 
working class. At the level of socially developed capital, capitalist development becomes subordinated to working 
class struggles; it follows behind them.” In this perspective, the upsurge of affective, immaterial labor is capital’s 
reaction to labor’s strategy of work refusal in the 1960s and 70s. See also Guattari and Negri (1990). Such 
simplistic dichotomy between “industrial” and “immaterial/affective” labor, however, has been criticized and 
challenged by various scholars. For a trenchant criticism that the binary tacitly gives grounds for the global 
hierarchies of labor, see Yanagisako (2012). 
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contemporary East Asian youth, have focused on the possibility of affective labor as a remedy to 
regional youth who are suffering from precarious and competitive lives under neoliberalism. For 
example, in illuminating such current Japanese youth-initiated social movements as the freeta 
union and precariat movement, Anne Allison (2009, 2012) illustrates affective labor’s active role 
in reconstructing broken sociality and suggests the notion of “affective activism” that aims to 
alleviate the “material/psychic/social instability of life for young Japanese” (2009: 92). In a 
similar vein, Cho HaeJoang (2015), a South Korean anthropologist as well as a member of the 
advisory board of Youth Hub, maintains that immaterial, affective labor serves as a locus where 
Korean youth’s precarity and anxiety not only can be reduced but also transformed into positive 
creativity. Cho Mun-Young (2014) also illuminates Chinese social workers’ attempts to offer a 
palliative to youth’s “uprootedness and loneliness” through organizing mutual care and affective 
labor. In these discussions, affective labor is commonly understood as providing “the space of 
social recognition” for underemployed youths who seek to find an alternative way of life and 
want to stay away from intensified neoliberal competitions (Lee and Myung 2016; Ryu 2014; 
Zhang 2015). That is to say, as the narrative of the “old” good ordinary life becomes increasingly 
improbable for the region’s underemployed youth, affective labor or hwaldong has emerged as a 
new channel that provides dignified works and social meanings.34  
Although aforementioned scholars have attended to the emerging possibility that an 
Arendtian “action” may intermingle with work/labor and thus become affective labor,35 I want to 
                                                 
34 Such a function of affective labor is not limited to the context of East Asia or to the younger generation. In 
exploring voluntary affective labor among retired pensioners in Italy, Muehlebach points out that “affect and 
affective labor are a currency through which they acquired some belonging and social utility” (2012: 74). 
Muehlebach maintains that, as the Fordist-social welfare system that had provided social recognition based on 
labor collapsed, voluntarism and unwaged labor have served for marginal labor population including unemployed 
youth, early retirees, and pensioners as an alternative, but partial and vulnerable path to social recognition.   
35 In distinguishing labor, work, and action, Arendt argues that action is an anti-foundational act of freedom that is 
premised on the co-appearance of fellow citizens. While work and labor serve for their own ends, action is a self-
referential act with no particular end but itself (1958: 207). In this sense, action creates an autonomous and 
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shed light here on the other side of reality that surround affective labor or hwaldong by focusing 
on how marginal populations (in this case, underemployed youth) are mobilized as a cheap 
affective labor force in the process of the governmental restructuring of social care that was 
discussed in Chapter 3. It may seem obvious that the concept of hwaldong includes the refusal of 
meaningless and alienated labor under industrial developmentalism as well as the existential 
pursuit of a valuable and meaningful work-life in the post-development and neoliberal system. 
Hwaldong and its supposed creation of affective networks, however, often contribute to 
incorporating youth into a marginalized labor market and plugging the gap between their 
dispirited precarious realities and their desire for social values and responsibilities.   
In fact, SIYAs find themselves in the midst of very poor labor conditions. In 2013, the 
SIYA program paid its participants only 4,860 won (approximately $4) per hour, the minimum 
hourly wage. Their working hours could not exceed 6 hours per day and 5 days per week because 
of the budget limit. As a result, the SIYAs were supposed to receive approximately 600,000 won 
($500) per month, which barely exceeds the legal minimum cost of living (572,168 won in 2013) 
and is less than half of the average monthly cost of living per person in Seoul (1,350,000 won in 
2014).36 The job instability is also a significant issue. The contract terms of SIYA cannot be 
longer than eleven months so as a result the municipal government effectively exploits the legal 
loophole that severance pay is required by law for employment longer than 12 months. In 2013, 
only 48% of SIYAs succeeded in extending their contract with social economy organizations 
                                                 
immanent public sphere where “people gather and act in concert” (244). If autonomists, including Hardt and 
Negri, find the political feature of Arendtian action in affective labor that is a hybrid of action, work, and labor, its 
latter features of co-existence and public-ness are taken by the aforementioned anthropologists as a remedial effect 
of affective labor to neoliberal fragmentation. I would rather like to argue that the Arendtian notion of action 
becomes increasingly ineffectual as it intermingles with work and labor in a form of affective labor. 
36 The Seoul Institute, “The Average Cost of Living in Seoul” <https://www.si.re.kr/node/51411> (Feb. 16, 2015). 
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where they worked.37 Evidently, such precarious conditions are not limited to SIYAs but are 
prevalent in the social economy sector as well. A number of studies on youth’s labor condition in 
the social economy frequently show that poor conditions, low wages, and high turnover rates are 
the norm rather than the exception in this sector: according to this research, the average wage in 
the non-profit and the third sector stayed at about 50%-60% compared with that of the profit 
sector; moreover, the employees in the social economy consider job security as their primary 
concern (Lee and Myung 2016).  
Although Youth Hub and the Seoul Metropolitan Government have promised that they 
would increase the related budget to improve SIYA’s low wages and working conditions, the 
problem of labor circumstances in the social economy should be understood within a wider 
context that has redefined the meaning of work in the post-development and post-work society. 
For example, one of the representative social economy institutes, Hope Maker, was caught up in 
a controversy in 2011 because of its “payless internship program.” The institute had hired long-
term interns who were supposed to work eight hours a day without payment. When some of the 
interns divulged their poor working conditions on social media, Park Won-Soon, the then CEO 
of Hope Maker and the current Mayor of Seoul, responded to their accusations: “We cannot give 
them a good salary. Instead, we give them a dream, a vision, and love.”38 What I want to note 
here in the statement—which almost seems to be a twisted parody of Negri’s argument that 
affective labor is “beyond capitalist measurement”—is not that it is hypocritical but rather that 
his remark is consonant with a neoliberal project that aims to re-constitute work as a locus for 
self-realization and self-development (Bröckling 2016; Castel 1996; Muehlebach 2011; Seo 
                                                 
37 Youth Hub, “2014 Youth Hub Annual Report,” p. 23. 
38 “Debate on Hope Maker Payless Internship Program,” Kyung-Hyang Daily (Oct. 8, 2011).  
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2011). In contrast to the old conception that views work and its drudgery as an economic means 
to pursue an ordinary good life and social citizenship, neoliberal laboring subjects are strongly 
encouraged to view their works as a key part of improving themselves and to seek “pleasure in 
work” (Donzelot 1991).  
As seen above, the SIYA program and its hwaldong as affective labor seem to epitomize 
such a transformation: in offering jobs to unemployed youth or deadbeats, the program argues 
that hwaldong should be neither a more committed, political movement [undong] nor more 
economic, self-interested work [nodong]. Instead, the semantics of hwaldong concentrates on 
giving the marginalized youth the opportunity of “improving themselves and restoring self-
esteem” through socially meaningful work. In this sense, Park’s words indicate the point where 
the rhetoric of hwaldong is met and intermingled with what Jodi Dean (2009) calls a “neoliberal 
fantasy,” in which everyone becomes an innovative entrepreneur. Dean argues that in the 
neoliberal fantasy work becomes an aesthetic, self-promoting, and socially innovative activity to 
the point that laborers and the bourgeois are non-distinguishable and thus the exploitation itself 
cannot be represented. That is to say, work serves anymore neither as the foundation of social 
citizenship nor as a political site that reveals the contradiction of capitalism; it rather begins to 
function as a locus where human capitals improve their value and portfolio through various 
experiences.   
As a result, such transformation in the notion of work contributes to the subjective 
acceptance of what Krinsky (2007) calls “free labor” in its ambivalent sense—the public work 
that is low-waged and precarious but often considered as free and meaningful.39 The semantic of 
hwaldong is often conducive to rendering the hyper-exploitative conditions invisible by re-
                                                 
39 In a similar vein, Song (2017) explores how young women’s emotional, service, and care labors are considered 
and appropriated as “free labor” in South Korean government-initiated projects.  
156 
 
writing work [nodong] as projective activity [hwaldong] that improve their future investability 
and also contribute to social good. As Garbriella Lukacs trenchantly criticizes in her exploration 
of Japanese young care workers’ experiences, affective labor and its rosy rhetoric thus serve as a 
stopgap to “tantalize young people with the possibility of self-growth and self-realization in 
work” and thus “promise a solution to the crisis of the human capital regime” that is caused by 
worsening precarious work conditions (2015: 397).  
 
Penetration: The Ghostly Presence of “Ordinary Life”  
It is important to note that I mean neither that affective labor simply serves to conceal the harsh 
working circumstances upon which it is built nor that youth in the social economy uncritically 
accept the semantics of hwaldong and implicitly collaborate with the self-exploitative neoliberal 
regime. Again, if social economy is a field where heterogeneous and various aspirations are 
invested, compromised, and governed, so is the field of affective labor. That is to say, 
representing affective labor as a large homogeneous category, as aptly pointed out by 
Hesmondhalgh and Baker (2008), often falls into the trap of covering up internal differences and 
segmentation in the field and disregarding the more significant question of how work and its 
precariousness “is registered and negotiated in the lives of young workers” (104). In fact, young 
affective laborers often penetrate the incompatibility of such rosy rhetoric with their precarious 
working habitats and try to negotiate their aspirations with this dissatisfying reality.  
At the wrap-up party of 2013 SIYA, a song was played by an activist from the Youth 
Union [ch'ŏngnyŏn yunion], a labor union for part-time youth workers. The song titled “Happy 
Me?” was a parody of the old hit song “Happy Me” that is about a hard-working couple who 
plan marriage but suffer from their economic hardships and a dark future. The original song 
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became popular in the middle of the 1997 Asian financial crisis when the lyrics provided a 
particularly vivid sense of reality.40 This activist rewrote the lyrics into a story about SIYA and 
their temporary jobs:  
 
I had this job after experiencing several layoffs 
I wish you were my last and life-time job  
Every night when I return home from work  
And if I have an overtime bonus 
I would hug my bank note  
And my stress and pain would melt away  
Please hire me just the way you do  
If you would never change  
You are the only one to have my labor  
Sometimes you tell me you are sorry  
About your dark, uncertain future  
Please don’t forget my love  
I will ignore the words of self-development  
And competition out there in the world  
My heart will always be with you as a SIYA    
 
This parodic song was appointed as the SIYA song of the night and drew a lot of acclaim—for 
the song’s metaphor of marriage vividly depicted youth’s strong wish for job security. As noted 
by Molé (2012), in the Fordist (and developmentalist) era, getting a job was often analogized and 
compared with a life-long committed marriage. Once one had an official job, it was normatively 
expected to be a lifelong contract that would obligate people. Such an analogy of employment 
and marriage, however, has become more and more inappropriate and problematic, as the “myth” 
of job security in the developmental period has collapsed and temporary, irregular jobs have 
                                                 
40 The original lyrics are as follows: “I met you after several heartbreaks. That may be the reason why I was hesitant 
to begin this relationship. But I wish you were my last love and only man I need to know and love.… Every night 
when I return home and if you are there waiting for me, I would hug you and your stress and pain would melt 
away. Love me just the way you do. If you would never change, you are the only person to have my all. My heart 
would never change. Sometimes you tell me you are sorry about your incompetency and dark, uncertain future. 
But don’t forget I love. If I’m with you I will be forever happy. I’ll ignore people’s expectations and the rule of the 
world. My heart will always be in the same place with you.”  
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increased with neoliberal reforms. According to Molé, the new subjective figure of the neoliberal 
economy is not the “monogamous and dedicated husband” married to his lifelong job but rather a 
“young entrepreneur” who continues to flirt with new partners (Molé 2012: 382). The aspiration 
for a stable relationship with a job and the dream of an “ordinary life” based on it, however, have 
remained as a “ghostly presence” that still haunts people’s imagination and enables them to 
penetrate and problematize their current precarious work conditions (Muehlebach and Shosan 
2012; cf. Berlant 2007).  
This SIYA song that likens having a job to a life-long marriage seems to reveal the 
lingering attachment to lifetime employment among youth. As seen in Jong-Min’s despair, they 
partially still wish that they could plan a “good ordinary life” and follow “the developmental 
chronotope,” although this form of life would be guaranteed only by arduous and intense work 
discipline (as glimpsed in Jong-Min’s metaphor of the “treadmill” and the terms of “night work” 
and “overtime bonus” in the song). This lingering aspiration is expressed in the lyrics as 
forgetting “the words of self-improvement and competition” that are presumably encouraged by 
the neoliberal work regime. These workers’ desire and attachment, however, would be easily 
betrayed in reality: while more than half of the SIYAs who attended the final meeting had to face 
another layoff or break-up, the government would only suggest that such precarity be viewed as 
a good opportunity for having various “experiences” and exploring their dream and vision. The 
question is then: how are the penetration and dissatisfaction limited and managed by both the 
government and youth in the social economy? How do they justify the reality of hwaldong and 
negotiate the breach between the rosy rhetoric of “hope”, “mission,” “dream,” and “vision” and 
the harsh reality of their precarious working conditions in the social economy? These questions 
may be addressed in part by exploring the internal and external divisions among social 
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innovation activists.    
 
THE SEGMENTED FIELD AND HETEROGENEOUS ASPIRATIONS 
 
As we have seen so far, SIYA cannot be understood simply as a name for a government 
program; rather it represents an ideal youth subjectivity that embodies the quintessential virtues 
of an ethical citizen. As “socially responsible entrepreneurs,” these youth are summoned to bear 
the burdens of not only “neoliberal” innovative entrepreneurship and self-accountability but also 
the responsibility for society and care for others (Lessenich 2011; Muehlebach 2012; Shamir 
2008). As poststructuralist theories of subject formation have taught us, the production of a 
certain subject always-already necessitates its “constitutive” outside or others (e.g., Butler 1997; 
Foucault 2001; Laclau and Mouffe 2001). The ideal figure of SIYA also produces internal 
divisions and external oppositions that signal negative mirror images of the innovative and 
affective subject. Although the pursuits of innovation and affective labor are often described as 
the younger generation’s “common intrinsic virtues,” there certainly exist hierarchical divisions 
among youth in the social economy according to the unequal imaginary distribution of the 
virtues. In the following section, I will shed light on the tangled differences and internal 
subdivisions among youth in the social economy sector, exploring how these youth register and 
manage their contradictory aspirations. 
 
Internal Division: Saeng-gye and Saeng-tae-gye 
In July 2014, I attended a panel “Asia Network for Young Social Entrepreneurs” at the 2014 
Seoul Global Social Economy Forum, with Eun-Jung who is one of the four SIYAs working at 
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the Seongbuk Community/Social Economy Center. After graduating from a local university as a 
geography major and going through one year of unemployment, Eun-Jung had joined the SIYA 
program “with the feeling of clutching at straws.” As a community promoter, her work in 
Seongbuk centered on interviewing and transcribing the life stories of Bukjeong Maul residents. 
The panel was held in the City Hall’s largest auditorium which when we arrived was already 
packed with more than 500 SIYAs, social entrepreneurs, and social economy activists. On the 
stage, international young “star” social entrepreneurs from South Korea, Hong Kong, Indonesia, 
Japan, and the Philippines were casually discussing “the roles of youth in the social economy.” 
Most of the panel members were well-known role models among SIYAs and young social 
entrepreneurs, and thus the intense enthusiasm-charged atmosphere of the hall somewhat 
reminded me of a rock concert.41 Throughout the discussion, the panelists related their success 
stories and repeatedly emphasized “creativity” and “resilience” as essential virtues for young 
social entrepreneurs. One social entrepreneur argued that youth are “naturally” more innovative 
than any other generations because they do not fear failures and are more “resilient” to 
precarious conditions: “Youth are so reckless that they easily take risks, but that’s why they can 
succeed in social start-ups. They might fail, but they would face challenges again.” The 150-
minute long panel concluded with the suggestion that the most urgent task is to construct a 
favorable “ecosystem” [saeng-tae-gye] in which youth freely challenge and fail, and thereby the 
                                                 
41 The education program of SIYA often includes the introduction of successful foreign social start-ups and 
entrepreneurs. Sometimes they invite star social entrepreneurs through cooperation with international social 
entrepreneur networks such as the Ashoka Foundation. Furthermore, the success stories of foreign social start-ups 
have been actively circulated as exemplars by the Seoul Metropolitan Government through various events and 
promotional booklets. Since the central and municipal governments vigorously support the social economy sector, 
a number of Asian social entrepreneurs have chosen Seoul as their second business place and have successfully 
built a vast network with Korean social economy activists. At the end of the panel discussion, a social entrepreneur 
who runs a blood donation social enterprise in the Philippines shouted with excitement and received a big applause 
from the audiences: “Very few people know my business in the Philippines. But here, whenever I meet someone, 
they say they’ve heard about me and my business. How’s that possible? So amazing! I love South Korea!” 
161 
 
experience of such failures can be a resource for their next challenge. In their stories, the salient 
aspiration for job security among youth was completely erased, and instead, “resilience”—the 
capacity to translate precariousness into the opportunity for innovation and development—was 
presented as the intrinsic nature of youth.42   
After the event, Eun-Jung and I talked about the forum’s conclusions over coffee. In 
response to my question about her thoughts on the wrap-up, Eun-Jung replied with a sheepish but 
obviously cynical tone: “For me, sustaining ‘minimal livelihood’ [saeng-gye] is more urgent than 
a favorable ecosystem [saeng-tae-gye].” At that time, Eun-Jung was receiving only about 
700,000 won (approximately $600) per month as a SIYA and had a second job as a wedding hall 
staff on the weekends. She also had a student loan as well as credit card debt that was incurred 
during her unemployment period. Eun-Jung’s pun of using similar pronunciations between 
minimal livelihood [saeng-gye] and ecosystem [saeng-tae-gye] reveals a distinctive hierarchy 
that exists among youth in the social economy. Although it appears that all youth are 
interpellated as creative innovators, affectionate activists, and resilient entrepreneurs, the 
hierarchy and the dividing lines are intentionally produced and reproduced by the government 
through various ways. For example, every year, South Korea’s government awards “Star Social 
Entrepreneurs” among social start-ups and community/social enterprises for identifying 
“successful role models” and “promoting a favorable ecosystem for social entrepreneurship.”43 
The selected entrepreneurs and enterprises receive various benefits including extra subvention 
                                                 
42 In tracing what can be called as “neoliberal temporality,” Sam Binkley (2014) argues that the ideal Fordist subject 
of a docile and disciplined worker is replaced by a new neoliberal figure of the “resilient entrepreneur” who 
actively adapts to an uncertain, risky future: “the unpredictability of the future meant one had to go beyond simple 
planning; one had to foster new capacities within the self for unknown struggles to come” (60). For a critique of 
resilience as a key virtue of neoliberal subjectivity, see Evans and Reid (2014). 
43 The Ministry of Employment and Labor. The 2014 Star Social Entrepreneurship Promotion Project [2014 스타 
사회적기업가 발굴계획]. 2014. p. 2. The criteria of selection enumerate: “innovativity (innovation+creativity), 
entrepreneurship, accountability, and social responsibility. 
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and are invited to various social economy events organized by the government to share their 
success stories and encourage social entrepreneurship. Furthermore, the district governments 
sometimes even compete to attract the star social start-ups to their incubation or business centers 
with the promise of more subvention and better support. In the process, the governments’ limited 
material and immaterial supports are often concentrated on these star social entrepreneurs at the 
top.  
Although not being officially appointed as star social entrepreneurs, Happy Seongbuk 
and Jong-Min still are considered a “star” community enterprise in the region. They were able to 
obtain funding for a three-room office space (which Fortune Care failed to obtain; see Chapter 3) 
and also to receive the municipal and district governments’ commissions to operate a co-working 
place and organize various events for local youth. Because all their activities have been 
sponsored by the district or metropolitan government, the cooperative members used to make a 
self-mocking joke that “the real CEO of our cooperative is Park Won-Soon and our Vice 
President is the District Mayor.” In return for this support, they were often summoned to serve as 
an emblem of the government’s youth-friendly policies and to play a missionary role in 
spreading an innovative and challenging spirit among youth. Despite the internal distress 
divulged by Jong-Min, Happy Seongbuk’s activities often have been described in the media as 
an exemplar of “an alternative way of life” that “successfully reconciles the discrepancy between 
the aspiration for monetary rewards and the desire for a joyful and meaningful life.”44  
On the other pole from this handful of star social entrepreneurs in the public spotlight, 
however, there exist most of the SIYAs and other young social economy activists who are 
                                                 
44 “Youth Who Go to Maul” [마을로 뛰어든 청년들], Seoul Sinmun (Mar.13, 2015); “Youth, Let’s do Politics” 
[청춘아, 정치하자], Hankyrey (Jan. 29, 2016). 
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exploited as a cheap, temporary, and disposable affective labor force. Although they are 
interpellated with the same rhetoric of creativity, innovation, and social responsibility, this 
interpellation is also a process of drawing a new dividing line between ideal, active youth subject 
on the one side and non-deserving, passive youth on the other. As the governments distribute 
their resources unequally along this dividing line, lay affective laborers are exposed to perennial 
instability and bounce around from one temporary work situation to another within the social 
economy sector. Despite or due to this reality, however, they are expected to more actively 
translate precarity as an opportunity for self-development. After the SIYA contract expired, Eun-
Jung managed to participate in a three-month long community regeneration project and then had 
to go through another period of unemployment. When we met again for a follow-up interview, 
she had been unemployed for four months but attending the urban regeneration course in Youth 
School along with a government-sponsored social entrepreneur mini-MBA program. When I 
asked her about the trainings, she answered with a smile: “I am using this unemployment period 
as an opportunity to learn more about social entrepreneurship... I joined the social economy 
because I hated to compete to accumulate ‘specs’ like others.45 Now, it’s like I am doing a kind 
of the same thing in this sector.”  
 
Constitutive Outside: Zombie  
If a dividing line between star entrepreneurs and lay affective laborers exists among youth in the 
social economy, another line is drawn between social innovation activists and the other youth. In 
everyday conversations with SIYAs and other youth in the social economy, I often encountered 
                                                 
45 The term “spec”, which is an abbreviation of specifications—the feature list of a commodity—is commonly used 
among youth to describe their employability in the job market. In concrete terms, “good specs” usually include a 
prestigious education, a high GPA, fluency in multiple languages including an excellent English test score, and 
various extra-curricular experiences such as volunteering and internships.    
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the metaphor of “zombie” that constitutes a negative mirror image against which many social 
innovators construct their identity. When I just began my fieldwork research in 2013, I met Joo-
In, a co-founder of the social start-up Co-Live, at a network meeting of young social 
entrepreneurs. This small venture seeks to provide mental health care for unemployed youth 
while obtaining their funding from the organization of “The Zombie Run,” a real game event in 
which participants are expected to run away from and survive disguised zombies within a limited 
prescribed space. With the catchphrase “Survive in South Korea Where Everyone Becomes 
Zombies!” the event has been held regularly since 2012 and increasingly has attracted popularity 
and media attention, most of which frames the event as a satirical allegory of youth’s dark 
present.46 When I asked Joo-in why her enterprise focused on unemployed youth and zombies, 
she responded: “Now in South Korea, youth have only a two-pronged path before them: either 
falling into being a depressed, unemployed loser or accumulating good ‘specs’ to be unhappily 
exploited by the older generations.” She paused and empathetically added, “They both are living 
like zombies. We aim to help the first group while providing refreshment to the second.” In 
addition to her extreme description of youth’s future, what immediately intrigued me about her 
words was that she intentionally lumped together the “losers” and the “winners” in the job 
market into the single figure of a zombie.  
As I extended my research, I came across other youth in the social economy who were 
using the metaphor of “zombie” in the same way as Joo-in did: to describe the negative ways of 
life from their perspective. On the one hand, many of youth who had experienced a short or long-
term unemployment period depicted their jobless lives as “zombie-like,” that is, a helpless life 
                                                 
46 “Make Zombies Run” [좀비를 뛰게하라], Slownews (Apr. 2, 2014); “Why Do Youth Become Zombies?” 
[청년들은 왜 좀비가 되었나?], Chosun Ilbo (Jun. 29, 2015); “A Report on Zombie Run” [좀비런 참가기], 
Hankyerey (Jul. 1, 2015). 
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without any vitality and productivity. On the other hand, social economy activists who used to 
work in the profit sector also occasionally relied on the figure of “zombie” to describe their past 
experiences. To illustrate, Ji-Sun, a former big corporation employee and now a social 
entrepreneur, once related me: “When I worked there, I was like a zombie: I got up in the 
morning, went to work, and came home late at the exact same time every day. The only thing 
that excited me was payday. Except for it, I couldn’t feel any sense of life.” She added that she 
liked people in the social economy, because “their eyes are lively and starry” in contrast to the 
employees in “normal” corporations who “look listless and dreamless.” Here again, seemingly 
opposite lives—one as an unemployed deadbeat and the other as a regular, ordinary worker—are 
condensed into the same figure of a zombie as a way to dismiss them. 
In fact, besides the fact that zombies have returned as a representative monstrous figure 
in the early 21st century mass culture,47 it does not seem surprising that social economy activists 
have conjured up the figure of a zombie to depict negative lives. In many aspects, a zombie 
serves as the perfect negative mirror image of “aspiring human capital” or an “affectionate social 
innovator.” Above all, the zombie hordes have no consciousness, no internal aspirations, and 
thus no individuality. They move like automatons, being manipulated by an outside force.48 For 
that reason, zombie masses have been used as an easy cliché of alienated workers and consumers 
in the era of “mass capitalist society” in which capital subsumes their bodies and spirits 
(Comaroff and Comaroff 2002; Lauro and Embry 2008). This also explains why the neoliberal 
                                                 
47 In the 21st century, zombie masses have become ubiquitous in pop culture and “zombie studies” has emerged as a 
new interdisciplinary subfield. See Castillo et al. (2016). In South Korea, The Train to Busan, a zombie 
apocalyptic film, recorded a mega hit, attracting more than 11 million audiences in 2016. In the film, the zombie 
pandemic seems to symbolize both ravenous financial capitalism that pursue only profits and greedy masses who 
become affectless infected by the lust for money. A protagonist fund manager, who used to “suck people’s blood” 
like a zombie, came to realize his humanity and love for his daughter while going through the catastrophe.   
48 The zombies usually appear as a faceless and nameless lumped mass that mindlessly follow the lust for blood and 
flesh; it is “not an aristocrat like Dracula or a star freak like Frankenstein” (Larson 2010: 8). 
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advocates of innovation often use the trope of zombie to criticize the welfare state that 
supposedly produces dependent and helpless economic agents (Dardot and Laval 2013). 
Furthermore, zombies are also characterized by their lack of capacity to emote and communicate: 
they are not only mindless, but also affectless, asocial, always mute, and out of communication. 
As Larson (2010) points out, in this sense, zombies are the pariahs of creative, affective 
capitalism: given that emotion, affect, and communication are deeply infiltrated into the labor 
process and economic behaviors (Hardt and Negri 2000), the image of a zombie has become the 
symbol of an abortive parasite who cannot contribute to production and reproduction at all. Such 
futility and importance might explain why the term “zombie” is also summoned to describe the 
status of unemployed deadbeat [ing-yeo] in youth’s imagination. The zombie mass as alienated, 
brain-dead, ideology-fed workers and consumers in the Fordist society returns in the post-Fordist 
regime as hopeless, disposable outcasts.49 In a word, in the condensed symbol of the zombie, its 
nonhuman monstrosity is associated with a lack of subjective individuality, affect, and 
communication; these imaginary features of zombie thus render the figure as the perfect alterity 
of the ideal youth subjectivity of SIYA or of “socially responsible entrepreneurs” who are 
encouraged to embody affectionate responsibility for others as well as subjective aspiration for 
creativity and innovation. 
What is more interesting, however, would be that the multi-faceted negative 
representation of zombie seems to symptomatically reveal the young subjects’ ambiguous and 
even somewhat contradictory desires surrounding work. What is excluded as a “zombie-like life” 
is not only an unproductive, unemployed life, but also a repetitive and stable work life that 
                                                 
49 In this sense, as Comaroff and Comaroff (2002) aptly points out, zombies “have arisen of social disruption, 
periods characterized by sharp shifts in control over the fabrication and circulation of value” (783). 
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presumably stands for the collective mass labor regime in the past developmentalism. That is to 
say, the figure of zombie speaks to youth’s anxiety about job precarity and insecurity, but it also 
divulges their dissatisfactions with the old-fashioned developmental laborism: although many 
youths in the social economy feel trouble about their abiding precarious conditions, they also 
tend to depreciate regular, normal work as affectionless, non-individual, and tepid. A narrative 
that “stability and secureness kill creativity and entrepreneurial spirit” is continuously circulated 
among SIYAs; they are rather encouraged to be “creative destructors” who upset the status quo, 
create continuous imbalances, and excoriate stability as a fetter on freedom. Although it is hard 
to tell to what extent they internalize such neoliberal maxims of innovation and entrepreneurship, 
in their imagination at least the economic precarity and the enthusiasm for a dream often appear 
to be juxtaposable as correlated (in the same way as Park Won-Soon’s response): for example, 
when I asked back Ji-Sun why she thought social economy activists’ eyes were lively and starry, 
she half-jokingly answered, “That’s because they pursue their own dreams, or because they are 
on the edge of survival, or maybe both?”  
In this sense, what Nancy Fraser calls the ambivalence of the “triple movement” seems to 
be reiterated at the level of youth subjectivity. According to Fraser, the recent social struggles 
“do not find any place within the [Polanyian] scheme of the double movement,” that is, between 
marketization and social protection (2013: 127). The recent movements want to disassociate 
themselves from the precarity that marketization has brought, but simultaneously challenge the 
exclusionary, oppressive security of past social welfarism (and developmentalism). In this way, 
their critique of oppressive protection may inadvertently “converge with the neoliberal critique 
of protection per se” (130). It appears that the youth in South Korea’s social economy find 
themselves in the same kind of irony: while they aspire for stable employment and maintain an 
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affective attachment to a “good ordinary life,” they also distance themselves from the non-
innovative and collective mass labor regime. Caught in a sort of double-bind, they cannot find 
deep relief either in the developmental model of ordinary work-life or the competitive innovation 
model of human capital regime.  
It is in this conflict zone that their genuine desire for not being alienated in work, creating 
a meaningful life, and contributing social goods are met and intermingled with governmental 
purposes to promote social entrepreneurship and mobilize a cheap, disposable affective labor 
force. In the “utopian” fantasy of affective labor, it is said that youth’s current economic 
precarity could be dissolved in the pursuit of building community and networks through their 
own affective labor and that hwaldong would provide them with social recognition and 
meaningful work that are not achievable in traditional forms of work [nodong]. As seen above, 
however, what this fantasy conceals are competitive hierarchy, unstable, low-wage labor 
conditions as well as imperatives to translate precarity and instability into the source of 
innovation. The expulsion of a dream-less and affect-less zombie mass in youth’s imagination 
thus signals such a conflicting reality as well as their own ambivalent desires. The irony, then, 
may be found in the fact that with this exclusion not only are the hopeless deadbeats disparaged, 
but the vision of a “good ordinary life” of which Jong-Min dreams also can be dismissed. 
 
CONCLUSION: HOPE AS COUNTERFEIT MONEY 
 
In commenting on Marcel Mauss’ enigmatic statement that “it is always society that pays itself 
with the counterfeit money of its dreams,” Ghassan Hage (2003) defines a society as “a 
mechanism for the distribution of hope”: “If hope is the way we construct a meaningful future 
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for ourselves... such futures are only possible within society, because society is the distributor of 
social opportunities for self-realisation. We can call this hope societal hope... society is a 
distributor of these forms of societal hope, these social routes by which individuals can define a 
meaning for their lives” (15). According to Hage, what is disappearing in the neoliberal world is 
“the very idea of society, or commitment to some form of distribution of hope” (18).50 In South 
Korea where rapid economic growth has substituted for the role of society, the end of 
development has brought the same “lack” of the hope distribution system. This might explain 
why the Korean younger generation recently has started to call South Korea “Hell Joseon,” a 
moniker that combines the name of Korea’s old kingdom with the hell of youth unemployment, 
intense competition, and shrinking marriage and family prospects (Cho 2015). As noted by Kim 
(2016), the popularity of the term “Hell Joseon” reflects the younger generation’s hopeless and 
futureless despair.  
This is, however, not the end of the story but rather only half of it. As Ben Anderson 
(2016) points out, we should resist the easy temptation to argue that “the affective life today is 
organized in a single, identifiable way—that we live in an ‘age of fear’ or an ‘age of anxiety’” 
(2). In fact, a more exact interpretation of Mauss’ words would be that no society can exist and 
sustain itself without providing its own promises for the future, for dreams, and for hope, even if 
those promises are only counterfeit. What is necessary, therefore, is less to simply repeat the 
vanishing of hope in neoliberalism than to explore the specific ways how the neoliberal human 
capital regime provides its own counterfeit dream. As seen so far, not only despair and 
desperation but also strong aspirations for hope, dreams, and the future are found in the 
                                                 
50 What Ghassan is missing here is the fact that societal hope is deeply related to the notion of development from the 
beginning. That is to say, the modern hope distribution system relies on the implicit hypothesis of continuing 
development. For the relationship of the birth of the social and development, see Donzelot (1979).  
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affective-discursive space that surrounds contemporary Korean youth; and the visions of “good, 
meaningful life” are again appropriated and mobilized in the process of managing the 
reproduction crisis and of searching for a new engine of development. Innovation and affective 
labor can thus be understood as the new social dispositifs for distributing hope and creating the 
future in the neoliberal human capital regime. While (social) innovation helps individuals to 
align their self-development with social transformation, affective labor provides a new utopian 
domain in which marginal populations including underemployed youth can find their places and 
existential meanings without being alienated from work as in the old developmental regime: they 
can gain economic profit and simultaneously contribute to the construction of “the social.” In 
this way, the developmental hope distribution system based on industrious labor and continuous 
economic growth, which Jong-Min analogizes with a treadmill, begins to be increasingly 
superseded by a new system in which individual aspirations are connected with social hope, not 
through the collective organization of labor, but rather through the innovation and affective labor 
of socially responsible subjects.  
In this chapter, I thus have shown how youth are interpellated and constructed as subjects 
of the new hope system at the center of a precarious reality: on the one hand, they are 
encouraged to overcome their precarity by building the social and communities through affective 
labor; on the other hand, they should become innovators who make the most of their instability 
and precarity as a source of innovation and development. In illuminating this discursive and 
affective heterogeneity surrounding contemporary youth in South Korea, I have focused on how 
youth in the social economy question, manage, and negotiate this paradoxical interpellation. The 
new hope distribution system, however, seems to be fragile and tenuous, to say the best. As it 
devolves the traditional role of society onto “socially responsible individuals” and projects 
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“society” as something to be built by their affective labor, it also erodes the very universal and 
secure ground of social solidarity upon which individuals’ dreams can be nested. As individuals 
shoulder the responsibility for the construction of society, the production and distribution of hope 
also becomes fragmented onto the individuals who are presumably resilient and innovative 
enough to translate precarity into an opportunity and compete in the market or otherwise secure 
the government’s resources. (I will explore this shift of the foundation of social solidarity in the 
next chapter.) As a result, precarity as a neoliberal affect can be neither eliminated nor 
ameliorated. The coexistence of the plethora of hope and the upsurge of despair would be a 
symptom of such an impasse.  
For youth subjects, their efforts to translate precarity into hope are not always successful. 
Although innovation and affective labor serve as a stopgap between stagnant reality and 
individuals’ aspiration for the “good life,” the fundamental insecurities—produced by the 
collapse of the social plane and the subjectification of social responsibility—are often abruptly 
divulged. In the conversation with Jong-Min described in this chapter’s introduction, being 
somewhat embarrassed with his unforeseen confession I tried to perk him up: “But Happy 
Seongbuk is a ‘star’ community enterprise being subsidized by the government. It could go 
well…” As soon as these words poured out from me and I saw Jong-Min’s expression in 
response, however, I came to the realization that I had made a mistake. Jong-Min was quick to 
emphatically rephrase my words, “It MUST go well,” he continued in an emotional voice, 
“Otherwise I have no place to belong to. This is the only place where I can find the meanings and 
senses of my life and work.” Jong-Min attempts to find his existential meaning and vision of 
“good life” in Joyful Sengbuk’s hwaldong for building youth communities; for this purpose, 
however, the small cooperative needs to find its way to survive in the market and obtain more 
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governmental subventions by proving its innovative entrepreneurship and investability. That 






THE MORAL ECONOMY OF FACE: 
GIFT-EXCHANGE, RECOGNITION, AND DEPOLITICIZED SOLIDARITY 
 





The first thing that greets you when you enter the office of the fair trade social enterprise 
Beautiful Coffee is a huge portrait of the Nepalese coffee producers with whom the company has 
conducted the trade. When I first visited the office for my fieldwork research in the summer of 
2012, Soo-Jin, a staff member at the organization, cheerfully informed me of the producers’ 
names in the photograph and gave me their brief life stories. Their smiling faces and the 
imprinted phrase of “Our Coffee is a Gift” seem to confirm Soo-Jin’s explanation that “fair trade 
is not simply an economic, anonymous transaction. Rather, it seeks to develop intimate, social 
bonds between producers and consumers.” As you pass through a hallway to the main office, this 
time you encounter the faces of regular consumers covering the entire wall. These photographs 
include their names along with short blurbs about why they purchase fair trade coffee and how 
much they like it. Some of them contain images of smiling producers and consumers together, 
taken when enthusiastic consumers visited the producers’ local farms.   
This research began with a simple question that dawned upon me at the first visit to the 
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organization: What are the implications of these representations of “face” [ŏlgul] that are often 
found in fair trade activism? Is the common metaphor relevant to the moral and solidary goals 
that the activism supposedly pursues? In undertaking my fieldwork research, furthermore, I came 
to realize that the representation and metaphor of face not only are prevalent in fair trade 
discourse, but also are common and widespread across the social economy sector that basically 
aims at grafting morality and sociality onto market economy. For example, fair trade and ethical 
consumption are frequently described as “trade with those whose ‘faces’ you know” [‘ŏlgul’ 
kajin saramgwa-ŭi kŏrae] or simply as “face-to-face commerce”; the CEO of a “fair tourism” 
social enterprise related me in an interview that “a fair and sustainable tour is a tour in which you 
can see the naked ‘faces’ of local people.” Likewise, when a major retailer in South Korea first 
set up a corner for products for products from social startups, the booth was titled as “the Goods 
with a Human Face.” Furthermore, the metaphor of face is also found when social economy 
activists describe their ultimate goal as building “capitalism or market economy with a human 
face.” As Park Won-Soon, Seoul’s current mayor as well as Beautiful Coffee’s founder, 
explains: the social economy can be basically understood as “an attempt to give a human face to 
the competitive and inhuman market capitalism” (Park 2012).  
In these metaphors, “face” seems above all to signify a moral and social dimension 
embedded in these practices that cannot be reduced to utilitarian economic calculation (as in 
“trade with persons whose faces you know”). Furthermore, it also seems to designate a 
privileged place from which to reconfigure the whole meaning and identity of the existing 
economic system (as in “capitalism with a human face”). In paying attention to the tacit 
imbrication of these two meanings, i.e., privileging morality and sociality as a remedial locus for 
a market-based economic system, I attempt here to raise and answer the following questions: 
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Why and how do fair trade and social economy activists rely on the metaphors of face to 
problematize market and capitalist economy? What truths do the repetitive metaphors divulge 
about the ethos of the moral economic practices? What kinds of political and social meanings do 
the metaphors of face implicate and produce?  
To address these questions, this chapter first re-examines the intimate connection 
between gift-exchange and face based on Marcel Mauss’ and Marcel Hénaff’s analyses of gift. In 
illuminating what is at stake in gift-exchange in light of symbolic recognition and discipline, I 
will maintain that face should be understood as social positions and identities that can be 
achieved by disciplined participants in gift-exchange. Then, drawing upon my fieldwork research 
in Beautiful Coffee,1 I define the practice of fair trade as “marketized gift-exchange” in which 
certain faces of producers and consumers are produced and circulated through the politics of 
symbolic recognition; next, I demonstrate how such faces reveal the hybrid characteristics of 
moral economic practices. In so doing, I focus particularly on how the moral economy of face 
has served as a crucial juncture of recognition and disciplinary empowerment, and thereby 
produced symbolic violence and (de-)politicized effects. The remaining part and conclusion will 
be dedicated to presenting fair trade activism as an exemplar of various moral economic 
practices that pursue a new form of market-based solidarity and to analyzing the implications and 
limits of the new imaginaries of the social and solidarity based on their metaphor of face.   
 
 
                                                 
1 Beautiful Coffee is not only the largest fair trade organization but also is considered the first “social enterprise” in 
South Korea. Being established in 2002 by Park Won-Soon, the pioneering social economy advocate and the 
current Mayor of Seoul, the organization has played a pivotal role in expanding fair trade and social economy 
activism in Korea. Beautiful Coffee’s office is currently located in Seoul Innovation Park.  
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GIFT-EXCHANGE, FACE, AND THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 
 
Let us begin with briefly re-illuminating the relationship between gift-exchange and face in 
Mauss’ pioneering discussion on gift. This could serve as a good starting point for exploring the 
implications of the metaphor of face, because social economy activism, including fair trade, have 
commonly justified their ideal of “moral economy” and “social solidarity” in terms of Mauss’ 
gift-exchange and its “reciprocity.” The “return to the spirit of the gift” is often considered as an 
encapsulation of the key principle of the social economy and its caring and ethical practices. 
Interestingly, Mauss’ The Gift provides a very clear analysis of the relation between face and 
gift. In discussing the three obligations of gift-exchange—obligations to give, to receive, and to 
reciprocate, he maintains that in many cultures one loses “face” if one does not (or cannot) fulfill 
the obligations. He explains the notion of face at stake as follows:  
 
Each Kwakiutl and Haïda noble has exactly the same idea of “face” as has the Chinese 
man of letters or officer. It is said of one of the great mythical chiefs who gave no 
potlatch that he had a “rotten face.” Here the expression is even more exact than in China. 
For in the American Northwest, to lose one’s prestige is indeed to lose one’s soul. It is in 
fact the “face,” the dancing mask, the right to incarnate a spirit, to wear a coat of arms, a 
totem, it is really the persona—that are all called into question in this way, and that are 
lost at the potlatch, at the game of gifts, just as they can be lost in war, or through a 
mistake in ritual. (Mauss, 1990: 39) 
 
In relation to our discussion, what should be noted in this quotation are three things. First, it is 
certain that “face” here does not merely mean a personal or physical countenance; face—“the 
dancing mask,” “the right to incarnate a spirit,” thus the persona—is rather related, as Mauss 
says elsewhere, to a certain “forename” in each clan or “a sacred object” given by ancestors that 
indicates one’s qualification to perform the role of the name (1985: 4-11). Second, Mauss’ 
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argument that one could lose their face in a failed gift-exchange could be conversely stated that 
an individual can acquire and maintain their face by successfully participating in a gift-exchange. 
That is to say, face means social positions, status, or identities that are acquired and socially 
allocated through successful gift-exchange rituals. Finally, as stated by Mauss above, one has to 
impeccably perform his role (for instance, dances or performances) in the rituals in order to 
acquire and maintain face; again, if one fails to perform one’s persona adequately, one would 
lose face. The acquisition and deprivation of face, therefore, includes the others’ judgment on 
one’s performance and eligibility. 
In this light, a potlatch is not only a paradigmatic example for gift-giving but can also be 
understood as a public ritual for (re)producing a social recognition system in which social 
identities and status are distributed, conformed, confirmed, and confined. As Mauss points out, 
“marriages for one’s children and places in the brotherhoods are only won during the potlatch, 
where exchange and reciprocity rule” (1990: 37). In providing an example of the Tsimshian chief 
who lost his grandson “Little Otter” to a fellow chieftain who had not been invited to the potlatch 
celebrating the boy’s birth and thus mistook him as an animal, Mauss directly links gift-
exchange in potlatch with the “recognition” of face and name:  
  
And the myth concludes: “This is why peoples mounted a great festival when the son of a 
chief was born and was given a name, so that no one should not know who he was.” The 
potlatch, the distribution of goods, is the basic act of “recognition,” military, juridical, 
economic, and religious in every sense of the word. One “recognizes” the chief or his son 
and becomes “grateful” to him. (1990: 40) 
 
Simply put, for Mauss, gift-exchange is inseparable from the recognition or entitlement of one’s 
face/persona, and furthermore, the recognition is deeply related to the issues of bodily discipline 
and performance. In this light, we can find in his discussion of gift-exchange a conceptual 
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schema consisting of his abiding scholarly interests such as gift-exchange, face, identity, 
discipline, and performance.2   
In further exploring the recognition substratum of gift-exchange, a French anthropologist 
and philosopher Marcel Hénaff maintains that gift-exchange should be primarily understood as a 
matter of symbolic recognition rather than an economic act (2010: 113).3 According to him, one 
of the most significant implications of Mauss’ discussion of gift is found in the idea that a gift 
always contains “part of the very being of the giver.”4 By giving part of their existence, the 
givers recognize the recipients and demand mutual recognition. What should be reciprocated in 
gift-exchange, Hénaff argues, is not thus the given object itself; it is rather “the spirit of the 
giver,” that is, the giver’s “gesture of recognition”: “Gift-giving is, above all, a gesture to 
recognize, accept, honor the other through the given object; it not only shows a respect to the 
other through the gift but also forces the other to respond and participate in a mutual 
commitment” (Hénaff 2002; 161, my translation).  
Of special interest is that Hénaff also connects gift-giving to the matter of face, albeit in a 
different way from Mauss. Hénaff finds what forces someone to participate in gift-exchange in 
the “face” of others, which demands recognition through gift-giving. In interpreting Mauss’ 
                                                 
2 For his concern with body and discipline, see Mauss (2006). Also, Mauss (1985) deals with the matter of 
performance and identity. Notably, all these elements are found in his analysis in potlatch and gift-exchange. See 
Mauss (1990).   
3 Hénaff criticizes the “economic” interpretation of gift-exchange, which regards it either as “the ancestor of trade” 
or as “an alternative to trade.” According to him, the former position is represented by Polanyi and Weber, while 
the latter is primarily maintained by Alain Caillé and his group M.A.U.S.S. (Mouvement Anti-Utilitariste dans les 
Sciences Sociales) (Hénaff 2010: 110-116). Hénaff goes further to maintain that the act of gift-exchange as 
reciprocal recognition does not disallow or replace commercial transaction; it can be added to or overlapped with 
market economy and serves to create and reinforce social bonds at a symbolic level. In fact, the conflicts between 
economic and recognition interpretations of gift-exchange can be also found in the early debate between Boas and 
Curtis over potlatch. For the debate, see High (2012).  
4 In analyzing the conception of hau in Maori gift-exchange, Mauss states, “...to make a gift of something to 
someone is to make a present of some part of oneself... to accept something from somebody is to accept some part 
of his spiritual essence, of his soul” (1990: 12).  
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“obligation to give” in a Levinasian perspective, he argues: “The ethology of encounter found in 
a ceremonial gift originates from the appearance of “face,” from the being-face of others… What 
face commands is the absolute requirement to recognize others who exist within our beings but 
are not reducible to what we are. (Hénaff 2002: 165, my translation) For Hénaff, therefore, what 
distinguishes gift-giving from commercial transaction are the “face” of the other and the giver’s 
ethical involvement with it, both of which attach to the circulated object but simultaneously 
exceed its materiality (Hénaff 2010: 400-404).  
In this regard, Hénaff’s discussion seems to provide a useful foundation on which the 
anthropological discussion of gift-exchange could be connected and aligned with the Frankfurt 
School’s “theory of recognition” or Levinas’s “ontological ethics.”5 What should be noted with 
respect to our discussion, however, is rather a gap that is found in Hénaff’s and Mauss’ 
discussion of “face” in gift-exchange: whereas for Hénaff face signifies others’ requests for 
recognition and gift-giving, Mauss associates face with socially recognized and confirmed 
identities as a result of successful gift-exchange. Such a gap thus opens a possibility for 
understanding gift-exchange as a site for symbolic struggle or even a symbolic violence 
surrounding recognition. In other words, although a gift is said to be an ethical response to the 
others’ faces as noted by Hénaff, the gift-exchange is a social procedure in which the recognition 
is selectively offered and only certain faces are finally recognized.  
Such selectivity should be more seriously considered, given that recognition itself 
implicates the construction of the recognized identity. As political philosopher Patchen Markell 
aptly points out, recognition is more than an act of simply re-cognizing or re-affirming what 
                                                 




people already are; it is also an act that “transforms the world in some way” by constituting or 
entitling “the identities of those to whom it is addressed” (2003: 40). To borrow Markell’s 
example, when a meeting’s chairperson recognizes a speaker, although it may appear to simply 
cognize a status or a right that already exists, it is not only an act that institutionally provides the 
privilege of speaking to them but also involves a disciplinary and constructive expectation of 
their performing properly as an entitled speaker (2003: 40-41). Furthermore, it should be added 
that the first identity or status that is assumed to already exist and to be recognized (e.g., a 
speaker) could be indeed performatively constructed by the very effect of the act of recognition.  
If we consider this intimate relation of gift-exchange and recognition, and furthermore 
the constructive effect of recognition on identity, it is possible to question and problematize the 
socio-political dynamics surrounding the construction and transformation of faces in fair trade. 
Put otherwise, if gift exchange includes recognition struggles and symbolic violence over the 
acquisition and maintenance of faces and the act of recognition itself contributes to the formation 
or even imposition of the faces, gift-exchange always involves a question of power: that is, who 
recognizes whom as what (or which face)? Based on this problematic, in the following sections I 
focus on the questions of what kinds of faces are allocated to producers and consumers in fair 
trade and what kind of assemblage of power can be identified through the faces.     
 
FAIR TRADE AS MARKETIZED GIFT-EXCHANGE 
 
To address these questions, it is crucial to first analyze an interesting and hybrid relationship that 
fair trade has with gift exchange. Fair trade activism, which was initiated in Europe in the wake 
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of the Second World War and recently expanded across the globe,6 often presents its aim as the 
alleviation of poverty through “Trade Not Aid.” Beautiful Coffee has also adopted as its slogan 
“To Fight against Poverty, Trade Not Aid!” Its educational booklet explains the difference 
between aid and trade as follows: “In the old practices of aid, the producers in the Third World 
were generally regarded as the poor who needed benevolence and charity. Fair trade is different 
from such one-sided aid. It aims at establishing an equal trade relation with the producers and 
empowering them through the trade. Fair trade is working not for but with the producers.”7 That 
is to say, the producers in the global South should be understood not as the recipients of 
paternalistic charity but as the partners of equal exchange and trade. In the booklet, the words 
from a coffee producer in Uganda are cited under the heading of “Not the Needy but Producers” 
with her smiling picture: “We are not demanding charity or aid. We want our customers to like 
our coffee. To hear from them that our product has the best quality, it is our aim and our greatest 
pleasure.” 
As pointed out by Brown (1993), such distinction from charity and the emphasis on 
“trade” and “market transaction” have constituted the distinctive identity of fair trade movements 
from the beginning. By distancing themselves from the traditional practices of gift-giving such as 
aid and charity, fair trade movements challenge and problematize the unequal, dependent 
relationship between the recipients and the donors that are inherent to the practices (Varul 2008). 
In fact, it is well known that market economy has accompanied a paradoxically emancipatory 
effect in comparison with traditional gift economy: whereas gift-exchange such as charity could 
serve to produce and maintain the subordinate position of the donee by generating symbolic 
                                                 
6 For a general history of fair trade movement, see Brown (1993) and Jaffee (2014).  
7 Beautiful Coffee, Understanding Fair Trade [공정무역 이해하기]. 2011, p.7. 
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capital and debt (Bourdieu 1977), market trade presupposes an equal position between each 
partners as a homo œconomicus who individually pursues their own interests. In contrast to gift 
exchange, the purchase of a commodity with money does not necessarily yield the recognition of 
social status; rather, it is conceived as fulfilling the ordinary desires of the participants as 
utilitarian agents. To put it differently, since the partners in a market exchange are mutually 
recognized only as a formal, empty persona of “economic man,” the transaction does not produce 
any particular social bonds nor interdependency between the participants (Godelier 1999; 
Graeber 2001; Gregory 1982). This is what many modern social theories have described as a 
“paradoxical egalitarianism” or “paradoxical emancipation” inherent in market and monetary 
economy (e.g., Marx and Engels 1967; Simmel 1990). The fair trade activities based on “trade 
not aid” seem to pursue such paradoxical egalitarianism, and therefore the participants are 
primarily represented as economic agents such as “producers” and “consumers” rather than 
needy recipients and philanthropic donors.  
Fair trade, however, also distinguishes itself from the existing commercial trades. 
Another booklet by Beautiful Coffee states that fair trade does not rely exclusively on market 
principles and economic rules. Because the current coffee market is practically unequal and 
unfair with “the tyranny of coyotes (brokers)” and “the systemic manipulations of big coffee 
companies,” fair trade aims to make the market “more equal and just” by guaranteeing a 
minimum price and establishing a “transparent and long-term partnership” with the producers; it 
also adds that fair trade seeks to empower the producers and their community by providing 
“social premium” for local development projects.8 Such emphasis on “fairness” and “solidarity” 
shows that fair trade movements pursue certain “social values” through but beyond market 
                                                 
8 Beautiful Coffee, Understanding Fair trade at a Glance [한눈에 알아보는 공정무역], 2010, p.1. 
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trades. For example, the social values are well reflected in one of the often-used catchlines of 
Beautiful Coffee, “When you buy Beautiful Coffee, you are not just buying coffee.”9 The 
statement, which is reminiscent of Mauss’ axiom that “a gift-exchange is more than giving and 
receiving an object,” naturally prompts the question of what else you can get by purchasing fair 
trade coffee. A staff member in Beautiful Coffee answered my question that it is “social bonds 
and solidarity with the producers,” which also resonates with Mauss’ point that a gift is 
accompanied by the social and moral force of hau.  
In fact, the shadow of gift is found more generally in the representations and practices of 
Beautiful Coffee. Their products are named after their producing areas as “The Gift of 
Himalayas,” “The Gift of Andes,” and “The Gift of Kilimanjaro.” With such names, the coffee 
purchases come to have an appearance of a mutual gift-exchange: as the coffees are represented 
as the producers’ gifts, the customers’ purchase could appear to be a sort of counter-prestation 
offering an extra premium to the local producers. What makes this process more interesting is 
that the products of Beautiful Coffee are apparently distinctive with their package having smiling 
pictures of the producers (see Figure 12). That is to say, when consumers buy Beautiful Coffee, 
one might argue that they are buying the faces of the producers and participating in the 
recognition of them, which seems to interestingly reflect Hénaff’s argument that what initiates 
gift-exchange is the face of others demanding recognition and response to it. Furthermore, the 
organization’s ordinary practices exhibit its concern for solidarity and social bonds: the company 
not only shares the producers’ everyday life stories on its homepage and Facebook page; it also 
continues to hold events in which its enthusiastic supporters and customers visit and interact with 
                                                 
9 A similar phrase is also found in fair trade movement in the U.S. For the comprehensive analysis of the meanings 
of the phrase, see Cole (2011).  
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local producers for raising “solidary consciousness.” 
 
 
Figure 12. A Package of Beautiful Coffee 
 
In this regard, fair trade activism locates its identity in what can be called “marketized 
gift-exchange,” a hybrid of market and gift-exchange. Although the activism distinguishes itself 
from traditional charity by foregrounding market-based solutions (as in “Trade not aid”), it 
simultaneously reintroduces in their practices the “spirit of gift,” the pursuit of social bonds and 
solidarity to correct the existing market system (as in “You are not just buying coffee”). In this 
way, fair trade activism, like other examples of social economy activism, seeks to graft and 
articulate the social and moral logics with economic rationality. What is interesting in relation to 
our discussion is not so much the ambivalence itself as that, through this dual, even dialectical 
movement, the recognition dimension of gift-exchange is brought again into the practices of fair 
trade. In other words, although fair trade seeks to replace the dependency of recipients on donors 
in gift-exchange with the equal relation between the market subjects of producers and 
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consumers, it also attempts to represent its participants not as anonymous, faceless economic 
individuals but rather as recognizable partners with social faces. Furthermore, in the process 
there has surfaced two discernible faces: an “entrepreneurial producer” who evokes moral, 
solidary sentiments of pity and sympathy, and a “responsible consumer” who is capable of 
responding to the demands of recognition and solidarity. In the concrete practices of fair trade, 
the empty, formal identity of homo œconomicus as producer and consumer is continuously 
overwritten by, and imbricated with, these returned faces, a process I will discuss in detail in the 
following section.   
 
THE RETURN OF FACES: 
ENTREPRENEURIAL PRODUCER AND RESPONSIBLE CONSUMER 
 
<Case 1> While I worked at Beautiful Coffee in 2012, I found that one of its bestsellers 
“The Gift of Kilimanjaro” was in fact produced in Mount Elgon in Uganda. When I asked 
several staff members about why they did not name it “The Gift of Elgon,” they looked to 
be slightly embarrassed and answered that, because Mount Elgon was not well known 
among Korean consumers, they instead adopted Kilimanjaro “as a representative name 
that signals Africa.”10 They were quick to add that there had been some internal 
disagreements with the decision.  
 
<Case 2> In 2010, Beautiful Coffee launched fair trade chocolate in addition to their 
coffee. For the promotion of the product, the organization was effectively using the 
pictures of child slaves in cacao plantations in West Africa, although its cacaos were 
indeed imported from Peru. In a staff meeting that I attended in July 2012, the issue 
resurfaced on the agenda as the publicity department complained that the focus on West 
Africa made it difficult for them to spread the actual producers’ stories in Peru. After a 
short discussion, however, it was generally agreed that focusing on child slavery could be 
“more compelling and effective for marketing the product as well as raising customers’ 
awareness of the problems in cacao production.”  
                                                 
10 Since Cho Yong-Phil’s mega-hit song “A Leopard in Killimanjaro” (1985), Mount “Kilimanjaro” has been 




What I want to point out with these examples is neither that the organization has provided 
incorrect information for their consumers nor that their moral initiatives are often compromised 
by market pressure; what I want to note is rather that these cases reveal an asymmetrical power 
relation between the producers and the consumers and that producers’ faces are selectively 
recognized based on the desires of the consumers. It would be needless to say that such 
asymmetry of the represented and the representing is reflective of the global socio-economic 
disparities between them. While the first case in which Mount Elgon is replaced by Mount 
Kilimanjaro seems to testify to the alleged complicity of fair trade with “the consumption of 
exotic differences,” the second example leads us to contemplate what Littler (2009) calls “the 
exploitation of victimized others” in the practices of ethical consumption. In this regard, what is 
remarkable is that the (mis)representations in these cases are not incidental but rather faithfully 
reflect the longstanding colonial paternalistic representation of “others”—“the exotic” (signified 
by Kilimanjaro) and “victims” (characterized by child slaves). 
In fact, various studies have illuminated and criticized “the reification of difference” and 
“the commodification of sufferings” found in fair trade activism (Cole 2011; Littler 2009; Lyon 
2006; Newhouse 2011; Varul 2008; West 2012). As aptly pointed out by Varul (2008), although 
fair trade strives to “de-fetishize” market commodity chains by building direct liaisons between 
producers and consumers, it often seems to fall prey to “re-fetishizing” the fixed imageries and 
identities of exotic, victimized producers. As in the above cases, in the process of replacing the 
anonymity of the market with the concrete, vivid representations of producers, fair trade tends to 
rely on and mobilize the familiar colonialist images of “exotic victims” in the global South. It is 
needless to say that such representations of producers presuppose the opposite pole, the fair trade 
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consumers in the North, who enjoy the exotic as a potential “tourist” and assume the role of 
“savior” for the suffering victims. It would thus not be irrelevant to smell out the legacy of 
colonial paternalism in these representations.   
This rather common critique, however, does not pay enough attention to a novel and 
hybrid feature of fair trade as “marketized gift-exchange.”11 That is to say, although it is quite 
legitimate to single out the latent colonial paternalistic desires in fair trade, the faces of producers 
and consumers circulating in the practice cannot be reduced to such traditional elements. As 
noted above, fair trade as a market-based practice, above all, necessitates the new identities and 
relations of producers and consumers as homo œconomicus, and thus the face of “exotic victims” 
only serves as a secondary imagery that is and should be superimposed by the figures of 
“economic subjects” who are engaging in market trades. In other words, because the moral and 
solidary values in fair trade should be primarily rooted on economic practices, what is at issue 
here is more complex: the question is how to represent the producers and consumers as economic 
subjects who are nevertheless responsible for moral obligations and social bonds.  
In order to uncover the complex, multi-layered figures of producers and consumers, it 
seems necessary to pay attention to the “stories” that accompany their images. As seen in the fact 
that many fair trade organizations include “the spread of producer stories” in their codes of 
practice, the stories and narratives of people and products have played pivotal roles in fair trade 
activism (Cole 2011). Not only do they contribute to make fair trade appear to be transactions 
                                                 
11 For example, representing producers only as suffering victims is an exception rather than a rule in fair trade. In 
many cases, the producers are described as “empowered” subjects who challenge the external predicaments. The 
researches that exclusively focus on the colonial elements in fair trade activism (e.g. Cole 2011; Newhouse 2011; 
Varul 2008) are missing the hybrid feature of fair trade as “marketized” gift-exchange. This could lead to neglect 
the new feature of transnational social economy practices such as international corporate social responsibility and 
global microcredit movement that are largely based on the imbrication of morality with market rationality rather 
than unilateral colonialism or paternalism.  
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between “concrete and identifiable individuals” with their own faces and stories;12 more 
importantly, it also provides the very foundation of social bonds and solidarity between them by 
producing and conveying certain moral affects such as pity and sympathy among consumers. 
Addressing consumers as a “responsible” subject could be first and foremost achieved through 
making them “respond” to the stories of producers (Derrida 1995; cf. Hénaff, 2002).  
It is evident that in fair trade activism producer stories are deliberately arranged and 
deployed for such purpose. As noted by Black (2009), the most representative way of appealing 
to sympathetic consumers is to contrast producers’ endeavor with their hardship, because 
sympathy relies on our assessment that the ill-fated individuals are experiencing undeserved 
sufferings even though they have fulfilled their own obligation and responsibility. That is to say, 
the more we may feel the discrepancy between individual responsibility and social difficulties is 
unfair, the more compassionate we become. In this regard, sympathizing with others’ hardship 
often includes unstated normative judgments about what are their duties to fulfill and whose 
suffering is unjust and underserved.13  
The question then will be what is taken as individual duties and what kind of suffering is 
represented as undue in fair trade discourse. In typical stories provided by fair trade 
organizations, producers are primarily represented as aspiring entrepreneurs who have fulfilled 
their obligations as economic agents but still suffer from external social and political conditions. 
What calls for special attention is the fact that, in carving up individual responsibility and 
                                                 
12 The role of story in gift exchange was already pointed out by Mauss. In analyzing Kula trade, Mauss points out 
that the luxuries (vaygu’a) exchanged in the gift ritual have their own names and stories. These stories not only 
distinguish the luxuries from other mundane objects exchanged in economic trade (gimwali) but also give prestige 
and special recognition to the owners (Mauss 1990: 24-6).   
13 As noted by Berlant (2004), sympathy or compassion with others not only implies this normative judgment about 
both subject and object of the affect, but also assumes the “privileged spectator” of suffering who (re-)produces 
the norms.   
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external conditions and then highlighting their undeserved hardship, these stories serve to 
naturalize and depoliticize the producers’ socioeconomic circumstances. For example, the 
“London Fairtrade Guide”—which I had to translate into Korean for the promotion of “London’s 
Fairtrade Olympics” in 2012, while I was working as an unpaid intern in Beautiful Coffee for my 
fieldwork research—provides the following self-narrated producer stories:   
 
<Producer story I: A Palestinian olive farmer, Mahmoud Issa (42)> “The olive means 
everything to us. In the village of Anin I have 15 hectares of olive groves. My father and 
my grandfather farmed on this land, and now my children work alongside me 
harvesting... Anin borders an illegal Israeli settlement area. Some of the farmers used to 
work in a nearby larger village to earn extra income when harvesting ended, but as that 
village now lies within the settlement area they can no longer do this... We are hoping 
that Fairtrade will help re-establish small farmers’ faith in the sustainability of the 
agricultural sector in Palestine. With our Fairtrade premium we would like to buy more 
mobile storage containers to retain quality.” 
 
<Producer story II: An Afghan golden raisin farmer, Ali Ahmed (58)> “There have been 
many generations of my family farming the same land... Our grapes are dried in kishmish 
khanas (mud brick drying houses). These were all destroyed during the Soviet 
occupation. I have remained in Chaharikar throughout war excepting for a week during 
the most intense fighting during the Taliban occupation in 1997... [The U.S.’s] Bombing 
destroyed a lot of the vineyards but many were not damaged at the root and were able to 
grow back. Our community would like to rebuild the kishmish khanas. The future of our 
business depends on our security. We are not that concerned about Taliban but we worry 
our raisins will get stolen at night. I hope that Fairtrade helps boost our economy so that 
there is less crime and we can confidently invest in our future.”14 
 
In these rather stereotypical narratives of fair trade, the political and historical 
circumstances such as the expansion of Jewish settlements in Palestine or Afghanistan’s war-torn 
contemporary history are only represented as external backdrop and adversities that contribute to 
accentuate the entrepreneurial aspiration of the producers who are exclusively interested in the 
                                                 
14 Fairtrade London, London Fairtrade Guide, n.d, pp.10-11. <http://www.hackney.gov.uk/Assets/Documents/ 
London_Fairtrade_Guide_2011.pdf> n.d., (accessed in Dec. 16, 2015). 
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“quality” and “security” of their products. It should be also noted that in these stories the 
solutions for the producers’ difficulties are primarily sought in the promotions of “product 
quality” and “investment” through a fair trade premium.  
The same kind of depoliticized representation is also found in Beautiful Coffee’s 
description of the producers: in their promotional brochures and booklets, the historical and 
political conditions in Nepal, Peru, and Uganda are never directly referred to; they instead focus 
on individual producers’ efforts to sustain and grow their enterprises. To illustrate, the 
organization’s official blog presents a touching story of a Nepali boy named Subhkar who 
struggles alone to manage coffee trees after his father and elder brothers have left for other 
countries (including South Korea) to find jobs.15 The story, however, zooms in on the boy’s 
endeavor and hardship without providing any information as to why his father and brothers had 
to leave the country (not to mention Nepal’s social contradictions such as longstanding political 
turbulence and civil war, imperialist interventions from neighboring countries, and entrenched 
caste disparities).16 By erasing all these socio-economic contexts from the sight, the story titled 
“A boy having a dream of coffee” deploys familiar sentimental tropes of a virtuous, 
entrepreneurial poor struggling against external predicaments. It is thus no wonder that the story 
seems to lead us to a trite moral lesson mentioned in the blog through a neighbor’s words: 
“Although Nepal is a poor country for now, whoever strives will be able to build their own 
                                                 
15 The story is one of the most popular producer stories in Beautiful Coffee. Due to the popularity, the facial picture 
of Subhkar has been used in a package of “the Gift of Himalaya.” See <Figure 12>. The producers’ stories 
including Subhkar’s had also been made as a documentary film and published as a book.  
16 A political philosopher, Wendy Brown sheds light on the two meanings of depoliticization: first, it commonly 
involves a mode of “dispossessing the constitutive histories and powers organizing contemporary problems and 
contemporary political subjects—that is, depoliticization of sources of political problems”; the second meaning 
can be found in “substituting emotional and personal vocabularies for political ones in formulating solutions to 
political problems” (Brown 2008: 16). These two meanings and strategies of depoliticization are deeply connected 
to each other. If we cannot find the cause of a certain problem in its political and historical contexts, the solution 
would be reduced and restricted to individual ethical choices and practices.       
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family, business, and life.” 
On the other side of this struggling entrepreneur, there exists the face of “sympathetic and 
responsible consumer-investors.” If the producers’ hope to overcome external predicaments rests 
on business development via fair trade, it would be ethical, conscientious consumers in the North 
who can make the dream come true. What is interesting is that the aforementioned stories—
highlighting the entrepreneurial development of producers and various efforts to promote fair 
trade consumption—contribute to rendering the relationship between producers and consumers 
in fair trade as a form of investee-investor. For example, as noted above, the information about 
how the fair trade premium is used to “empower” producers and improve the quality of coffee 
are continuously updated on Beautiful Coffee’s homepage, so that consumers can trace the 
individual and entrepreneurial development of producers; enthusiastic regular customers are 
encouraged to visit producers to witness the impact of their purchases. In this way, fair trade 
consumers follow the visible influences of their purchases and build up imaginary “social bonds” 
with producers and their businesses. Their purchases therefore go beyond anonymous economic 
acquisitions and become a sort of “investment” in producers’ human capital and businesses.  
Furthermore, it is argued that participation in fair trade brings meaningful changes into 
the global market economy beyond producers’ individual and entrepreneurial development: in 
fair trade, consumers are represented as cosmopolitan, active agents who feel responsible for 
global poverty and inequality beyond their own narrow interests. “Enlightened Consumer,” a 
Beautiful Coffee educational booklet, describes the emergence of global, ethical consumers as 
follows:  
 
With the proliferation of inexpensive products around the globe, conscious consumers 
have called into question the costs of their over-consumptive lifestyles. People are 
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increasing their awareness of business practices, labor conditions, environmental issues, 
and cultural changes that increase the vulnerability of low-income people. Increasingly, 
consumers in developed nations are applying their buying power to challenge the current 
system and demand supply-chain accountability. Consumers are seeking alternatives that 
offer secure and rewarding lives for less fortunate people.17 
 
That is, consumers are now depicted as what Littler calls a “hybrid subject of activist-consumer” 
who “seeks alternatives” through “their buying power” (2009: 3). Another brochure for youth 
supporters of Beautiful Coffee suggests more concrete virtues of the activist-consumer-investor: 
“Empathy: Be empathetic as a human being with those who are suffering in the other side of the 
earth; Responsibility: Be responsible as a global citizen for building a new solidarity with the 
suffering others; Challenge: Be voluntary and ambitious as a young innovator for fighting 
against global poverty.”18 As seen in these morally-infused virtues, the fair trade consumers 
stand for cosmopolitan, ethical citizens who engage with global issues and pursue human values. 
Whereas the producer is represented as a virtuous entrepreneur who attends only to their 
enterprises and the quality of the products, the consumer is interpellated as an empathetic, 
responsible investor embodying affective and ethical agency. The agency of the consumer-
investor, however, should not be exaggerated, because such agency is limited and restricted to 
the market-based transactions of fair trade, which I will turn to now. 
Above all, the new symmetrical figures of “entrepreneurial producer” and “responsible 
consumer/investor” are sharing depoliticized forms of subjectivity in that they both present 
“individual” activity and participation as a “market agent” as the solution to structural socio-
                                                 
17 Beautiful Coffee, “Enlightened Consumer” [깨어있는 소비자], 2010. This booklet is the translation of “New 
Conscious Consumer: Expanding Economic Justice through Fair Trade” issued by Fair Trade Resource Network. 
The English original file can be accessed at <http://www.fairtraderesource. org/uploads/2007/10/The-New-
Conscious-Consumer.pdf> (accessed in Dec. 16, 2015). 
18 Beautiful Coffee, The Code of Practice for Coffee Commandos [커피특공대 행동규칙], 2011. 
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political problems (Maniates 2002; Newhouse 2011). For example, in a “consciousness raising” 
event for the regular consumers of fair trade chocolate that I attended in April 2014, a staff 
member of Beautiful Coffee enumerated the causes of poverty in West Arica as follows: 
“discrimination, exclusion, insecurity, precarity, and the lack of resources, consciousness, 
institutions, assets, capacities.” These structural problems, however, are soon displaced to the 
matter of “unfair market competition” on the producer’s side: the staff member was quick to 
recapitulate that “because of these problems, in a word, the cacao producers in West Africa are 
not competing in a fair playground.” The solution for the problems would thus be sought in 
making the uneven playground “flat” via fair trade, so that the empowered producers could fairly 
compete.  
On the consumer side, the keys for resolving the aforementioned problems are limited to 
the purchase of fair trade products. In another education program for high school students 
organized by Beautiful Coffee, a staff member described the reality of child slavery in West 
Africa and asked the audience, “What can we do to help them and change this harsh reality?” It 
should not be surprising that a simple answer was immediately presented, despite the complexity 
of an issue in which colonialism, capitalism, and developmentalism are all entangled: “We 
should buy fair trade chocolates instead of others, because fair trade products are made without 
child slavery and give the fair and just price to the producers.” The promotional leaflet that the 
instructor gave to the students even goes further to suggest the four ways of contribution that fair 
trade customers can make: “1. purchase of fair trade products; 2. participation in fair trade 
education; 3. donation to fair trade organization; 4. involvement in the fair trade campaign.”  
What is remarkable here is a gaping chasm between the diagnosis of the problem and the 
prescription for it. The presented solutions seem to doubly depoliticize the global poverty issue: 
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on the one hand, the social and structural causes of poverty are depoliticized as they are simply 
reduced to a problem of unfair competitions and transactions in the market; on the other hand, 
when the sociopolitical elements are erased out, the solutions for poverty are also depoliticized 
as they are sought not in political, structural transformations but in the individualized practices of 
the responsible consumers and entrepreneurial producers.  
Such depoliticizing elements in fair trade discourse and practice seem to reveal the 
internal contradictions of fair trade as “marketized gift-exchange.” That is to say, although 
activism advocates social solidarity between producers in the South and consumers in the North, 
such solidarity is considered to have to be built upon market transactions, and thus the solidary 
activities of the participants are also primarily bound to commercial trades and investments as 
market subjects. For that reason, the faces of producers and consumers circulating in the practice 
seem to be reduced to “entrepreneurial producers” imbued with exotic victimhood and 
“sympathetic investor” or “responsible consumers” with limited agency. Consequently, the 
whole mechanism of such representation seems to stumble into a trap of what Povinelli (2001) 
calls “the cunning of recognition” in her analysis of aboriginal reparations in Australia. As 
aboriginals had to stage and “perform” their already-damaged “nativeness” to gain the 
recognition and reparation from the state, the subjects in fair trade could gain their “face” and 
obtain recognition insofar as they primarily perform their market subjectivities as homo 
œconomicus.19 As a result, fair trade’s market-based activism, despite its valid criticism and 
                                                 
19 Various researches have illuminated how fair trade organizations attempt to discipline and supervise their 
producers through various techniques including certification (Jaffee 2014; Molberg 2010; West 2012). For 
example, in exploring the transformations of coffee agriculture in Papua New Guinea by fair trade NGOs, West 
(2012) strongly criticizes that fair trade NGOs contributes to disseminate market rationality among producers and 
introduce “neoliberal audit culture” in the global South. It is beyond the scope of this paper to question whether 
the criticism is valid and legitimate. In relation to our discussion, it would be enough to point out that we could 
reassure the intimate relation between recognition and discipline in the disciplinary and supervisory activities of 
fair trade organizations.     
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problematization of the current market system, can only stay within the limited solutions such as 
the empowerment of producers and the ethical consumption of customers.   
 
IN PLACE OF CONCLUSION: 
MARKETIZED MORALITY AND DEPOLOTICIZED SOLIDARITY 
 
As is well known, Mauss’ theory of gift is an attempt to explore the grounding principle of 
“society” as a realm distinct from market and state. As Mary Douglas rather plainly puts it in her 
English preface to The Gift, “the cycling gift system is the society” and “the theory of the gift is a 
theory of human solidarity” (1990: ix-x). In the still-controversial conclusion of the book, Mauss 
maintains that contemporary societies are returning to the “group morality” of gift-giving, which 
begins to serve as the foundational principle of then-emerging social welfare states. According to 
Mauss, the institutionalization of social welfare and the resurgences of solidarity organizations 
such as cooperatives, mutual aids, and occupational groups signal the “great progress” that 
“Durkheim has often advocated” (1990: 70). In this sense, Mauss’ theory of gift-exchange can be 
understood as an attempt to locate general principles of social solidarity such as mutuality and 
reciprocity, and thus demarcate the plane of society within the then-emerging social welfare 
state. 
 In tracing how fair trade as marketized gift-exchange creates multi-faceted social bonds 
between producers and consumers, this chapter has elucidated that the faces of fair trade 
participants have three distinct layers. If the first layer is the pair of “exotic victim” and “tourist 
savior” that is characterized by traditional aid and its paternalistic dependency, the second layer 
consists of the mutual recognition of homo œconomicus as an anonymous partner of market 
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trade. Finally, the third layer includes the faces of aspirational entrepreneurs and responsible 
consumer-investors that are formed by a returned social and moral bond that are rooted upon the 
market. As the slogan “Let them taste a fish” (discussed in Prologue) indicates a new 
developmental paradigm that diverges from both conventional aid-economy and industrial 
developmentalism, the multi-layered social bonds created by marketized gift-exchange are also 
distinguished from both the interdependent sociality of gift-giving and anonymous transactions 
in the market. What we are witnessing in fair trade and ethical consumption is the emergence of 
the hybrid “social bond” that cannot be reduced simply to either economic/financial liaisons or 
social associations.20 It would be interesting, then, to ask what characterizes the social bond or 
solidarity between producers and consumers in fair trade activism and how the newly emerging 
sociality is differentiated from the Maussian notion of solidarity based on gift-exchange.   
To address these questions, it might be useful to briefly consider a genealogical analysis 
of the notion of “social solidarity.” As Michel Foucault points out in examining the emergence of 
liberal government in the 18th century, the modern notion of “society” first emerged as a new 
domain for solving an inherent conundrum in liberal government: “the art of government must be 
exercised in a space of sovereignty... but the trouble, misfortune, or problem is that the space 
turns out to be inhabited by economic subjects” (2010: 294). According to Foucault, the newly 
emerging liberal subject, homo œconomicus, is based on different logics from the traditional 
model of sovereignty and its subject, homo juridicus: if sovereignty originates in a totalizing 
                                                 
20 I appreciate Elizabeth Povinelli and Rosalind Morris for pointing out this ambivalence of the term of “social 
bond” and helping to develop my thoughts. In this sense, the newly emerging sociality is characterized by the 
indistinguishableness or indeterminacy between social affiliation and financial liaison (see also the discussion of 
the emerging notion of community in Chapter 2). Such a transformation seems to undermine the potential and 
perspective of various political projects that are based upon a sort of “logocentrist” and dualist approach that 
distinguishes immanent social bonds and its alienated or parasitic financialized form, finding an alternative in the 
former (e.g. Graeber 2011; Hardt and Negri 2011).   
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unity of legal-political right, economic subjects are assumed to embody non-totalizable and 
irreducible multiplicities of interests; if sovereignty relies on the closed boundaries of the state, 
economic rationality surpasses the boundaries to create a global economic bond. A new 
governmental plane of “civil society”—which, Foucault adds, will be quickly called “society, the 
social, and nation”—emerges for mediating the irreconcilable heterogeneity and split between 
the subject of right and the subject of interest (2010: 296). That is to say, society is demarcated 
as an intermediary space in which to integrate multiple interests and build moral bonds among 
individuals via the paradoxical principle of what Adam Ferguson called “disinterested interest” 
and the modernized form of pastoral power based on “omnes et sigulatim (all and each)” 
(Foucault 2010; Procacci 1987). In this way, society would serve to bridge and reconcile two 
different principles—i.e. the multiplicities of interest (market) and the unity of right (state), in 
which individual pursuits of self-interests are translated into the general, national good. 
According to Jacques Donzelot (1994) and Bruno Karsenti (1994), Mauss’ “theory of gift” and 
Durhkeim’s “social solidarism” can be grasped as “strategic inventions” to provide a formula of 
stable moral and affective associations in-between the state and modern market and institute the 
organizational social solidarity on a national level.21  
In this respect, what apparently distinguishes social solidarity sought in fair trade from 
the traditional one is that the new “imagined community” exceeds the boundaries of a nation. As 
noted by Gupta (1998), the hyphenated structure of nation-state is now being recomposed, as 
new national and fraternal bonds, which have served as the space for solidarity, recognition, and 
                                                 
21 Karsenti argues that Durkheim and Mauss, despite shared scholarly and political purposes, take different 
approaches to “social facts.” While Durkheim views social facts as objective and independent entities by 
emphasizing an absolute separation between individual and collective representation, Mauss develops a more 
complicated framework regarding freedom and obligation in a society. According to Karsenti, Mauss presents the 
relation between individual and collective representations as one of “translation” that is open to ambiguity and 
interpretation rather than following Durkheim’s social determinism (Karsenti 1994).  
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gift in the modern state, begin to form beyond the boundaries of the states. The direct, intimate 
associations that fair trade and ethical consumerism pursue between producers in the South and 
consumers in the North exemplify the tendency toward such transnational, cosmopolitan 
solidarities, along with other moral economic practices such as international volunteerism, 
transnational corporate social responsibility, and the global microcredit movement.  
The more significant and fundamental difference of the new solidarity, however, should 
rather be found in the fact that the traditional trichotomy of state-society-market surrounding 
social solidarity is now replaced with the dichotomy of market and society. That is to say, the 
cosmopolitan solidarity that fair trade imagines builds upon the foreclosure of the matters of 
political right and subject, and instead it works exclusively along the axis of market-society. 
What reveals such foreclosure in the most symptomatic way is perhaps the slogan of “Vote with 
your dollar!” that is commonly chanted in the practices of fair trade, ethical consumption, and 
global microcredit movements. The popular slogan betrays that the exercise of political right is 
now substituted by economic practices, and that a short circuit, in which the construction of 
social bonds is directly grafted onto economic practices, becomes successfully established.22 In 
an interview with Beautiful Coffee’s vice president who has maintained that fair trade is part of 
the human rights movement, I asked him to elaborate how he defined human rights; he answered, 
“I think that the fundamental human right is the right to live without the fear of poverty and 
maintain a sustainable, good life.” No matter whether we agree with his definition, this notion of 
human rights seems to illustrate that the concept of right in the new imagined community can be 
                                                 
22 For example, World Fair Trade Organization (WFTO) and Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International (FLO) 
include “Fair trade as a social contract” in their charter of fair trade principles. They explain the principle that 
“Fair Trade transactions exist within an implicit “social contract” in which buyers (including final consumers) 
agree to do more than is expected by the conventional market, such as paying fair prices, providing pre-finance 
and offering support for capacity building.” FLO and WFTO, A Charter of Fair Trade Principles, 2009, p. 5.  
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conceived without going through the political dimension, which would be impossible in the 
traditional political right such as sovereignty within nation-state.  
Finally, in this new social imaginary, “the social” seems to be imagined less as an 
autonomous and objective structure than as a set of affective, moral, and immanent networks that 
should be voluntarily constructed and sustained by ethical individuals. When Émile Durkheim 
argues that social facts should be treated to be an objective reality and society as a whole is 
bigger than the sum of its parts, he supposes society as a homogenous, transcendental, and 
universal plane that exists independently from subjective wills and individual representations. As 
Poovey aptly points out, such a Durkheimian assumption of underlying orders and structures lies 
“at the heart of the modern social imaginary” (2012: 141). Furthermore, paradoxically, the very 
assumption that society consists of an objectified set of invisible orders has enabled the modern 
social plane—that is also called nation or civil society, as noted by Foucault—to serve as a target 
of political intervention and state involvement, whether such interventions are for a radical 
transformation or gradual reforms of the abstract structure (Laclau and Mouffe 2001; Therborn 
1985).23 The modern social imaginary, however, seems to be gradually superseded by a new 
imaginary based on an a posteriori set of direct, affective, and intimate—but simultaneously 
instable and fragmented—networks between socialized individuals (Boltanski and Chiapello 
2005; Davies 2014; Muehlebach, 2012; Terranova 2016;).24 Likewise, what characterizes the 
                                                 
23 Charles Taylor posits the paradox as the “bifocal” character of the modern social imaginary (2003: 77). That is to 
say, on the one hand, a modern society is imagined as the public sphere that can be transformed by “self-ruling 
people” or “collective agencies” but simultaneously, it is also presented as following objectified laws and having 
abstract orders like other processes in nature (2003: 75-77). According to Taylor, this paradoxical understanding of 
society characterizes “modern social imaginary” that is distinct from the traditional social imaginary based on a 
static, cosmological hierarchy. See also Elliot and Turner (2012).   
24 The examples that signal the transforming social imaginary are found in various fields beyond the social economy 
sector. To name a few: the decline of the hegemony of statistical knowledge (Davies 2015a), the rise of social 
network theory and big data in social science (Freeman, 2004), and the plethora of social network platform 
services (including ‘Facebook’). To trace the widespread symptomatic examples is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation that focuses on the new social imaginary in the social economy. The return of Gabriel Tarde in 
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social solidarity found in social economy activism, as well as fair trade, is not so much an 
imagined identification with the whole anonymous group of population or nation as connected 
communities in which you share affect and intimacy with “people whose ‘faces’ you know.” As 
the paradox of the modern social imaginary is dismantled, the politics that target the universal, 
national plane of society also come out of purview and are simply equated with the building of 
social bonds through market transaction (again, as in the slogan of “Vote with your dollars!”).  
The aforementioned depoliticizing effects that fair trade has produced are not unrelated to 
this condition that the new form of solidarity has faced. Simply put, the problematic of social 
solidarity now seems to oscillate between the bleak axis of market and society with the 
foreclosure of politics. It is in this impoverished imagination that the meanings and implications 
of “face” in fair trade and social economy become evident. The metaphor of face undoubtedly 
shows that such practices seek to build mutual recognition and social bond through gift-
exchange; nevertheless, it also seems to divulge that, as seen in the phrase of “market 
economy/capitalism with a human face,” the creation of social solidarity works only at the 
surface that is still deeply rooted and embedded onto the deeper structures of market economy 
                                                 
contemporary social theory, however, seems to be worth of noting. As the main rival of Durkheim, Tarde’s social 
theory has received little attention for a long time. Recently, however, his main arguments—that a society is open 
networks or associations that should be built through inventions—and his project of “psychological economy”—
that examines the working of non-rational, affective elements such as passion in economic system—starts to 
attract more and more attention of scholars (e.g., Candea 2010; Latour 2002; Latour and Lépinay 2009; Lazzarato 
2014). Bruno Latour and Vincent Lépinay even asks:  
“How different the history of the 20th century would have been had the bible of men of action been Gabriel 
Tarde’s Psychologie Économique, published in 1902, instead of Marx’s work!” (Latour and Lépinay 2009: 1) 
We can see clear consonance between Tarde’s arguments and the new subjectivity and sociality in the neosocial 
government. Let me note here that Gabriel Tarde is one of the first scholars who used the expression of “human 
capital” (Latour and Lépinay 2009: 49-56).   
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and capitalism.25 The gaping chasm that we have already observed between the diagnosis of 
social problems and the prescription may be caused by the contradictory attempt to redefine the 
whole economic structure only by engaging with the surface or face without political and radical 
challenges to it. Conversely speaking, the attempts to seek social solidarity and transformation in 
the lack of universal political right and subject would privilege face as a remedial locus, which 
nevertheless, as we have already seen, only serves as the point of juncture of humanist discourse 
based on gift-exchange and the increasing imposition of market rationality are met and mutually 
intertwined.   
In conclusion, in order to escape from the closed circuit of society and market, we need to 
think beyond the conventional critique of market which is based on the water-downed Maussian 
and Polanyian dichotomies—market versus society, utilitarianism versus solidarism, homo 
œconomicus versus homo socialis. As shown by various works on ethical capitalism and the new 
form of solidarity, such blunt oppositions have not only been practically superseded by the 
practices of moralizing market and marketizing morality, but also have been mobilized to 
disseminate and justify the depoliticized neoliberal rationality rather than to serve as a critique of 
it (Collier 2011; Muehlebach 2009, 2012; Rajak 2011; Vogelmann 2012; Davies 2012, 2015b). 
By exploring the new ethicality and sociality found in fair trade in the heuristic terms of “the 
moral economy of face,” this chapter has illuminated and problematized the depoliticized 
articulation of the moral aspiration with market rationality. What I want to point out here is not 
simply that the moral economic practices have produced depoliticizing effects; my point is rather 
to show that such moral practices and their dream of new solidarities, which often appear to be 
                                                 
25 In this sense, the practices of social economy and ethical capitalism, pace their Polanyian language, seem to 
produce a “market-embedded society” not a “socially-embedded market.” For Polanyian perspectives in the moral 
economic practices, see Browne and Milgram (2009), Hann and Hart (2011). 
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out of innocent non-political goodwill, are always-already haunted by recognition struggle and 
disciplinary intention.26 In other words, the construction of social solidarity cannot be conceived 
without the symbolic, political struggles for and beyond recognition. What we need, therefore, 
would be a sort of double deconstruction: on the one hand, we should deconstruct the narrow 
binary of the social/the moral and market to politically problematize the whole structure of 
contemporary capitalism; on the other hand, we should also deconstruct the nonpolitical, moral 
solidarity by revealing that gift-exchange and recognition are always saturated with the matter of 
power. It would only be through the elaborated framework via the deconstructions that we could 
fully grasp and go beyond the underlying contradictions inherent to the practices of “marketized 
gift-exchange” and its new form of solidarity, which are emerging as the new “face” of 
millennium capitalism.  
  
                                                 
26 In fact, this is a position that was already adumbrated by Mauss himself when he pointed out the ambivalence of 
“gift” as a present and simultaneously a poison. That is to say, the benevolence of gift always includes a potential 






INNOVATION, CARE, GIFT, AND GARY BECKER 
 
 
“The sphere of circulation or commodity exchange, within whose boundaries the sale and 
purchase of labour-power goes on, is in fact a very Eden of the innate rights of man. It is 
the exclusive realm of Freedom, Equality, Property, and Bentham. Freedom, because 
both buyer and seller of a commodity, let us say of labour power, are determined only by 
their own free will… Equality, because each enters into relation with the other, as with a 
simple owner of commodities, and they exchange equivalent for equivalent. Property, 
because each disposes only of what is his own. And Bentham, because each looks only to 
his own advantage. The only force bringing them together, and putting them into relation 
with each other, is the selfishness, the gain and the private interest of each.” – Karl Marx 
(1976: 280).  
 
In analyzing the capitalist labor market as the “surface” that conceals “the hidden abode of 
production” or “the secret of profit-making,” Marx suggests the well-known association 
“Freedom, Equality, Property, and Bentham” as the principles that rule the ideological realm 
(Marx 1976: 278-80). It is important to understand that here Marx is not simply dismissing 
modern liberal values such as freedom, equality, and property.27 What this seemingly awkward 
association indicates is rather a sort of proto-logic of “signification” or more exactly, what I call 
the logic of translation. That is to say, the meanings and values of the universal, abstract ideas—
freedom, equality, property—are not given and pre-determined; they can and should be 
determined in retrospect, only when the last element, “Bentham,” is added. “Bentham” here 
signifies a human condition that provides a matrix upon which the actual values of the universal 
                                                 
27 I appreciate Seo Dong-Jin for reminding me of this phrase and its interpretation in a personal conversation. See 
also Seo (2015: 114).  
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ideas are translated and allocated. To borrow a Lacanian term, the Benthamite idea of utilitarian 
homo œconomicus serves as a “punctuation” or an ideological “point-de-capiton” that “brings 
them together” and quilts the drifting meanings of the abstract values (Lacan 2007; cf. 
Stavrakakis 1999). As discussed in the Introduction, when Étienne Balibar argues that “the 
dominant ideology in a given society is a specific universalization of the imaginary of the 
dominated” (1992: 12-13), his point seems to be consonant with Marx’s. The utopian ideals—
which include the imaginary and dream of the dominated—are “translated” in a certain context, 
conjuncture, and perspective in order to serve as the “dominant ideology.”   
The question that I have attempted to engage in this dissertation can be encapsulated as 
follows: how can we evaluate and establish the values such as “innovation,” “care,” and “gift-
giving”—which are advanced by the contemporary project of “ethical capitalism”—in 
connection to the neoliberal human condition? In other words, what if the specific implications 
of these universal, ideal values can be considered only in relation to the new figure of homo 
œconomicus, human capital—which is represented, albeit insufficiently and non-exclusively, by 
the name of Gary Becker? How can we understand the actual value of these ideas in the new 
matrix, i.e., the new human condition? This dissertation is an attempt to follow such a 
transformation in the ideology of contemporary capitalism by critically examining the emerging 
social economy sector in South Korea.  
The purpose of this discussion is not limited to determining whether the social economy, 
social entrepreneurship, and their representative values are elements of neoliberal ideology. Nor 
is it to argue that the emerging discourses of “the social,” “moral economy,” and “ethical 
capitalism” are simply a “new ideological cover” that manipulatively screens the deeper 
contradictions of capitalism. If I sound somewhat cynical at various points in this work, the 
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laugh is not directed at enthusiastic social economy activists and participants. In fact, it is rather 
easy to ridicule “moral homo œconomicus” who dresses up his or her business with a moral 
cloth, reflecting Žižek’s sardonic comment that “now we can have the global capitalist cake, i.e., 
thrive as profitable entrepreneurs, and eat it, too, i.e., endorse the anti-capitalist causes of social 
responsibility and ecological concern” (2008: 16). Instead, what I found during my fieldwork 
research is that something “utopian” exists in people’s desires, aspirations, and endeavors that 
are invested in the social economy and ethical capitalism (Wright 2010). In the social economy 
sector, one can find a social welfare beneficiary who establishes an elderly care cooperative to 
improve the working condition of care workers; a young idealist who quitted a prestigious job 
and is struggling to launch a social start-up to address the issue of wealth inequality; and people 
who willingly commit to affective labor or ethical consumption to help and empower the 
underprivileged in their own communities and developing countries. Where my laugh is directed 
is rather an ironic space in which the social, democratic, and utopian aspirations for building 
social bonds and taking care of social problems with their own hands are met and intermingled 
with governmental exigencies to prescribe moral solutions to the ongoing crisis of capitalist 
development and reproduction. What I have tried to illuminate throughout this thesis is how the 
desires are translated and contained through the working of various dispositifs—in other words, 
how the dispositifs contribute to a “specific universalization” of the utopian dreams of the 
dominated.  
In summary, this dissertation has focused on a new social imaginary, knowledge form, 
subjectivity, and ethicality that have emerged in the social economy as a result of the imbrication 
of moral aspirations with the neoliberal human condition. First of all, I have argued that the 
neoliberal human condition presupposes a new form of homo œconomicus, human capital, who is 
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expected to manage all the aspects of life within a single value frame, acting as a “portfolio 
manager.” The new subjectivity thus incorporates non-economic factors—including social logics 
and moral orientations—as assets to appreciate his or her overall investability. As a result, the 
responsibilities for the social or the construction of social bonds are subjectified and transferred 
onto human capitals who are required to view and manage social and moral values and economic 
utility as mutually translatable forms. Furthermore, I have explored how the governmental 
programs that mobilize citizens to build social bonds have changed the natures and forms of 
community, care, labor, and ethical practices that serve as new potential foundations of sociality. 
In examining the various fields of community development (chapter 2), the social care market 
(chapter 3), the social innovation youth activist program (chapter 4), and fair trade consumption 
(chapter 5), this dissertation has explored how community, care, labor, and ethical practices have 
been intermingled and articulated with a new form of economic rationality that can be called 
financial or human capital logic. The notions such as “enterprization of community,” “projective 
ethicality,” “affective labor (hwaldong),” and “marketized gift-exchange” were discussed to flesh 
out and illuminate the transformation and articulation more clearly. In doing so, I have attempted 
to show how the financial logic of neoliberal human capital has conditioned and shaped the new 
sociality and ethicality: For example, affective social bonds are recast as business resources, 
caring practices turn into investable projects, and affective labor and ethical consumption 
contribute to the economization and individualization of social solidarity. Finally, I have 
conceptualized the dynamics of the new subjectivity, ethicality, and social imaginary in terms of 
“neosocial government” in which the crisis and dead-end of the neoliberal human capital regime 
are managed and addressed through social associations based on care, affective labor, and spirit 
of gift. In exploring how the new form of government emerges in the South Korea’s social 
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economy sector, this dissertation has sought not only to illuminate the depoliticizing effects of 
the new form of governing rationality but also reveal its political contradictions and 
predicaments.  
 
IN SEARCH OF SOCIETY 
 
“If one is going to talk about crises at all, would it not be more apt to speak of a crisis of 
politics, rather than a crisis of the social?” (Donzelot, 1991: 178) 
 
The analyses of this dissertation eventually illuminate the political predicaments that anti-
neoliberal social movements in South Korea are currently facing. As civil society movements 
have changed their roles from being the forefront of anti-dictatorship struggles, through the 
watchtower onto the market, to being an equal partner in governance with the government, the 
political imagination of South Korean social activism has not only lost its critical capacity but 
also has been gradually subsumed into various governing programs as a quasi-state apparatus. 
Despite the radical rhetoric and rosy vision found in the social economy or social 
entrepreneurship trainings, the opposition in these bodies to neoliberal marketization, as seen so 
far, has safely remained within the remit of the moral problematization of the market economy 
and thus have led to active participation in governance that aims to offset and correct the 
inhuman effects of the market. In so doing, their anti-neoliberal agenda has been often 
appropriated by the state to reproduce and reinforce the neoliberal hegemony. 
In fact, the involvement of the anti-neoliberal critique with neoliberal hegemony, either 
advertently or inadvertently, is neither unique to South Korea nor an exclusive issue for social 
activism (cf. Paley 2001; Sinha, 2005; Zhan, 2017). In analyzing the current lethargy of critical 
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theory against neoliberalism, Nancy Fraser (2011) points out the general “crisis of critique”: 
although the neoliberal system has undergone a multi-layered crisis over the last decade, the 
critique of neoliberalism is still struggling with “clarifying the nature and roots of crisis as well 
as the prospects for an emancipatory resolution” (138). In fact, various diagnoses have been 
presented regarding the impotence of the critique of neoliberalism: while some locate the cause 
in the prevalent epistemological misunderstanding of neoliberalism that simply equates it with 
market fundamentalism (e.g., Amable 2011; Dardot and Laval 2013; Peck 2010), others 
illuminate more fundamental transformations in the language and grammar of the criticism of 
capitalism in light of “aesthetic critique” (Boltanski and Chiapello 2005), “moralization of 
critique” (Brown 2001), or “the vanishing of negativity” (Badiou 2001; Davies 2015a; Han 
2015). What should be pointed out in relation to our discussion is that these diagnoses share the 
vanishing of universal, objective “society” as their common background. As Poovey (1995, 
2002) aptly points out, modern politics has presupposed a sort of meta-position through which to 
intervene onto the “objective” and “structural” order of a society, either to partially reform or 
radically transform it (cf. Taylor 2003). As the objective and universal nature of society has been 
gradually denied, however, the meta-position to institute and transform the social order has also 
been threatened (Marchart 2007). In a new social imaginary consisting of voluntary social bonds 
and intimate networks, what fills the lacunae of the structural analysis and political critique are 
rather moral or aesthetical discourses that reduce historical and political problems into the issues 
of individual ethics and existence. The decline of the universal and structural social has been thus 
deeply entangled with the crisis of anti-neoliberal politics and critique. 
In this sense, it would not be surprising that the pursuit of “the social” in the social 
economy has only produced dubious political effects, at best. As seen so far, social economy 
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activists’ efforts to construct “the social” are justified and supported by Maussian or Polanyian 
language as part of gift-economy or society’s “self-defense” in opposition to neoliberal 
marketization. Such attempts, however, often appear to end up depoliticizing the social issue and 
deepening the crisis of anti-neoliberal critique. For example, during my fieldwork research 
period, the Seoul Social Economy Center and the Seoul Metropolitan Government have actively 
promoted “social housing” projects as an alternative to the precarious housing conditions and the 
saturated real estate market.28 The main purpose of the policy is to provide housing units with 
small private rooms and shared living space for impoverished youth who cannot afford the high 
rents in Seoul. The social housing residents are required to build a “community” in the unit and 
expected to become active and participatory in local community regeneration projects. Lee Joo-
Won, who was introduced as the vice-president of the Youth School in the Prologue, is also a 
pioneering social housing activist and the CEO of a social enterprise “Toad Housing.” One of his 
main businesses is to renovate empty houses with the government’s financial support and rent 
them to youth at a 20% lower price than the average price in the neighborhood. A government 
policy report introduces Toad Housing’s social housing project as an “innovative” way to address 
housing and youth poverty issues. Given the explanation, it appears that everyone will benefit 
from the project: the homeowner who has abandoned the empty house can renovate it without 
financial burden and earn additional income; youth can get a stable residence with an affordable 
rent; and the government can solve the youth housing issue and prevent “urban crime” 
potentially caused by empty houses. Finally, “social” housing projects are expected to contribute 
                                                 
28 For the social precarity of housing among South Korean youth, see Jung (2017). 
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to “reinvigorating the residential communities around the empty houses” and “boosting the 
sharing economy” in Seoul.29  
What is interesting in this situation is that the monopolized ownership of land and house 
properties—that has often been cited as a main factor in the current saturated real estate 
market—is completely out of purview and instead the issue is represented as manageable and 
solvable by individuals’ sharing practices. This is not saying that this program is meaningless or 
neoliberal because it does not touch the underlying structure. This is simply pointing out that the 
program shows how much the adjective “social” in the social economy is depoliticized and how 
bleak its political imaginations are. The political bareness would be strikingly revealed if we 
compare the program with Polanyi’s own prescription on the “fictitious commodities” such as 
land, labor, and money, which locates the solution in their de-commodification or socialization 
(Polanyi, 2011). In this sense, the “social” housing project seems to be an example of what 
William Davies (2015a) calls “neoliberal socialism” or what I call “neosocial government” in 
which the social problems are addressed by appealing to the values such as community, caring, 
and sharing and people’s moral commitments while being cautious not to interfere with the 
underlying structures—in this case, property ownership. As Edward Said (1983) conceptualized 
“traveling theory” in tracing how Lukács’ revolutionary concept of “reification” became reduced, 
codified, and instituted as a tepid literary theory as it went through different conjectures, the 
Maussian and Polanyian ideas are traveling and circulating in South Korea’s cramped “social” 
space where political imagination is foreclosed and the link between social solidarity and politics 
is broken.    
                                                 
29 The Seoul Social Economy Center and the Seoul Metropolitan Government, “The Economic and Social Impacts 
of Seoul’s Sharing House Policy,” 2016. 
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To be sure, it might be misleading to say that the pursuit of society “heads off” the 
political challenge, or to describe society and politics as having a trade-off relationship. As James 
Ferguson argues, it is true that “a wide range of new social programs have been sites of political 
contestation and provided the grounds for new forms of mobilization” (2015: 207). It should be 
pointed out, however, that the politics in the field has a new feature that continually displaces the 
meta-intervention of politics with the ongoing pursuit of the social. In other words, politics is 
now equated with the construction of the social rather than with the transformation of social 
structure. The paradoxical coexistence of hope and despair in the social economy, as we have 
already discussed in Chapter 4, might be symptomatic of this transformation of the political. On 
the one hand, society—which is not regarded as an objective reality—can be easily transformed 
by individual innovative, caring, and sharing practices; on the other hand, although or because it 
lacks objective structures, the fundamental transformation of society has become unimaginable 
and impossible. The plethora of hope can be co-existent with the prevalent feelings of despair.  
These analyses do not necessarily lead to a pessimistic conclusion, however. What I want 
to elucidate is a simple fact: criticizing and problematizing neoliberalism based on the liberal 
human condition and social imaginary will always miss the target. As repeatedly pointed out 
throughout the dissertation, the neoliberal condition and the new economic rationality require us 
to re-think the criticality of anti-neoliberalism that has relied on a series of conventional binaries 
between social logics and market rationality, the private and the public, and care and labor. In 
order to challenge the “Janus-faced” neoliberalism and pursue a new possibility for politics, 
therefore, we need to first understand the new forms of subjectivity, ethicality, and sociality that 
have cropped up in the transformed, neoliberalized conditions. The ultimate goal of this 
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dissertation lies in examining the novel, hybrid fields and emphasizing the necessity of further 
explorations to envisage a new politics as well as an advanced critique of neoliberalism.  
 
TOWARDS NEW COMBINATIONS OF DISPOSITIFS 
 
I conclude this dissertation by ironically suggesting that the clue for the new critique of 
neoliberalism could be found in the characteristic practice of “innovators,” i.e., seeking a “new 
combination” of the existing elements. If, as Ong (2006) argues, neoliberalism should be 
understood as “mobile assemblage” that involves the articulation, de-articulation, and re-
articulation of “existing radical, alternative, and contestatory discourses and technologies” for its 
purposes, the alternative to neoliberal assemblage should be found in the re-articulation of its 
dispositifs toward a new direction. For example, we should ask and explore how the spirit of gift 
in ethical capitalism discourses can be used to radicalize fiscal issues and debt refusal (Lazzarato 
2012, 2015; Ross 2013), how the ethics of care and affective labor can serve as a foundation for 
a new polity instead of being mobilized to ameliorate the crisis of the human capital regime 
(Federici, 2012; Hardt and Negri, 2011; Weeks 2011), and how the aspirations of communities 
can formulate a new notion of ownership and “communal property” (Coombe 2011). That is to 
say, what is at stake here is how to re-translate the “utopian” aspirations for different, divergent 
political purposes.  
In this sense, cacophonies found in the translation works of the existing dispositifs should 
get more attention. A translation always leaves “the untranslatable” as remnant (Balibar 2012). 
Aspirations for communal lives, for example, cannot be completely translated into the desires for 
social capital or social networks. It is in the remnant of the untranslatable that the gap between 
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the potential and the actual is revealed. According to Agamben, the duty of “the contemporary” 
or an “archaeologist of the present” is to excavate the potential that is buried under the actual: 
“the contemporary”— in my opinion, understood as another name for “anthropologist”—should 
find the potential by “returning to a present where we have never been” (2009: 51-52). Although 
Agamben does not suggest any new dispositifs for re-translating or actualizing the potential,30 it 
could be said that what we need is a new arrangement of dispositifs for re-activating politics and 
political subjectivization beyond the existing translation and actualization.  
This is not to say simply that we need to “re-write” or re-imagine the dynamic of 
contemporary capitalism. In criticizing the totalizing representation of the economy and 
capitalism, Gibson-Graham (2006) suggests a new politics of re-presentation of the economy as 
an open field that consists of heterogeneous tendencies and practices (253). According to them, 
the “capitalocentric representation” has made it so difficult for people to think about the existing 
anti-capitalist elements in the current capitalist system that a new discursive strategy is necessary 
to enable to “empty, fragment, decenter and open the economy, liberating discourses of economy 
and society from capitalism’s embrace” (45).31 The problems with this rather idealistic and 
pseudo-deconstructionist argument, however, lie not simply in that the heterogeneous non-
capitalist elements are not easily separable and distinguishable from the articulated totality of 
capitalist (re)production, but also that representing and organizing the economy as diverse, 
heterogeneous fields has long served as part of the governing language and strategy.32 As we 
have seen so far, the neoliberal condition—which places social logics and economic rationality 
                                                 
30 According to Bernard Stiegler (2010), this lack of internal re-appropriation of dispositifs marks a major limitation 
of Agamben’s politics. For Agamben, dispositifs are discussed as a set that should be either wholly embraced or 
entirely abandoned (Stiegler 2010: 162-165). 
31 Their position leads to an analysis of “non-capitalist elements” in the system including community economies and 
ethical consumption. See Gibson-Graham (2013). 
32 See also the footnote 20 in chapter 5.  
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onto the same plane as mutually translatable forms—continues to produce hybrid spaces where 
capitalist elements cannot be distinguished from what Gibson-Graham hastily called “non-
capitalist” elements. What is most important, then, is not so much “re-writing” or de-centering 
the capitalocentric narrative about the economy as inventing a universal foundation of politics 
and “re-arranging” the dispositifs to restore a broken link between society and politics. 
 
INNOVATION, CARE, GIFT, AND…X? 
 
Let us return to Marx’s epigraph. Although Marx emphasizes that the “truth” of capitalist 
production lies in the “hidden abode,” it does not necessarily mean that the sphere of circulation 
and its values function as a simple screen or ideological hoax. It should be understood, rather, as 
indicating that the universal, abstract values are open to new translations and articulations and 
thus their definitions become the objects of ideological and hegemonic struggles. Such re-
translation is, in fact, exactly what Marx attempts throughout his work: in the realm of capitalist 
production, he discovers and analyzes “labor power”—the “peculiar commodity” that internally 
escapes from and disrupts the rule of equal, free exchange and the principle of reciprocity—and 
thereby reveals the class partiality of the universal and ideal values. It might not be an 
exaggeration, therefore, to say that modern socialist and communist politics was born when 
“labor” took the place of “Bentham,” i.e., when universal labor was declared as “a new human 
condition” (Castel 1996, 2003). As the values of freedom, equality, and property were 
problematized and redefined in the perspective of labor and the “right to labor” (le droit au 
travail), the notions of social property, social citizenship, and universal solidarity have emerged 
as objects of collective, hegemonic struggles (Balibar 2004; Castel 2003; Procacci 1987). The 
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formation of what Balibar (1990) calls the “national-social state” and “social government”—in 
which the antagonism between capital and labor is registered and managed on the national-social 
plane—was a historical by-product of the struggles.33  
Perhaps, what we are missing today, then, is a new conceptualization of the human 
condition that we can put in lieu of Gary Becker. How can we newly define the universal human 
condition in a way that would problematize and redefine abstract values such as innovation, 
caring, and gift, and thereby introduce space for critique, politics, negativity, and antagonism? In 
fact, potential candidates have been actively presented including biopolitical humanitarianism 
(e.g., Fassin 2007; Feldman and Ticktin 2010); precarity or vulnerability (Barchiesi 2011; Butler 
2006; Gilson 2016; Ross 2010; Standing 2011); the common (Hardt and Negri 2011) and so on. 
Although this dissertation has shown that some of potential candidates—community, care, 
affective labor, and gift-exchange—remain within the threshold of depoliticized and ethical 
sociality, their potentialities should continue to be experimented and thoroughly examined. Can 
these alternatives not only provide “the source of social utility” and a “legitimate ground for 
social recognition” but also succeed in generating a universal vision of politics (Castel, 1996: 
620)? Can they open up a new condition of possibility for politics by re-translating and re-
appropriating emerging ideological values such as innovation, community, care, and gift, as 
wage labor once did? Can they provide a conceptual and practical foundation upon which the 
dispositifs are rearranged? Those questions cannot be answered immediately. What is for sure, 
however, is that addressing these questions will be the challenge for anyone who wants to go 
                                                 
33 In this sense, the “developmental” government can be understood as relying on the governing rationality that 
adjusts the liberal universal values in terms of the collective or the nation but still denies the “right” to/of labor. 
Instead of enfranchising social rights, the developmental state sought to directly align individual interests with 
national prosperity by continuing to promote rapid economic growth.   
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beyond social and moral correctives to the crisis of contemporary capitalism and engage with its 
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